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IMPLEMENTING SOCIAL PROTECTION IN COMPETITIVE CLIENTELIST POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS: 
A CASE STUDY OF THE LIVELIHOOD EMPOWERMENT AGAINST POVERTY (LEAP) 
PROGRAMME IN GHANA 
SUMMARY 
Since the early 2000s, transnational actors promoted cash transfer schemes as solutions to 
extreme poverty in the global south. In the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) region, three transnational 
actors, the World Bank, DFID1 and UNICEF were instrumental in persuading governments to 
adopt and implement cash transfer programmes. Research on the politics of social protection 
policy has to date focused primarily on the promotion and adoption of cash transfers in southern 
and eastern African countries with dominant-type political settlements. However, not much 
attention has been given to why and how cash transfers have been adopted and implemented 
in western African countries with competitive clientelist political settlements. This thesis 
addresses this knowledge gap, using the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) 
programme in Ghana as a case study. 
Employing a qualitative case study design, the study examines the influence of domestic and 
transnational politics on the implementation of the LEAP programme. Specifically, three 
research questions guide this study. First, how have the ideas and interests of transnational 
actors influenced the implementation of Ghana’s LEAP programme? Second, how do local 
government actors and institutions in Ghana’s competitive political setting impact on the 
implementation and expansion of LEAP? Third, how does Ghana’s competitive democratic 
politics drive implementation and expansion strategies of LEAP? 
Using Lavers and Hickey’s Adapted Political Settlements framework, the study finds that the 
programmatic ideas and organisational interests of the WB, DFID and UNICEF were instrumental 
in the design and strategy for implementing Ghana’s LEAP. However, the political interests of 
domestic elites exerted as much influence especially in how the programme expanded, often in 
unintended ways. The interests of political elites were instrumental in determining which 
districts the LEAP expanded to and who was targeted.  
The study makes three contributions to the literature on political settlements and its 
intersection with social protection. First, an empirical contribution documenting how 
transnational and domestic politics shape the implementation of social protection in the context 
of competitive clientelist political settlements. Second, a theoretical contribution, in identifying 
how socio-cultural values and norms play a key role in shaping targeting decisions at the local 
government level. Third, a methodological contribution by using a multi-level data collection 
and analytical strategy to analyse the politics of implementing social protection. The thesis 
concludes with implications for redesigning social protection and recommendations for future 
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Chapter 1   Introduction, background and rationale for study  
Introduction  
Since the late 1990s, social protection, described as targeted state interventions in response to 
unacceptable levels of vulnerability and deprivation (Norton, Conway and Foster, 2001), has 
become an important policy agenda in the global south.  
The effects of droughts on food consumption (Ellis, Devereux and White, 2009) and inadequate 
human capital to  move vulnerable households out of poverty (Babajanian, Hagen-Zanker and 
Holmes, 2014) in the global south,  have progressively provided grounds for governments to 
implement social protection programmes. Since its implementation in Ghana, the Livelihood 
Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme has become a lifeline for many beneficiaries, 
as the following narratives indicate.  
Zinabu, a widow in the Upper East region2 of Ghana, recounted:   
‘Life was unbearable after I lost my husband. I relied on the benevolence of the community 
chief and support of community members for survival, until I became a beneficiary of LEAP. I 
am now able to take good care of my children, send them to school and take care of their 
health needs. LEAP has also given me the opportunity to generate a livelihood in pig-rearing. 
I thank the government for giving me this opportunity’ (LEAP, 2016). 
Similarly, severely disabled Awenuma, in the same region, described the challenges she faced 
prior to being enrolled on the LEAP programme.  
‘My sister and I had no meaningful source of income and so we were unable to have regular 
meals. But since enrolling on the LEAP, the grant has enabled us to meet daily food needs, 
provided education opportunities for my sister and I have been able to enrol on a dress 
making apprenticeship course’ (LEAP, 2016). 
The life-changing experiences of Zinabu and Awenuma show the importance of the LEAP 
programme to the wellbeing of vulnerable individuals and demonstrate that, extending LEAP  to 
many vulnerable households in the poorest communities of Ghana could potentially reduce the 
risk of hunger and over time provide livelihood opportunities to enable households to exit 
extreme poverty. However, as this thesis will show, the implementation of such a targeted 
 
2 The Upper East region is one of the poorest regions in Ghana. It is also home to the highest number of 
LEAP beneficiary households in Ghana (Hamel, 2018). 
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programme in a democratically competitive environment in which multiple actors, including 
transnational actors3 (TNAs), are actively involved is not without its challenges (Thomas and 
Grindle, 1990). It raises the stakes on exertion of control over implementation and risks the use 
of the programme for unintended purposes. Transnational ideas and interests as well as 
domestic political elites’ interests and agendas become important in shaping decisions on 
programme design, implementation and subsequent expansion. 
1.2    Background to the study 
In 2008, the World Bank (WB), UK’s Department for International Development (DFID)4 and the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) persuaded the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government 
in Ghana to introduce a cash transfer programme targeted at the poorest and most vulnerable 
households in Ghana (Foli, 2016; NDPC, 2009). The LEAP programme emerged as a policy 
alternative to growth-enhancing and broad poverty alleviation programmes which previously 
had failed to reduce extreme poverty and inequality in Ghana (Debrah, 2013; Foli, 2016; NDPC, 
2008).   
The WB’s recommendation came after a Poverty and Social Impact Assessment (PSIA)5 study 
indicated the inadequacy of existing poverty alleviation programmes to lift vulnerable 
populations out of poverty (Foli, 2016; MMYE, 2007). Cash transfers instead of in-kind transfers 
were recommended as the main mechanism of social assistance based on the belief that the 
former had achieved greater impact in reducing extreme poverty and inequality in low-income 
countries, particularly in Brazil (Foli, 2016; MMYE, 2007). This was strongly supported by DFID 
and UNICEF, both of which had a history of promoting social cash transfers in the Sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) region (Foli, 2016;  Hickey and Seekings, 2017).  
Although cash transfers for poverty reduction were entirely new to the social protection 
discourse in Ghana, political elites of the NPP government embraced the concept after attending 
conferences, workshops and study tours organised and sponsored by DFID and UNICEF about 
cash transfer experiences in low-income countries (Foli, 2016a). This culminated in the 
introduction of the LEAP cash transfer programme, which was designed with the assistance of 
technical experts from Brazil and Mexico (Foli, 2016; MMYE, 2007), and which had two main 
 
3 International policy actors who influence social welfare and social protection across borders. They 
include international organisations and donor agencies such as the World Bank and the International 
Labour Organisation. 
4 DFID is now integrated into a new department of the government of United Kingdom called the Foreign, 
Commonwealth and Development Office. 
5 Studies that assess the distributional and social impacts of policy reforms on the well-being of different 
groups of the population, particularly on the poor and most vulnerable (World Bank, 2015) 
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objectives.  First, to respond to the short-term consumption needs of households in extreme 
poverty through the provision of regular cash grants. Second, to link targeted households to 
existing social services in ways that enabled them to move permanently out of extreme poverty 
(Abane, 2017; Debrah, 2013; Foli, 2016).  
The LEAP cash transfer programme was first piloted in 2008 under the administration of the 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) government just weeks before the 2008 national elections in Ghana 
(Foli, 2016). The initial pilot implementation reached 1,645 households in 21 districts (Abane, 
2017; Debrah, 2013; Foli, 2016). Following the electoral victory of the National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) party in the national elections, LEAP continued its implementation with the 
programme reaching a  further  72,000 extreme poor households in 100 districts by the end of 
NDC’s first term in office in 2012 (DFID Ghana, 2013). By the end of the NDC’s second term in 
office, LEAP had expanded to an additional 20,000 households, for a total of 92,000 extreme 
poor households in 144 districts out of a total of 216 districts in Ghana (Foli, 2016a). 
1.3    Research problem and questions 
When I decided to research the LEAP programme, its implementation and further expansion by 
NPP and NDC governments of a cash transfer programme pushed by TNAs aroused my interest.  
I was particularly interested in understanding why and how three TNAs actively promoted a cash 
transfer programme and used ‘soft power’ mechanisms to gain support from domestic political 
elites in Ghana. I was also intrigued by the active involvement of the TNAs in the design of the 
programme and wanted to understand why these three TNAs aimed to replicate a targeted 
model of poverty reduction from a global south country like Brazil in Ghana.  
It seemed from reading the literature that there was a close alignment of the overall goal of the 
LEAP programme with the organisational goals of the three TNAs, although each had adopted a 
slightly different approach in meeting the programme’s goal (Hickey and Seekings, 2017). The 
WB’s approach was to use regular cash grants in response to short-term needs of extreme poor 
households, including consumption, but placed emphasis on the development of skills to enable 
them to move out of poverty.  As a United Nations agency which advocates welfare provisioning 
as a basic human right, UNICEF focused on assisting governments in improving the delivery of 
social services like healthcare to enhance the welfare of the most disadvantaged children and 
their families (UNICEF, 2019). DFID, on the other hand, emphasised the importance of 
supporting low-income and disadvantaged households with small but regular cash grants 
without the need to comply with specified actions as was the policy of the UK’s Labour 
4 
 
government at the time (Hickey and Seekings, 2017). What I was puzzled by was that, despite 
what could be described as differences in ideas among the three TNAs, they collaborated to 
encourage and support the NPP government in adopting a new social protection programme 
that was consistent with their organisational interests. 
Another issue of interest was how a new social protection programme proposed by the WB as 
an alternative to poverty reduction programmes was so effortlessly adopted. Given the active 
role played by political elites in the NPP government in conceptualising and embracing the new 
programme, I was interested in understanding whether their role in the adoption process was 
simply a passive one, or whether they saw in it, at a deeper level, an opportunity to further their 
political interests. The NPP government showed no resistance to the recommendation of the 
WB to implement an entirely new social protection programme which directly offered cash 
grants  to the poorest households, even though it was a liberal democratic government more 
inclined towards the use of liberal market policies to support a poverty reduction agenda (Ayee, 
2017; Grebe, 2017). It enthusiastically embraced, adopted, and implemented a new form of 
social assistance programme which, on the face of it, seemed inconsistent with its ideological 
leanings. This heightened my interest in the topic of this thesis.   
In addition, why did an opposition government significantly expand the LEAP when it took over 
the reins of power from the incumbent government? The NDC government, which was in 
opposition at the time of LEAP’s launch, gained political power after the 2008 elections and 
continued to implement LEAP, although it had criticised the NPP government for using LEAP as 
a ploy to buy votes to retain power (Public Agenda, 2008). Like the NPP government, NDC also 
worked closely with the three TNAs to expand LEAP to new districts and communities. As a social 
democratic political party, the NDC is seen as a party which prioritises the welfare of the most 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society (Ayee, 2017; Grebe, 2017). Thus, it could be 
argued that its interests were much more aligned than the NPP’s with the objectives of LEAP.  
What further fed my curiosity was why the NDC chose specific electoral periods during which to 
expand LEAP, in the same way as the NPP had in the programme’s pilot implementation. This 
raised questions about whether the choices it made were driven more by political interests than 
by needs on the ground. For the two opposing political parties, the LEAP programme appeared 
to have become part of a game of ‘political football’ played to gain political advantage over each 
other. I was therefore also interested in the interests of national actors, specifically the NDC and 
NPP elites, and why both governments used the same local government actors and institutions 
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to expand the LEAP programme to vulnerable households. This also suggested that the TNAs’ 
interests were not the only interests driving the implementation and expansion of LEAP.   
In terms of expansion of the programme, a critical issue of interest was whether and how TNA 
support for the LEAP programme changed or remained the same as LEAP expanded under 
different political administrations. These issues were worth researching to understand how, in 
Ghana’s competitive democratic political environment, TNA ideas and interests as well as 
domestic political elites’ interests play out and influence the implementation of the LEAP cash 
transfer programme. Thus, the overarching research question I investigated in this study was:  
How have transnational and domestic politics shaped the implementation of the LEAP 
programme in Ghana? 
To address this main question, I posed three sub-questions. 
Research question one:  
How have the ideas and interests of transnational actors shaped the implementation of 
Ghana’s LEAP programme?  
To answer this question, I explore how the ideas and interests of the WB, DFID and UNICEF have 
shaped the design and implementation of LEAP under two ideologically different governments.   
Research question two: 
How does Ghana’s competitive democratic politics drive the expansion strategies of LEAP? 
This question focuses on how Ghana’s competitive clientelist settlement, characterised by 
intense and constant competition for power between the NPP and NDC, has influenced the 
expansion strategies of NPP and NDC elites.  
Research question three:  
How do local government institutions and actors in Ghana’s competitive political setting 
impact the expansion of LEAP?    
This question investigates how Ghana’s local government system and powerful actors within 
local government shape the expansion of LEAP as political power has alternated between NDC 
and NPP governments.   
1.4    Motivation for study  
My interest in this topic was driven by two factors. The first was what I came to see as a gap in 
the existing literature on political settlements and its intersection with social protection. Most 
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research to date focused primarily on the promotion and adoption of cash transfers in southern 
and eastern African countries, where domestic politics is characterised by the dominance of a 
political party or political leader. For example, Hickey and Bukenya (2016) demonstrated how 
the WB and DFID promoted cash transfers in Uganda and how these were adopted by political 
elites to design a social assistance programme for elderly and labour-constrained households6. 
Similarly, Lavers (2016b) explained how the WB and DFID promoted direct income support 
grants and cash-for-work programmes7 for extremely impoverished and labour-constrained 
households in Rwanda. These two cases exemplify cash transfer promotion and adoption 
experiences in east African countries that exhibit the characteristics of dominant party-political 
settlements.  
While research in such contexts abounded in the literature, little was known about the politics 
of implementing cash transfers in contexts of competitive clientelism where domestic politics is 
characterised by intense competition for power between political parties. Ghana provided a 
unique opportunity to explore and fill this gap.   
The second driving factor was an analytical gap. The use of a case study design utilising a 
multilevel analytical strategy to analyse data on implementation of cash transfer programmes 
was also rare. Previous studies focusing on the politics of promotion and adoption of cash 
transfers more commonly employed a process tracing methodology to explore the adoption 
process at a single/national level of governance (see Hickey and Bukenya, 2016; Lavers, 2016a; 
Lavers, 2016b). In the most recent literature on the politics of adoption of the LEAP programme 
in Ghana, Abdulai (2020) explored adoption at the national level and concentrated on issues 
such as the influence of donor finance. Although Abdulai (2020) discussed some implementation 
issues, he limited the discussion to policy issues such as the employment of technical assistance 
and its impact on the implementation of LEAP. He did not analyse the implementation of LEAP 
at the subnational or local government levels. In this study, I argue that analysing the 
implementation experiences of key actors at different levels of governance has the potential to 
provide deep insights into how political influences at different levels of governance work to 
explain the implementation and expansion of social protection.  
 
6 The social assistance programme in Uganda comprised a direct income support grant for two groups of 
vulnerable households: persons aged 65 years and above and extremely vulnerable families that lacked 
labour capacity. 
7 A cash-for-work programme involves the payment of a wage (in cash or food), often but not always 
provided by the state, in return for the provision of labour. The objective(s) can either be to alleviate 
poverty or to enhance employment (Carter et al., 2019). 
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The multilevel implementation of LEAP is analysed with attention to the political context out of 
which LEAP emerged, using Lavers and Hickey’s Adapted Political Settlement framework (APSF), 
an analytical tool which combines transnational factors with domestic politics to explain the 
uptake of social protection.  
1.5   Significance of the study 
It is my expectation that the findings of this study will add to knowledge on the politics of social 
protection in two ways. First, regarding the implementation of social protection in competitive 
democratic contexts where TNAs are actively involved, a broad understanding of the prevailing 
political settlement and how the underlying interests of domestic elites interact with TNAs’ 
interests to shape implementation will provide deep insights into not only the influence of TNAs 
on implementation but also the limits of this influence on the outcome of implementation.  
Second, this study will make a unique methodological contribution to the approach employed 
in analysing data on the politics of implementing social protection. As I noted earlier, in section 
1.4, multi-level analysis of data in a competitive political environment where implementation is 
carried out by elected governments at different levels of governance will provide deep insights 
into the complexities of social protection implementation and expansion.  
1.6    Thesis structure 
Including this chapter, this thesis is comprised of 8 chapters.  
Chapter 2 provides an overview of social protection provisioning by governments in Ghana. It 
highlights domestic and global political developments which laid the foundation for the 
introduction of the LEAP programme. Significant developments following the adoption of 
Ghana’s fourth republican constitution, including the emergence of a de facto two-party political 
system, Ghana’s prevailing political settlement and the institutionalisation of local government 
systems, are discussed.  
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on the politics of social protection and of political settlements 
and its intersections with social protection. It problematises issues relating to the politics of 
social protection in low-income countries in the West African sub-region and in Ghana more 
specifically. Chapter 3 also presents the conceptual framework which guides this study.  
Chapter 4 discusses the methodology and research methods employed in this study. It includes 
discussion of data collection and data analysis methods and of the validity and reliability of 
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findings. Reflections on my positionality as an insider and an outsider regarding the Ghanaian 
political culture is also discussed.  
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the empirical chapters of this study. Chapter 5 focuses on the role of 
transnational actors in the implementation of the LEAP programme and on the limits of their 
influence. Chapter 6 emphasises the role of Ghana’s political settlement in expanding LEAP. 
Chapter 7 examines the expansion of LEAP at the local government level. It demonstrates how 
Ghana’s local government system and powerful actors within the local government direct the 
expansion of LEAP. Using the multilevel analytical strategy and guided by Lavers and Hickey’s 
APSF, each of the empirical chapters answers one of the three research questions outlined in 
section 1.3.   
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter. It discusses the main research findings in relation to the 
existing literature and the conceptual framework utilised in the study. It considers implications 














Chapter 2    A historical overview of social protection provisioning in 
Ghana  
Chapter purpose and structure   
In chapter 1, I introduced the main topic of interest in this study, the politics of implementing 
social protection in a competitive democratic context, using the LEAP programme in Ghana as a 
case study. In this chapter, I provide a historical overview of social protection provisioning in 
Ghana, with a focus on the political and macroeconomic developments which laid the 
foundation for democratic politics from which the LEAP programme emerged. This contextual 
information will provide the reader who is unfamiliar with Ghana’s social protection landscape 
a sense of the political and macroeconomic developments which led to the introduction of LEAP. 
It will also help to inform discussions in subsequent chapters. 
The chapter broadly discusses social protection provisioning in three political periods. It 
highlights the political and macroeconomic developments of the era, their effects on poor 
households and subsequent responses by governments. It comprises four main sections, 
beginning in section 2.1 with a discussion of social protection in the early independence era and 
the period of military rule. Next is a discussion of social protection in the pre-democratic era in 
section 2.2. This is followed in section 2.3 by a discussion of social protection in the democratic 
era. In this section, I pay attention to the domestic and global developments of the era, including 
the introduction of multi-party politics and a transnational poverty reduction agenda which 
culminated in the adoption of a cash transfer programme named LEAP. In section 2.4, I 
summarise the key issues emphasised in the chapter and conclude the chapter.  
2.1    Social protection in the early independence era and the era of military rule: 
1959- 1975 
The early independence era and the period of military rule in Ghana spanned over twenty years 
and featured six governments, five of which were military regimes with a short period of civilian 
rule (Berry, 1995; Jedwab and Osei, 2012). For the purposes of this study however, I focus on 
three governments, one civilian and two military, which governed over a sixteen-year period. 
Both civilian and military governments made efforts to improve Ghana’s macroeconomic 
performance but did not introduce social protection policies or targeted programmes to address 
welfare concerns of the poorest households. At the time, ruling governments’ incentive to tackle 
poverty was influenced much more by political priorities and ideology (Luiz, 2013), which did 
not particularly identify the poorest households or address their particular welfare concerns. In 
addition, this period is significant for a gradual decline in macroeconomic performance 
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indicators, an increasing risk of hunger and poverty among vulnerable populations and a reliance 
on informal social protection programmes administered by non-state actors. 
2.1.1    Political and macroeconomic developments and effects on poor households 
Following the declaration of independence8 from British colonial rule, the Convention People’s 
Party (CPP), led by Dr Kwame Nkrumah, moved towards a one-party state, with the argument 
that political pluralism or multi-party regimes were divisive and undermined economic and 
social progress (de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016; Widner, 1993). Nkrumah’s CPP government 
centralised political power and also embraced strong socialist ideology in an attempt to move 
away from colonial imposition of Western political and economic models of development 
(Grebe, 2015; Grebe, 2017). 
Nkrumah inherited a relatively stable economy characterised by reasonable growth in the cocoa 
and mining sectors and a well-developed infrastructure including ports and harbours to serve 
the export trade (Berry, 1995). Nonetheless, he also inherited the effects of a growing 
development gap between the northern and southern parts of Ghana left by the British Colonial 
administration (Fosu and Aryeetey, 2008). To strengthen the economy and reduce growing 
unemployment caused by north to south migration, Nkrumah diversified Ghana’s economy from 
a primarily agricultural economy to a mixed agricultural-industrial one (Berry, 1995). His strategy 
was based on the idea that economic growth and development would only result from 
industrialization and through surplus from the agricultural sector including from cocoa (Jedwab 
and Osei, 2012). Nkrumah thus adopted an import-substitution industrialisation strategy (ISI) 
and established industries that produced import substitutes for the mining and cocoa sectors9 
(de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016).  
Guided by his socialist ideology, Nkrumah ensured that the state’s revenue generated from 
cocoa exports was used to provide essential services such as healthcare and basic education for 
the benefit of all (my emphasis added) Ghanaians (Oduro, 2010). There was no attempt to target 
the poorest households with services which would improve their wellbeing, although issues of 
vulnerability to extreme poverty were not uncommon at the time. In terms of macroeconomic 
performance, Nkrumah’s strategy achieved little success. Falling cocoa prices on the 
international market meant that the cocoa industry failed to generate export revenue for 
 
8 Gold Coast was renamed Ghana after gaining independence from British rule.  
9 Cocoa was Ghana’s highest-earning foreign exchange commodity. 
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industry to expand as planned (Berry, 1995). Nkrumah’s ISI policies thus negatively affected 
macroeconomic indicators as rising unemployment, soaring trade debts and  food price inflation 
characterised his regime (de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016).  
Although, on the positive side, Nkrumah introduced free basic education10 and healthcare 
policies to ensure all (my emphasis added) households accessed essential social services, these 
policies were not particularly targeted at the poorest households. The real problem for poor 
households at the time was their inability to afford food items and the lack of formal social 
protection such as income and non-income support schemes to cushion them against the effects 
of price shocks. As food prices rocketed, poor and low-income households were increasingly at 
risk of hunger and malnutrition (Fosu and Aryeetey, 2008).  
While informal social protection, comprising the provision of food items and cash grants, 
administered by chiefs and family networks, respectively, remained the main source of support 
during the immediate post-independence era (Oduro, 2010), such schemes were less regularly 
provided by family members (Bhattamishra and Barrett, 2010), and had limited impact on the 
wellbeing of vulnerable households. The resulting economic hardship and associated unrest was 
used by coup plotters to overthrow Nkrumah’s government in a military coup in 1966. The 
‘National Liberation Council’ (NLC), a military government, then took over the reins of power.  
The NLC ruled from 1966 to 1969, but in 1968 it encouraged political party activity (Jedwab and 
Osei, 2012). With plans to restore Ghana to democratic governance, the NLC government 
promoted political competition (de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016).  Five political parties contested the 
national elections. The Progress Party (PP), led by Dr K. A. Busia, won the elections and Busia 
became Ghana’s prime minister in the second republic from 1969 to 1972 (de-Graft Aikins et al., 
2016).  
Like the CPP government, Busia’s administration aimed to generate domestic revenue through 
the protection of domestic industries and raising employment in order to reduce Ghana’s 
soaring trade debt (de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016). However, unlike the CPP government, which 
had strong socialist leanings, Busia’s government subscribed to a liberal democratic philosophy 
(de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016). Economic policies including a devaluation of the domestic currency 
and privatisation were promoted to boost foreign investments. Busia also protected small-scale 
 
10 In Ghana, basic school covers school years from pre-primary to the end of junior high school. This relates 
to children aged between 5 and 16 years (MOE, 2019). 
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businesses from foreign-owned competitors with his unpopular Aliens Compliance Order of 
1969, which saw the expulsion of a large number of Asian and Middle-eastern businesses from 
the retail sector (de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016).  
Despite these policies, domestic revenue generation to offset Ghana’s trade debt incurred by 
the previous administration did not materialise as planned (Jedwab and Osei, 2012). Ghana’s 
internal debts owed to commercial banks in the country mounted and fuelled inflation, 
particularly food price inflation. The effects of privatisation of state-owned enterprises were 
mostly felt by small- and medium-scale farmers who lost their livelihoods to the private sector 
(Killick, 2010). But most important was the effect on subsistence farmers with no form of income 
security and little support from family networks. This group was particularly affected by high 
prices of imported food items as soaring inflation left them out of pocket (Hutchful, 1987; Killick, 
2010). Even though inflation dipped from double to single digits and jobs in the manufacturing 
sector began to increase, the recovery was not uniform (Hutchful, 1987). Poorer groups 
including subsistence farmers did not feel the economic recovery in the same way as formal 
sector workers in manufacturing did.  
In addition to the effect of privatisation was the effect of devaluation of the Ghanaian cedi on 
the livelihoods of poor households. Not only were households with subsistence farmers priced 
out of the food production sector because of the significant increase in the cost of production, 
but devaluation also increased the demand for certain exports while excluding vegetables often 
produced by subsistence farmers. Thus, the livelihoods of subsistence farmers were affected. A 
combination of soaring inflation and the collapse of private sector resulted in another military 
takeover and effectively ended the NLC government and the Busia regime.  
From 1972 to 1975, the National Redemption Council (NRC), a military government led by 
Colonel Acheampong which had overthrown Busia’s government, took over the reins of power. 
Colonel Acheampong’s NRC government nationalised foreign firms as a strategy to boost 
economic progress (Berry, 1995). However, persistent shortfalls in domestic food production, 
exacerbated by a prolonged drought and bush fires that hit the country in the early to mid-
1970s, resulted in widespread inflation (Fosu and Aryeetey, 2008). An increased cost of living 
which affected the quality of life of all households but hit the poorest groups the hardest (Fosu 
and Aryeetey, 2008) followed. 
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However, like the previous NLC, PP and CPP governments, the NRC government did not 
introduce a social protection policy to enable the poorest households to manage economic 
hardship. Informal social protection in the form of food support from family networks and 
microcredit from community self-help groups such as rotating savings clubs11 remained the 
primary source of support (Oduro, 2010). Such informal social protection interventions 
coexisted with a limited social security scheme initiated by the CPP government (de-Graft Aikins 
et al., 2016). In addition to social security, a poverty alleviation programme was launched by the 
military NRC for all households in Ghana (Girdner et al., 1980).  
2.1.2    The social security scheme and poverty alleviation programme 
Although the civilian and military governments did not prioritise targeted intervention 
programmes for the poorest, they focused on implementing some programmes to protect their 
political constituents. While the CPP provided income security to protect its supporters in the 
media sector, the military-led NRC government concentrated its efforts on securing political 
support from small- and medium-scale farmers with a poverty alleviation programme (de-Graft 
Aikins et al., 2016). 
The CPP’s social security scheme, targeted at public sector workers, comprised a contributory 
pension scheme modelled on the previous colonial government’s pension scheme (Kpessa, 
2011). Also called the Provident Fund, it involved contributions made by employees over a 
period of their working life which they received in the form of a lump sum payment when they 
retired (Dixon, 1989). In contrast to the colonial government’s ‘CAP 30’ pension scheme which 
was exclusively funded by the colonial government, the Provident Fund Scheme had both 
contributory and non-contributory components of 5% and 12.5% by the employee and 
employer, respectively (Kpessa, 2011). The aim of this scheme was to protect public sector 
workers against post-independence risks such as illness, unemployment and old age (Kpessa, 
2010; Kpessa, 2011). The scheme was initially administered by the Department of Pensions 
through the State Insurance Corporation, a government commercial insurance institution. 
However, from 1972, implementation of the fund changed hands to the Ghana Social Security 
 
11 Rotating savings clubs are also called susu clubs. In this scheme, each member of the group makes an 
agreed contribution to a common fund over a time period. The total contributions are then disbursed to 
a single member of the group. The recipient changes each period in a rotating fashion such that all 
members of the group are eventually recipients (Alabi, Alabi and Ahiawodzi, 2007). 
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and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), (Kpessa, 2011). The Provident Fund Scheme operated until 
the late 1980s when a decline in the Ghanaian economy resulted in hyperinflation and a 
significant fall in interest rates which affected the value of funds (de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016). 
As I noted earlier about ruling governments’ protection of their political constituents, an 
underlying motive of the NRC government was to protect small- and medium-scale farmers in 
exchange for political support (de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016). The NRC government’s programme 
dubbed Operation Feed Yourself (OFY), comprised three components. First, subsidised seedlings 
for small-scale farmers; second, microloans targeted at small- and medium-scale farmers; and 
third, self-help food production projects for all households in the country. Regarding self-help 
food production, the entire country was divided into nine zones to represent the nine 
administrative regions at the time, and each zone was directed to concentrate on growing the 
crop it was best suited to produce (Girdner et al., 1980). 
The OFY scheme, it could be argued, had social protection inclinations because it was a targeted 
scheme. However, the scheme was targeted at small- and medium-scale farmers, not 
subsistence farmers who comprised the majority of the most vulnerable and poorest households 
(Girdner et al., 1980) at the time. Thus, food insecurity and its associated hardships remained a 
threat to subsistence farmers and other vulnerable groups throughout the early independence 
and military periods and well into the pre-democratic era (Berry, 1995).  
2.2    Social protection in the pre-democratic era: 1981-1991 
Ghana’s pre-democratic era began with the military government of Flight Lieutenant Rawlings 
and the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). Rawlings’s government faced significant 
macroeconomic challenges which called for assistance from international donors including to 
support the PNDC government in implementing targeted intervention programmes. The pre-
democratic era thus marked the beginning of transnational actor involvement in social 
protection provisioning in Ghana. Targeted initiatives for the most vulnerable groups primarily 
comprised non-income support schemes (supplementary feeding, nutritional supplements, and 
skills training) implemented with support from international aid agencies and faith-based 
organisations. Such initiatives aimed at enabling vulnerable groups to manage economic 
hardship as well as build their capacity to acquire relevant skills for the labour market. Arguably, 
the political and macroeconomic developments of the era facilitated these initiatives. 
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2.2.1    Political and macroeconomic developments  
Ghana’s economy had almost collapsed by the time the PNDC government took over the reins 
of power (Grebe, 2015 ; Jedwab and Osei, 2012). The declining state of the economy, particularly 
falling production levels, was the outcome of failing economic policies of previous governments 
including export and import restrictions and overexploitation of the cocoa sector to finance 
industrial development (Pickett and Shaeeldin, 1990). There was no growth in the agricultural 
or industrial sectors, domestic savings were negative and foreign exchange reserves were non-
existent (Jedwab and Osei, 2012). The country suffered from hyperinflation and every 
conceivable item was in short supply (Grebe, 2015).  
Poor households were living considerably below the poverty line as their yearly calorie intake 
declined from 88 percent in 1979 to 68 percent in 1983 (Krauss, 1991). Rawlings’s attempts to 
recover the economy from decline through a state-led industrialisation strategy did not work 
(Grebe, 2015). As a result, his government sought advice and financial assistance from the World 
Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) even though his socialist ideology as the 
leader of a military government did not particularly align with their capitalist values (Foli, 2016; 
de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016; Jedwab and Osei, 2012). This was a significant development because 
it set the scene for donors, including transnational actors, to make significant input in national 
policies on economic growth, poverty reduction and social protection provisioning in Ghana. 
2.2.2    Austerity measures of the WB and the IMF and their effects on poor 
households 
In response to the economic crisis in Ghana, the WB and the IMF introduced a Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) of economic stabilisation also known as the Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP)12. The ERP comprised liberal economic policies aimed at reducing the size of 
the public sector and promoting private sector activity to restore Ghana’s economy (Grebe, 
2015; Jedwab and Osei, 2012). Economic stabilisation measures for Ghana consisted of cutbacks 
on budgetary allocation to education and health sectors, abolition of price and import 
restrictions and devaluation of the domestic currency to boost private sector development (de-
Graft Aikins et al., 2016; Jedwab and Osei, 2012). These policy recommendations were based on 
IMF’s principle that limited government intervention in the macroeconomy worked best to 
improve economic decline (Boafo-Arthur, 1999). 
 
12 ERP and SAP are used interchangeably in this chapter. 
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In the first four years of its implementation, the ERP resulted in significant improvements in 
Ghana’s economy as the agricultural, manufacturing and trading sectors grew by large margins 
between 1984-1989 (Killick, 2010). In addition, Ghana’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which 
had fallen between 1981-1983 from 0 percent to minus  0.8 percent, began to recover and 
reached an average growth of 5.7 percent from the mid to late 1980s. Inflation dropped from 
123 percent in 1983 to 10.4 percent in 1991 (de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016). Thus, the ERP 
programme began to have a positive impact on the macroeconomy. However, alongside 
improvements in macroeconomic indicators were painful impacts on the welfare of already 
disadvantaged households (Gayi, 1991). This was because the ERP was not designed to cushion 
poor households against economic hardship.  
For example, cutbacks on the education budget in Ghana meant the cost of education was no 
longer subsidised. Subsequently, households had to absorb the costs of textbooks and 
examination preparation. The immediate outcome was that primary education was no longer 
affordable and school attendance rates in the entire country fell from 76.4 percent in 1984 prior 
to the implementation of the ERP to 73 percent in 1987 soon after the introduction of user fees 
in education (Boateng et al., 1990). Similarly, cutbacks in the healthcare budget increased the 
cost of healthcare for poor households and led to an immediate decrease in outpatient 
attendance among the rural poor by 50 percent (Boateng et al., 1990).  
In addition to already disadvantaged households, a ‘new poor’ category made up of redeployed 
public sector workers emerged because of the massive public sector retrenchment 
recommended by the IMF (Gayi, 1995). Concerned about the effect of the SAP on the 
microeconomy, the PNDC government sought support from UNICEF and the WB. They designed 
and implemented appropriate programmes that addressed the welfare concerns of already 
disadvantaged groups and the ‘new poor’. 
2.2.3    Targeted interventions: supplementary feeding, food-for-work and skills 
training projects 
The ERP period saw the emergence of two transnational actors who would later become key 
partners with the government of Ghana to implement the LEAP programme. In 1988, UNICEF 
and the WB supported the PNDC government to implement targeted interventions for 
households affected by the ERP reforms. A programme of interventions referred to as the 
Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) was thus  
introduced to address specific health and economic challenges such as malnutrition, food 
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insecurity and unemployment which left households vulnerable to extreme poverty (Gayi, 
1991). PAMSCAD interventions, unlike previous programmes launched by governments in the 
immediate independence and military eras, could be described as social protection measures 
because they were designed to affect specific vulnerable groups. 
Interventions comprised supplementary feeding projects for primary school-aged children in 
deprived communities whereby rations of wheat and non-fat powdered milk were provided at 
specified nutrition centres in selected communities (Gayi, 1995). In addition, a food-for-work 
project distributed small quantities of grain to subsistence food crop farmers in the northern 
region of the country13 in exchange for constructing community irrigation dams (Gayi, 1995). 
Moreover, skills training projects such as tailoring and baking for unemployed men and women 
respectively in urban areas were introduced to provide employable skills to the ‘new poor’ (Gayi, 
1995). These targeted measures co-existed with interventions introduced by non-state actors 
such as faith-based international non-governmental organisations. The Adventist Development 
Relief Agency (ADRA) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) were two organisations which emerged 
in Ghana14 in the mid-1980s and provided welfare support in this regard (Gayi, 1991). As 
vulnerability to extreme poverty took on different forms, the two non-governmental 
organisations launched several poverty-related projects including the provision of agriculture 
extension services and delivery of food staples to farmers in  impoverished communities (Gayi, 
1991). PAMSCAD continued alongside the ERP reforms with mixed impacts on welfare (Gayi, 
1995) until lack of financial commitment from donors and mismanagement of some projects led 
to its eventual collapse in 1995 (Overseas Development Institute, 1996).  
The ERP reforms of the PNDC government, however, continued into the 1990s until 
constitutional reforms ushered in an era of democratic reforms and a re-instatement of 
multiparty politics from 1992 (Grebe, 2015). 
2.3    Social protection in the democratic era: 1992-2009 
In contrast to the previous periods, where political and macroeconomic developments and 
political ideology of governments shaped ruling governments’ plans to support poor 
households, the implementation of targeted intervention policies by elected governments in the 
democratic era was shaped by domestic and transnational political developments as well as 
 
13 The northern region is one of the poorest regions in Ghana. 
14 The ADRA and CRS initially provided humanitarian assistance to drought-stricken households in Ghana. 
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poverty reduction trends. Significant features of the democratic era which laid the foundation 
for implementing social protection for the poorest households in Ghana are discussed. They 
comprise the re-instatement of multi-party politics and a de facto two-party system (Grebe, 
2017; Osei, 2013), the development of Ghana’s political settlement (Grebe, 2015), the 
institutionalisation of a local government system (Ahwoi, 2010; Ayee, 2003; FES and ILGS, 2016) 
and a commitment by governments to implement social protection for the poorest (de-Graft 
Aikins et al., 2016; Grebe, 2017). These are discussed in detail in section 2.3.1. Following these 
developments, several targeted programmes combining cash and in-kind support for targeted 
households and financed exclusively by the government of Ghana or with bilateral and 
multilateral aid agencies, have benefitted poor households in Ghana. 
2.3.1    Domestic political developments from 1992  
 Constitutional reforms, multiparty politics and a de facto two-party system 
Following more than a decade of quasi-military rule under the Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC) government, there were strong internal and external pressures, particularly 
from external aid agencies, to reform Ghana’s constitution and introduce multiparty democracy 
(Adjei, 2013). This gave way to the promulgation of a liberal constitution in 1992 and the 
introduction of multiparty democracy in 1993 (Adjei, 2013; Grebe, 2015) whereby multiple 
political parties contested national elections for presidential and parliamentary positions every 
four years.  
While parliamentary candidates were elected on the basis of a ‘First Past the Post’ voting 
system15 (Adjei, 2013; Osei, 2013; Whitfield, 2009), the president was elected by direct popular 
vote, meaning to be elected as president, the candidate was required to obtain above 50 percent  
of valid votes from the electorate (Adjei, 2013). Following the election of the president, the 
constitution allowed the president to appoint ministers of state to take responsibility for 
government decisions in key sectors of the economy (Government of Ghana, 1992).  
The political system which resulted from the 1992 constitutional reforms thus represented a 
shift from the administration of military governments which focused much more on political 
 
15 In a ‘First Past the Post’ voting system, a candidate is voted into power when they receive the most 




ideology and their associated policies to strengthen the macroeconomy, to a democratic system 
in which elected officials represented the interests of the electorate including the welfare needs 
of the poorest households.  The outcome of this political system was that it allowed Lieutenant 
Rawlings’s military PNDC government to transform into a civilian political party, renamed as the 
National Democratic Congress (NDC), contested with other political parties and won the national 
elections of 1992 (Grebe, 2015; Grebe, 2017; Osei, 2013) .  
Since the adoption  of the fourth republican constitution of 1992 in Ghana, political competition 
has intensified, with more than ten political parties contesting national elections, but with only 
a handful making it to the parliamentary level (Osei, 2013). For example, in the 2008 national 
elections, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) were the two 
political parties that won nearly all seats in parliament, with a combined total of 223  out of 230 
seats, leaving only 7 seats for the remaining contesting political parties (Osei, 2013). The 
introduction of multi-party democratic politics in Ghana resulted in the dominance of the NDC 
and NPP on Ghana’s political scene (Grebe, 2015; Grebe, 2017). 
Multi-party politics in Ghana has to date, been overshadowed by the institutionalisation of a de 
facto two-party system in which the NDC and the NPP are the major political parties between 
which power alternates. Moreover, with each four-year electoral cycle, the NDC and NPP 
become increasingly competitive (Appiah and Abdulai, 2017) as the development of patron-
client politics remains a significant feature of Ghana’s democratic politics.        
Ghana’s democratic politics: a competitive clientelist political settlement  
As sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 indicate, Ghana’s political developments from the early 
independence era to the era of democratic governance have been characterised by political 
competition. This was demonstrated by how civilian, military and quasi-military governments 
competed for power to shape macroeconomic policy. Nonetheless, competition for power was 
and remains strongly characterised by clientelism. This was exemplified by how governments in 
power formed strong clientelist networks with political constituents who, in return, were 
rewarded through some form of protection. For example, Nkrumah relied on public sector 
workers in the media industry for political support and rewarded them with social security (de-
Graft Aikins et al., 2016) while the military NRC protected small- and medium-scale farmers with 
microcredit (Luiz, 2013) in exchange for political loyalty. This political arrangement in which 
competition for power necessitates the use of clientelism to secure political control describes 
competitive clientelism (Appiah and Abdulai, 2017; Idun Arkhurst, 2013). Since the fourth 
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republican constitution, democratic politics and the way power is distributed in Ghana have 
remained competitively clientelist in character, and Ghana is described as having a competitive 
clientelist political settlement (Abdulai, 2020; Appiah and Abdulai, 2017; de-Graft Aikins et al., 
2016; Idun Arkhurst, 2013; Oduro, Mohammed and Ashon, 2014; Whitfield, 2011). 
Competitive clientelism in Ghana is characterised by an intense and constant vulnerability of 
elites to loss of power in competitive elections (Abdulai, 2019). Elites’ fear of losing power to 
opponents threatens the rule of governments and increases the likelihood that they will 
distribute government resources in ways that serves their political  interests (Whitfield, 2011). 
In addition to competitive clientelism, constitutional reforms facilitated the institutionalisation 
of a local government system (Ayee, 2003). 
Ghana’s local government system: The District Assembly 
Following the introduction of multi-party democracy, Ghana adopted a decentralisation policy 
which began in 1988 under the previous PNDC military government. The decentralisation policy 
primarily involved the establishment of local governments, called District Assemblies16, which  
were transferred political power as well as  financial and administrative resources from the 
central government (Ahwoi, 2010). The establishment of the District Assembly was backed by 
various legislative instruments including the Local Government Act of 1993 (Act 462) (Ahwoi, 
2010; Ayee, 2003; Botchwey, 2017). District Assemblies were in effect, created to become key 
players in development at the local government level. They were entrusted by law to initiate, 
co-ordinate and deliver the central government’s policies and programmes to communities 
(Ayee, 2003; Bebelleh and Nobabumah, 2013).  
The establishment of the District Assembly system, thus represented a slight departure from the 
previous governance system of the British colonial administration, where chiefs and elders of 
towns and villages were appointed by the colonial government to form traditional councils, 
enforce customary law and administer the colonial government’s policies (Ahwoi, 2010; Ayee, 
2003; Botchwey, 2017; FES and ILGS, 2016). In the established local government system, the 
administration of central government’s policies was no longer the responsibility of chiefs, but 
that of the head of the local assembly as prescribed by the 1992 republican constitution.  
However, the chief’s role as community leader and a custodian of traditional laws and norms 
remained (Asamoah, 2012). 
 
16 The District Assembly is equivalent to a local council in England. 
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The presence of a District Assembly backed by various legislative instruments marks the 
difference between Ghana’s democratic local government system and the colonial 
government’s local government system. 
The District Assembly which operates today comprises various local governments demarcated 
by population size.  For example, a ‘Metropolitan’ Assembly describes a local government with 
a population of over 250,000, a ‘Municipal’ Assembly describes one with a population of 
between 95,000 and 250,000, and a ‘District’ Assembly is a local government with a population 
of between 75,000 and 95,000 (Ahwoi, 2010). For the purposes of this thesis, the various local 
government units, regardless of size, will be referred to as District Assemblies. 
As stipulated by the 1992 constitution, heads of local authorities referred to as Chief Executives  
were to be nominated by the ruling government and endorsed by members of the Assembly 
through local elections (Ahwoi, 2010; FES and ILGS, 2016). Chief Executives thus owe direct 
allegiance to the government that nominated them. Members of the District Assembly, referred 
to as Assembly members on the other hand, are elected into office to represent an electoral 
area and to present views, opinions and proposals of the electorate to the District Assembly 
(Ahwoi, 2010; Bebelleh and Nobabumah, 2013). 
The 1992 constitutional reforms also strengthened the commitment of elected governments to 
implement formal social protection for the poorest. 
Commitments by governments to implement social protection.  
Since the 1992 constitutional reforms, elected governments in Ghana have been obligated to 
implement targeted programmes for the poorest households. Article 17, subsection 4(a) of 
Ghana’s fourth republican constitution proposes the implementation of policies and 
programmes to correct economic, social and economic  imbalances in Ghanaian society 
(Government of Ghana, 1992). Similarly, Article 37, subsection 2(b) of Ghana’s constitution 
establishes that ‘the state shall enact appropriate laws to ensure … the protection and promotion 
of all basic human rights and freedoms, including the rights of the disabled, the aged, children 
and other vulnerable groups in the development process’ (Government of Ghana, 1992, p. 34).  
This requirement became much stronger when the Kufuor-led NPP government signed treaties 
and protocols expressing Ghana’s commitment to implement social protection. In 2000, the NPP 
government signed the United Nations Millennium Declaration, pledging to combat extreme 
poverty and associated problems of vulnerability through social protection interventions 
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(MOGCSP, 2015). The NPP government further signed the Ouagadougou Declaration of 2004 as 
a partner country of the African Union and pledged its commitment to implement social 
protection systems to fight extreme poverty, reduce inequality and promote growth (MESW, 
2012). This renewed commitment gave rise to legal frameworks including the Persons with 
Disability (PLWD) Act 2006 (Act 715) enacted by the NPP government (MOGCSP, 2015).  
The commitment by governments to implement formal social protection increased towards the 
end of the second millennium, when rising levels of extreme poverty and vulnerability in the 
global south, exacerbated by the effects of climate change and structural adjustment economic 
policies, brought in transnational policy actors (Hickey and Seekings, 2017). 
2.3.2    A transnational poverty reduction agenda 
From the early to mid-2000s, transnational actors, notably representatives of the WB, DFID and 
UNICEF, embarked on a global poverty reduction agenda and began to promote particular forms 
of cash transfers as possible solutions to the deepening vulnerability and extreme poverty in the 
global south (Grebe, 2015; Hickey and Seekings, 2017). Inspired by the economic and human 
development experiences of Latin American countries which had used targeted cash transfer 
programmes to reduce extreme poverty, the WB and DFID began advocating these innovative 
policy ideas in middle-income countries in the southern American region and low-income 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Grebe, 2017; Foli, 2016; Hickey and Seekings, 2017).  
The WB focused its attention on replicating Mexico and Brazil’s Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) 
model of social assistance (Holzmann, 2008). In this model, the WB assumed that limited access 
to education and healthcare in the poorest households contributed to intergenerational poverty 
and exacerbated social and economic inequalities. Thus, small and regular transfers of cash were 
required to target poor households with children, but on the condition that the latter complied 
with two requirements: enrolling children in school and attending regular immunisation clinics 
for age-appropriate children (De Britto, 2004; Hellmann, 2015). The CCT model emerged as a 
‘neighbourhood policy transfer model’ (Hickey and Seekings, 2017, p. 11) because policy ideas 
were transferred from the southern American region to its neighbour in the same region. This 
model was promoted by WB technocrats, usually through conferences and workshops in Brazil 
and Mexico to allow cash transfer experiences of implementing governments to be shared with 
other countries in the southern American region (Foli, 2016; Hickey and Seekings, 2017).  
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Similarly, DFID promoted cash transfers as a policy for reducing vulnerability to extreme poverty 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, in contrast to the WB, DFID’s focus was on unconditional cash 
transfers, also referred to as social cash transfers (Hickey and Seekings, 2017). DFID’s model of 
poverty reduction reflected the philosophy of the UK Labour government at the time, which 
placed value on regular income support for vulnerable and needy groups in society (Hickey and 
Seekings, 2017). Also, in contrast to the WB’s policy transfer approach was DFID’s policy 
translation approach (Hickey and Seekings, 2017). The latter allowed countries to adapt aspects 
of policies that were relevant to the needs of governments in different policy contexts (Hickey 
and Seekings, 2017). Thus, for DFID, even though targeted beneficiaries in one context 
comprised mainly poor households with school-aged children, targeted beneficiaries in other 
contexts comprised disabled groups.  
Like the WB and DFID, UNICEF sponsored conferences and workshops to enable countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa to learn about the experiences of pioneering countries and adopt cash 
transfers to support the most vulnerable households (Foli, 2016). Encouraged by research 
evidence that CCTs had the potential to reduce the effects of malnutrition in children (Hickey 
and Seekings, 2017), UNICEF went on to design and sponsor cash transfer programmes for 
vulnerable children in the eastern African country of Kenya and the Southern African country of 
Mozambique (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012).    
With the growing commitment to implement cash transfers backed by financial resources, the 
WB, DFID and UNICEF stood in a strong position to influence the design and implementation of 
cash transfer programmes in low-income countries, including Ghana.  
Not only did the global poverty reduction agenda characterise the democratic era in Ghana, but 
macroeconomic developments in the early 2000s and vulnerability to extreme poverty created 
the right conditions for social protection programmes to take centre stage in the poverty 
reduction discourse in Ghana.   
2.3.3    Macroeconomic developments and extreme poverty trends: 1991-2006   
From 2000 to 2009, Ghana began experiencing macroeconomic stability resulting in strong 
economic growth which increased from 5.8 percent in 2002 to 7.2 percent in 2008 (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2015; Molini and Paci, 2015). This was the outcome of the continued ERP 
reforms including the devaluation of the national currency and a reduction in corporation taxes 
(de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016). Private sector growth followed, and there was a reduction in 
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unemployment, a fall in the cost of living and a general improvement in living standards (Molini 
and Paci, 2015). Macroeconomic stability helped to reduce the incidence of extreme poverty 
and enabled Ghana to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the 
incidence of extreme poverty (Ghana Statistical Service, 2015; Molini and Paci, 2015). This is 
shown in figure 2.1. below. 
Figure 2.1 Extreme poverty trends, 1991- 2006 
Source: Adapted from Ghana Statistical Services, 2007  
Figure 2.1 shows a decline in the incidence of poverty17 from 51.7 percent in 1991 to 31.9 
percent in 2006 and a significant decline in the incidence of extreme poverty18 from 36.5 percent 
to 18.2 percent over the same period. It can be argued from these trends that Ghana managed 
to half the percentage of its population who lived below the $1-a-day income poverty line 
(Ghana Statistical Services, 2007).  
However, the real challenge for the NPP administration was reducing vulnerability to extreme 
poverty. As figure 2.1 illustrates, 18.2 percent of the population remained in extreme poverty 
and could not escape the conditions that made them vulnerable to extreme poverty. Also, 
extreme poverty across administrative regions in the country was very uneven and much more 
widespread in the northern sector of the country (Cooke, Hague and McKay, 2016). For example, 
while the Upper East region, located in the eastern part of the northern sector experienced an 
increasing share of extreme poverty, households in the Eastern region and Central regions 
 
17 Individuals who lived below a national upper poverty line of $380 per year were considered poor. 
































located in the southern sector of the country, experienced the opposite, having 
disproportionately benefitted from economic expansion. Figure 2.2 below illustrates these 
trends.  
Figure 2.2   Extreme poverty in Ghana by administrative region 1998/99-2005/06 
  Source: Adapted from Ghana Statistical Services, 2007 
Figure 2.2 shows that the incidence of extreme poverty was more pronounced in the Upper East 
region where 88 percent of the population were extremely poor in 1998/1999 compared to the 
Eastern and Central regions, where 44 and 48 percent of the population, respectively, lived in 
extreme poverty in the same period.  
The regional distribution of poverty exhibited in figure 2.2 suggests that pockets of extreme 
poverty persisted and was widespread in regions of the northern sector despite an overall 
reduction in the incidence of extreme in the country. The concentration of extreme poverty in 
the northern sector of the country can be traced to a number of factors. The northern sector of 
the country is landlocked and has a poorly developed infrastructure including transport which 
limits access to markets and social services (Fosu and Aryeetey, 2008; World Bank, 2016). In 
comparison with regions in the southern sector, it has less rainfall, greater land and soil 
degradation, and a predisposition to droughts and floods which forces subsistence farmers to 
adopt low-input strategies, creating a low farm output, irregular household income and a  virtual 
cycle of extreme poverty (World Bank, 2016). There is also considerable and deepening 
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the northern regions than the rest of the country having inherited an unequal development gap 
created by the colonial government (Abdulai and Hulme, 2014 ; de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016; Fosu 
and Aryeetey, 2008). 
In the late 1990s to mid- 2000s, a combination of factors contributed to a high incidence of 
extreme poverty in the Upper East and Upper West regions of Ghana (Bierderlack and Rivers, 
2009). Poor soils and an unusually low rainfall between 2002 and 2004 in the Upper East region 
resulted in a prolonged lean season of five to seven months and an exceptionally low level of 
food production which increased poor households’ risk to food insecurity (Bierderlack and 
Rivers, 2009).  Similarly in the Upper West region , food insecurity was visibly evident in child 
malnutrition cases as 12.4 percent of under-five year olds were described as malnourished and 
wasted19 in 2003, compared to cases in the southern regions of Greater Accra where a 
significantly low rate of 2.7 percent of children were malnourished (Ghana Demographic and 
Health Survey, 2003). 
In the Central and Eastern regions of the southern sector of Ghana where the incidence of 
extreme poverty was relatively lower than in regions of the northern sector of Ghana, factors 
which contributed to extreme poverty were markedly different.  The HIV epidemic in Ghana 
between 1999 and 2006, threatened the quality of lives of households in the Central and Eastern 
regions, although prevalence rates were highest in the Eastern region of Ghana (Adjei- Mensah, 
2006). Evidence from both sentinel surveillance survey data obtained from health centres  as 
well as the Demographic and Health Survey data from households, showed that Eastern region 
persistently recorded high HIV prevalence rates with a 5.3 percent in 2000 compared to an 
overall 1.4 percent recorded for Ghana in the same year (Adjei- Mensah, 2006  ; Ulasi et al., 
2009).  Although there is very limited data on HIV/AIDS related deaths in the Eastern region of 
Ghana, there is evidence that children orphaned by the HIV epidermic  could not enrol in schools 
because of the fear of being stigmatised (Adjei-Mensah, 2006; Ulasi et al., 2009). In addition to 
children who were excluded  from education, their caregivers and adult members of households 
affected by HIV/AIDS could not access essential services such as healthcare  (Ministry of Health, 
2001) thus  widening economic and social inequality gaps and remain Ghana.   
 
19 Wasting means low- weight-for height, among children under five. It is usually the result of acute 
significant food shortage that requires urgent response. 
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In addition to climate and HIV/AIDS, economic and social inequality contributed to the uneven 
nature of extreme poverty across administrative regions of Ghana between 1996 and 2006. The 
per capita income of households in the Upper East, Upper West and Northern regions of the 
northern sector 20 was GH 13021, while the per capita income of households in Greater Accra 
region, in the southern sector of Ghana was GH 54422, about four times the per capita income 
of households in the northern sector of the country (Cooke, Hague and McKay, 2016; Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2007). Differences in the net primarily enrolment rates between poorest 
regions in the north and the rest of were evident. Despite improvements in primary net 
enrolment rate from 59.6 percent in 2004 to 77.5 percent23 in 2007, the net primary enrolment 
rates in the poorest regions of the north remained low, at an average of 75.4% (Ghana Statistical 
Services, 2007). To address these problems, the NPP government employed growth-enhancing 
measures intended to stimulate demand for social services and poverty alleviation measures to 
address extreme poverty. These measures however had limiting impacts on households that 
lived in extreme poverty.  
2.3.4    Limits of growth-enhancing policies  
From 2000 onwards, the NPP continued with the NDC government’s objective of stabilising the 
macroeconomy and implementing growth-enhancing policies to achieve poverty reduction. 
These policies were outlined in Ghana’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy document, the Ghana 
Poverty Reduction Strategy framework (GPRS 1), and were intended to illustrate to donors how 
Ghana would achieve poverty reduction over a specified timeline (International Monetary Fund, 
2002; Whitfield, 2005).  
Healthcare policies were introduced to stimulate demand for healthcare (Oduro, 2010). They 
included the Ghana Health Insurance Scheme (GHIS)24, launched in 2003 to make basic 
healthcare affordable for all households including the poorest (Abebrese, 2011; Sultan and 
Schrofer, 2008). In addition to healthcare policies were policies that stimulated demand for basic 
education25 for all households in Ghana. This saw the introduction by the NPP government of 
 
20 Extreme poverty is concentrated in the three northern regions. See Cooke et al. (2016) for 
characteristics of households in these regions. 
21 Equivalent to $22.1 as of December 2020. 
22 Equivalent to $92.75. 
23 World Bank data via http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.NENR 
24 The GHIS replaced the previous cash and carry health care system in which all patients paid the cost of 
healthcare (consultation, medication etc.) on demand. 




the Education Capitation grants (EC) in 2004. The EC was designed as a per capita subsidy to 
reduce the direct costs of basic education, such as costs of stationery, which had become 
barriers to accessing education, especially for poor households (MOGCSP, 2015). The EC started 
as a per capita subsidy of GH 4 and is currently GH 9 (equivalent of $1.88) per head given directly 
to all basic schools (MOGCSP, 2015). However, as these two programmes were not directly 
targeted at extremely poor households, they had limited impacts on the 18.2 percent of 
households in Ghana that remained in extreme poverty (Oduro, 2010). 
In addition to the GHIS and the EC, the NPP in 2005 launched a poverty alleviation programme 
called the Ghana School Feeding Programme (GSF) as part of its efforts to achieve the MDG 
targets regarding extreme poverty and hunger (Oduro, 2010). The GSF provided one hot meal a 
day for children in deprived rural communities (MOGCSP, 2015). Although the GSF had social 
protection inclinations, it cannot be described as a social protection programme, because it was 
not particularly targeted at the most vulnerable children at the time. It was designed stimulate 
demand for certain agricultural crops and subsequently reduce hunger (Oduro, 2010).  
Despite incorporating growth enhancing measures in the GPRS 1, vulnerable households were 
unable to escape conditions of extreme poverty (Cooke, Hague and McKay, 2016). As a result, 
the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), a government body mandated to 
advise the government on development planning policies and strategies, initiated a review of 
GPRS 1 to assess the effectiveness of existing pro-poor programmes on vulnerability and poverty 
reduction (NDPC, 2008). As part of the GPRS 1 review, a Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) 
conducted by the WB revealed three problems which contributed to the inability of existing 
programmes to affect extreme poverty (NDPC, 2008).   
First, earlier poverty reduction measures had not sufficiently identified and targeted households 
who lived in conditions of extreme poverty. Second, the specific needs and risks of extremely 
poor households were not sufficiently clarified nor integrated into national development 
planning. Third, the government had not made any budgetary allocation to deal with the risks 
that pushed households into extreme poverty (NDPC, 2008). Based on the findings, the WB 
suggested the need for a different approach to poverty reduction. With an emphasis on the most 
vulnerable groups, the key recommendation was that the NPP government consider providing 
‘support for those who are unable and may never be able to help themselves’ (NDPC, 2005, p. 
60). This implied a targeted approach to poverty reduction. In addition, the WB advised the 
formulation of a National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) to guide the implementation of all 
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targeted intervention programmes in the country. These WB proposals were intended to guide 
the design of Ghana’s second Poverty Reduction Strategy framework, GPRS II, implemented 
between 2006 and 2009 (NDPC, 2008; NDPC, 2009). 
2.3.5   A targeted poverty reduction approach: The National Social Protection 
Strategy (NSPS) 
The NSPS framework was incorporated into the second Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) 
which emphasised accelerated growth and poverty reduction (NDPC, 2009). As the primary aim 
of the NPP government was to ensure that the 18.2 percent of households who remained in 
extreme poverty were lifted out of the conditions that trapped them in poverty, a targeted 
approach was required. The NSPS thus became the key framework which guided the 
government’s approach to poverty reduction and provided a much more structured and 
targeted approach to poverty reduction (MMYE, 2007b) than broad poverty alleviation 
programmes had previously offered. 
In effect, the NSPS framework epitomised a shift from the less targeted approaches of previous 
governments to an approach with a focus on the most vulnerable groups. It created space for 
state and non-state actors to participate in implementing social protection programmes. The 
NSPS also allowed for a combination of instruments such as cash grants with essential services 
like education and healthcare to complement cash grants and respond to the multi-dimensional 
challenges of extremely poor households (MMYE, 2007b). 
To ensure that a draft NSPS was finalised and a cash transfer programme incorporated into the 
GPRS II, three transnational actors (TNAs), namely the WB, UNICEF and DFID, actively promoted 
cash transfers to reduce vulnerability to extreme poverty in Ghana (Foli, 2016). The three TNAs 
were instrumental in persuading governments in Sub-Saharan Africa (Hickey and Seekings, 
2017), including Ghana, to use cash transfer programmes as a policy alternative to broad growth 
enhancing and broad poverty alleviation programmes which had previously failed to affect 
extreme poverty. The cash transfer adoption process and the subsequent emergence of the 
Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) cash transfer programme is presented next in 
section 2.3.6. 
2.3.6    The cash transfer adoption process and emergence of LEAP  
Following the WB’s recommendation of a cash transfer programme as an alternative policy to 
reduce vulnerability to extreme poverty in Ghana DFID and UNICEF intensified their efforts to 
get Ghanaian policymakers to adopt a new policy idea regarding social protection, with cash 
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transfers as the main instrument of delivery. This new policy idea informed the design of Ghana’s 
second Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II). 
The new policy idea’s adoption process started with identifying a local champion who would 
promote it and play a leading role in translating it into a social protection programme. The then 
deputy minister of the Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment (MMYE), in charge of 
social welfare issues, became an ally to champion this new policy idea (MMYE, 2007). She set up 
and chaired several stakeholder meetings including a Vulnerability and Social Exclusion Sector 
Working Group26, which met regularly to discuss the potential of cash transfers to reduce 
extreme poverty in Ghana.  She was also able to use her background in academia and experience 
in working on poverty and vulnerability related issues to convince national and subnational level 
stakeholders of the effectiveness of a cash transfer programme to tackle extreme poverty and 
related vulnerability issues in Ghana (Foli, 2016).  
As part of their efforts in promoting cash transfers, UNICEF in 2005 started implementing a small 
cash transfer programme for about 2500 Orphaned and Vulnerable Children (OVC) in HIV-
prevalent communities (Foli, 2016). As an international development organisation with the 
welfare of children at the centre of its work, UNICEF’s intention was to demonstrate to 
policymakers in Ghana how cash grants conditional upon healthcare access could induce 
demand for health services of children disadvantaged by HIV/AIDS (Foli, 2016; MMYE, 2007). 
The one-year programme comprised UNICEF paying health insurance premiums for OVCs and 
their caregivers who were not yet beneficiaries of the Ghana Health Insurance Scheme. Small 
but regular cash grants were provided to OVCs on the understanding that their caregivers would 
ensure regular health check-ups including immunisations (Foli, 2016). The programme was then 
monitored by UNICEF’s technocrats to ensure fulfilment of the conditions (MMYE, 2007). Later, 
UNICEF teamed up with DFID to continue promoting their brand of social protection. This was 
done primarily through study trips and conferences to expose Ghanaian policymakers to social 
cash transfer programmes in other countries of the global south.  
 
26 The Vulnerability and Exclusion Sector Working Group was a consultative group chaired by the deputy 
minister of Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment. It comprised local technocrats (academics) 
and representatives of local Non-Governmental Organisations such as Help Age International.   Among 
the TNAs who were consulted for their cash transfer ideas were policy advisors from World Bank, DFID, 
UNICEF and social policy advisors from the Luxembourg Trust, International Labour Organisation (ILO) (de-
Graft Aikins, et al., 2016 ; Foli, 2016) 
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In 2006, DFID and UNICEF, with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) support, 
facilitated study trips for Ghanaian policymakers to Brazil to learn from the experience of 
policymakers there, how cash transfer programmes had been used to reduce vulnerability and 
extreme poverty (Foli, 2016).  
In March of the same year, DFID organised an African regional experts meeting in Zambia to 
share further evidence on the role of cash transfers in response to specific risks and challenges 
of different target groups (Foli, 2016). In this meeting, dubbed the Livingstone Call for Action, 
social protection experts from thirteen African countries including Mozambique, South Africa 
and Lesotho who had previously implemented cash transfer programmes shared their 
experiences of delivering cash transfers to vulnerable groups such as the disabled, children and 
the elderly. 
In August 2007, DFID organised a study trip to Brazil for Ghanaian policymakers and technocrats, 
this time to build technical capacity for implementing Ghana’s cash transfer programme. This 
was to be achieved through the establishment of a cooperation programme, dubbed the ‘Brazil 
- Africa Cooperation’ Programme. In this cooperation programme, representatives from Ghana, 
Kenya, Namibia and Mozambique, as well as from the African Union’s development agency, the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), shared insights on how Brazil’s Bolsa 
Familia Programme (BFP) was implemented. The study included visits to social assistance 
reference centres to provide new participating countries including Ghana with relevant technical 
information about the implementation of cash transfers more broadly (Foli, 2016) and 
specifically enlightening countries about enrolment of  beneficiaries, monitoring conditions and 
developing policies for graduation’ (IPC, 2008, p. 1). To develop further technical expertise, the 
Brazilian officials responsible for social protection engaged new participating countries in 
bilateral dialogue to address country-specific issues (IPC, 2008). This learning experience is a 
classic example of South-to-South policy transfer facilitated by northern transnational actors to 
convince countries of the effectiveness of conditional cash transfers as a strategy to address 
extreme poverty in their countries.   
In the case of Ghana, the study tours paid off because policymakers, including the then deputy 
minister, and politicians at the time wholeheartedly embraced the new policy idea on how to 
reduce extreme poverty. In addition, they incorporated it into the GPRS II development 
blueprint which focused much more on policies to accelerate growth and poverty alleviation in 
contrast to the GPRS I which focused attention  primarily on programmes and measures to 
address poverty alleviation (NDPC, 2009). 
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Following the acceptance by the Ghanaian team of introducing a cash transfer programme, DFID 
arranged a three-day mission of technocrats from Brazil, Mexico and Turkey to Ghana to support 
local consultants in designing Ghana’s first National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) in line with 
the WB’s recommendations (MMYE, 2007). With this agenda, Ghana requested financial 
assistance from international donors.  As the global aid architecture at the time favoured a 
budget support form of development assistance (Abdulai, 2020), nine multilateral donors 
including the WB and the European Investment Bank (EIB) planned to support the 
implementation of Ghana’s GPRS II, which included the NSPS (Woll, 2008). However, to ensure 
that the money was used to implement targeted poverty alleviation programmes, donors 
conditioned the release of credit from the Multi-Donor Budget Support27 (MDBS) initiative on 
certain triggers, one being the completion of a draft National Social Protection Strategy (Woll, 
2008). In addition, the donors emphasised the importance of including and implementing a 
targeted cash transfer programme to reduce vulnerability to extreme poverty in Ghana (NDPC, 
2008). Thus, to access credit for implementing GPRS II, the NPP government had to comply with 
the conditionality of launching a National Social Protection Strategy and introducing the first 
ever cash transfer programme to meet the objective of the NSPS (Abdulai, 2020). The outcome 
of the triggers and policy requirements of donors was the emergence of the Livelihood 
Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) social cash transfer programme. 
 In effect, LEAP was a response to a policy conditionality imposed by donors, including TNAs, on 
Ghanaian policymakers who made financial assistance a condition for implementing the NSPS 
from which LEAP emerged. The NSPS, together with the new cash transfer programme LEAP, 
was officially approved by Ghana’s cabinet and launched in 2008 (Foli, 2016). 
LEAP was targeted at four vulnerable groups. First, extremely poor households with severely 
disabled persons without productive capacity.  Second, extremely poor households with persons 
aged 65 years and above without any form of support. Third, extremely poor households with 
OVCs and fourth, extremely poor households with pregnant women and mothers with infants 
aged under 18 months. The design of the LEAP cash transfer programme and how the 
programme was to be implemented, including the most effective approach to targeting 
 
27 The Multi-Donor Budgetary Support (MDBS) mechanism comprised grants from nine donors including 
multilateral agencies (EIB and AFDB) and bilateral donor agencies (USAID and Norway) to support the 
poverty alleviation programmes. The MDBS initiative involved a matrix of triggers, a list of policy 




households, the disbursement of cash grants and graduation of beneficiaries were primarily the 
ideas of DFID, WB and UNICEF.   
Since the launch of LEAP, other targeted intervention programmes have been implemented. In 
2009, the NDC government launched the Free School Uniform and Exercise Book (FSUEB) 
programme, primarily to absorb the indirect costs of education which limited access to basic 
education for children in chronically impoverished households (MOGCSP, 2016). The 
programme provides free school uniforms to needy children in selected deprived communities. 
It also distributes free exercise books to all children in public primary schools in the ten regions 
of the country (MOGCSP, 2016; World Bank, 2016). The FSUEB programme is entirely funded by 
the government of Ghana and implemented by the District Assemblies28, which are given the 
responsibility of targeting and enrolling children on the programme (MOGCSP, 2016). 
In 2010, another social assistance programme, this time funded entirely by the WB, was 
introduced under the administration of the NDC government (MOGCSP, 2016; World Bank, 
2016). The Labour-Intensive and Public Works (LIPW) programme involves the payment of a 
wage, in the form of cash, in return for participation in  community development projects (Carter 
et al., 2019). Ghana’s LIPW targets extremely poor adults in rural communities whose livelihoods 
are threatened by drought and crop failure. The LIPW programme began in 49 deprived districts, 
mainly concentrated in the three northern regions of Ghana (World Bank, 2016) with the aim of 
mitigating shortfalls in consumption during the lean season with cash grants and building 
households  productive capacity with skills to allow them to participate in economic activities 
(World Bank, 2016a). As a WB initiative, Ghana’s LIPW was informed by policy ideas of similar 
WB initiatives, such as Rwanda’s Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme implemented in 2008 and 
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme implemented in 2009, which provide small 
amounts of cash in exchange for community development projects.  
Table 2.1 below provides a summary of poverty alleviation and social protection programmes 
by governments in different political periods in Ghana. It shows that the PNDC era and PAMSCAD 
interventions ushered in TNA involvement in social protection provisioning in Ghana. The 
democratic era, however, was the period which during which TNA involvement in the provision 
 
28 Ghana’s decentralised local government system, equivalent to a council in England. 
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of social protection intensified. A glance at the instruments of social protection from the table, 
shows how the forms of social protection have evolved over time.  








PROGRAMME ERA  GOVERN-MENT  FUNCTIONS /RISKS 
ADDRESSED 
INSTRUMENT/S  TARGET GROUPS   ACTOR/S  
Provident Fund Social 
Security Scheme / 





CPP  Post-independence 
contingencies e.g 
unemployment, disability, 
poor health, retirement 
Income support Public and private sector workers 
  
Government of Ghana through the 
Department of Pensions + State 
Insurance Corporation  
 
 










Food insecurity  
 
Agricultural input 
subsidies eg. seedlings, 
farm implements  
All Ghanaians – but particularly small and medium 
scale farmers  
Government of Ghana- through 
Ministry of Agriculture  










food insecurity   
Microcredit; food 
support; supplementary 
feeding; skills training in 
tailoring and brick 
layering 
Chronically poor subsistence farmers (Northern + 
Volta regions 
‘New poor’ (retrenched public sector workers)  
Malnourished children 
Government of Ghana + UNICEF+ 
World Bank + International Non -
Governmental Organisations e.g ADRA 
and CRS 
Pay-AS-You-Go Statutory 
pension/ SSNIT pension  
 Democratic  
1992 
NDC   Post -PAMSCAD 
unemployment risks; 
retirement 
Income support  Public and private sector workers  Government of Ghana, through the 
Social Security and National Insurance 
Trust (SSNIT) 




NPP  Equitable healthcare access  Subsidised healthcare  All Ghanaians  Government of Ghana through the 




Capitation grants  
 
Democratic   
2004 
NPP  Barriers to educational 
access i.e indirect costs  
Subsidised education  All public-school aged children (5-15 years) Government of Ghana through the 
Ministry of Education  




NPP  Food insecurity; rural 
poverty  
Supplementary feeding  School aged children in deprived communities  Government of Ghana (Ministry of 
Gender and Social Protection) + 
Netherlands Development Agency 
(SNV) + World Food Programme 







Democratic 2008 NPP  Food insecurity 
stigmatisation, disability; 
child labour 
 Cash grants + 
complementary linkages 
to government 
programmes e.g health 
insurance  
 
Orphaned and Vulnerable Children; People Living 
with Disability; People Living with HIV/ AIDs; 
Elderly with no productive capacity; Lactating 
mothers with infants aged < 18 months 
Ghana Government (Ministry of 
Gender, Children and Social Protection) 
+WB + DFID + UNICEF through the 
District Assembly 
FSUEB  Democratic 2009 NDC Indirect costs of education  School Uniforms +  
Exercise and textbooks 
School aged children from the most deprived 
communities +  
Ghana Government (Ministry of 
Education) through the District 
Assembly 
LIPW  Democratic  
2010 
NDC Seasonal unemployment, 
hunger  
Cash grants + community 
development projects  
Chronically poor subsistence farmers   World Bank through the Ministry of 




2.4   Conclusion  
This chapter presented a historical overview of social protection provisioning in Ghana. It 
highlighted the political and macroeconomic contexts from which the LEAP cash transfer 
programme emerged.  
The chapter argued that prior to the democratic period, responses that addressed the welfare 
concerns of the poorest households in Ghana were shaped by the political priorities and 
ideologies of ruling governments. Informal social protection remained the primary source of 
support for the poorest households. However, as Ghana democratised, constitutional reforms 
gave way to a governance system which allowed elected governments to implement formal 
social protection programmes for the most vulnerable households. Democratic politics has since 
created the political expediency of social protection provision. In addition, the 
institutionalisation of a local government system has facilitated the delivery of social protection, 
while a global poverty reduction agenda involving TNAs has since driven the discourse and 
practice of social protection implementation in Ghana. 
The next chapter presents a review of the relevant literature on the politics of social protection. 
It explores gaps in the literature which this study focuses on. The chapter also presents the 














Chapter 3   Review of literature and conceptual framework  
Chapter purpose and structure  
In chapter 2, I presented a historical overview of social protection provisioning in Ghana over 
three political periods. I argued that the democratic era saw an increased transnational actor 
presence on the social protection scene in Ghana. Elected governments have since introduced 
social protection for the poorest and most vulnerable households either singlehandedly or with 
support from international aid agencies including transnational actors.  
In this chapter, I present a review of the literature on the politics of social protection. I also 
introduce the conceptual framework which will guide my analysis in this study. The chapter is 
divided into three main sections. In section 3.1, I present the literature on the politics of social 
protection.  I highlight the role of transnational actors in the policy process in section 3.1.1 and 
discuss their tools of influence, ideas and interests in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 respectively. I also 
discuss national actors’ (domestic political elites) interests in social protection policy in section 
3.1.4. 
In the second section, 3.2, I present a review of the small but growing literature on social 
protection, political settlements, and their intersections. The definition and purpose of political 
settlements is presented in 3.2.1, before turning to the types of political settlements and their 
implication for the implementation of social protection in section 3.2.2. Subsequently, the 
characteristics of competitive clientelist political settlements like patronage and ethnic politics 
which have relevance for the implementation of LEAP are discussed. The purpose of these two 
sections is to identify gaps in the literature which this study addresses. 
The third section, 3.3, presents conceptual frameworks for analysing social protection.  It first 
reviews the frameworks which explain social protection in 3.3.1, before focusing attention on 
Lavers and Hickey’s (2015) Adapted Political Settlements framework (APSF) in section 3.3.2. The 
usefulness of the APSF and its limitations for this study are subsequently discussed. The purpose 
of this third section is to present a lens through which the politics of implementing the LEAP 
programme will be analysed. Section 3.4 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
3.1   The politics of social protection  
As I noted in the introduction to this thesis in chapter 1, social protection describes a range of 
targeted actions employed by state or non-state actors in response to socially unacceptable 
levels of vulnerability and deprivation (Norton, Conway and Foster, 2001). An area of focus in 
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the social protection literature is the politics of addressing extreme poverty and vulnerability in 
low-income countries.  
The literature on the politics of social protection involving international development actors in 
global poverty reduction has evolved. As the nature of vulnerability to extreme poverty changes 
across the global south, forms of social protection delivered by international development 
agencies and organisations similarly change. The outcome on the literature has therefore been 
shifts in debates around responses that work.   
In the mid-1990s when extreme poverty was primarily driven by drought, food insecurity and 
poor macroeconomic performance in the global south, international development agencies 
including United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) responded by providing emergency food assistance to 
affected households and communities.  Social protection was then administered in the form of 
emergency assistance. The politics of social protection literature thus focused on emergency 
and short term assistance to affected households and communities in low-income countries in 
SSA (Ellis, Devereux and White, 2009; Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012). Studies did not focus on how 
responses by international development agencies interacted with domestic politics in drought-
stricken countries for example, to shape poverty reduction approaches.  
In the late 1990s to early 2000s, as factors driving households into extreme poverty became 
multi-dimensional and complex,  international aid agencies and development organisations who 
were involved in the delivery of emergency assistance regarded emergency responses as ill-
equipped to move households permanently out of the conditions that held them in poverty,  
although they did address their short-term challenges (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012). Efforts were 
thus made to dissuade affected governments from providing emergency assistance (Ellis, 
Devereux and White, 2009; Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012) and to shift to much more regular social 
cash transfers29. Subsequently, the literature on the politics of social protection focused 
attention on the pilot implementation of social cash transfer programmes across much of SSA 
(Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2010; Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012). Studies on the pilot implementation of 
cash transfers such as  Malawi’s Mchinji Cash Transfer programme and Zambia’s  Palomo Cash 
transfer programme, focused on the role of regular cash grants in improving child wellbeing and 
 
29 Social cash transfers comprise non-contributory transfers in cash, vouchers, or in-kind payments 
(including school feeding) to individuals or households in need (Carter et al., 2019). 
40 
 
food security (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012). The literature then did not focus attention on how the 
innovative ideas of international development agencies which financed the pilot schemes 
interacted with domestic politics in low-income countries of Africa to shape poverty reduction 
approaches. This is a gap in the literature that my study explores. 
From the early 2000  onwards, when extreme poverty deepened across SSA amidst the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, international aid agencies and organisations pushed for a new poverty reduction 
agenda involving targeted social cash transfers (Pino and Confalonieri, 2014; Whitfield, 2009). 
Aid agencies including transnational policy actors  played active roles in designing and financing 
national social protection strategies, as evidenced in the development of country-level Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers30 (PRSPs) (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012; Pino and Confalonieri, 2014; 
Whitfield, 2010). Cash transfers were then proposed and adopted in the design of PRSPs  (Pino 
and Confalonieri, 2014), although in some cases the inclusion of donor ideas in country-level 
PRSPs was enforced through policy conditions  (Abdulai, 2020;  Whitfield, 2010). In this era, the 
role of donors in designing and financing poverty reduction programmes with their ‘tried and 
tested ideas’ was documented. The literature on the politics of social protection concentrated 
on the practical challenges of turning these ideas into actual programmes. Consequently, 
debates centred around the affordability and sustainability of pilot programmes (Niño-Zarazúa 
et al., 2012). There was not much literature on how domestic politics interacted with 
transnational actors’ ideas to shape the design and implementation of programmes. This gap in 
the literature relates directly to the overarching focus of this study.  
Since the mid-2000s, even when transnational policy actors like the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) acknowledged the role of domestic politics and engaged 
powerful domestic elites in social protection policies (Hickey and Seekings, 2017),  much of the 
literature  focused unproblematically on promoting and ensuring the adoption of  targeted social 
cash transfer programmes. There has been limited literature on the politics of implementation 
particularly beyond the pilot phase. The scholarly works of Lavers (2016b) on Ethiopia’s 
Productive Safety Net Programme31 (PSNP) and on Rwanda’s Vision Umurunge Programme32 
 
30 PRSPs were official documents required by major multilateral donors such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank prior to debt relief and receipt of further development assistance 
(Whitfield, 2010). 
31 A social assistance programme which delivers cash and/or food transfers to chronically food insecure 
households through public works or in the form of direct income support (Lavers, 2016a). 
32 A social assistance programme which delivers cash grants, public works and financial services to 
extremely poor households (Roelen, 2017). 
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(VUP) (Lavers, 2016a) and of Ulriksen (2016) on Tanzania’s Productive Social Safety Net33 (PSSN) 
programme focus on the politics of promotion and adoption of transnational ideas, primarily 
cash transfers. Moreover, such studies concentrated mostly on eastern and southern African 
countries with dominant party type governments. There have not been many studies on the 
politics of implementing social protection in competitive democratic contexts in west Africa.   
This research aims to fill this gap by exploring the politics of implementing social protection using 
Ghana’s LEAP programme as a case study.   
Although Abdulai (2020) has recently documented the politics of adoption and implementation 
of the LEAP programme in Ghana, the elements of implementation he discusses relate to 
geographic targeting and limited technical capacity. Abdulai’s (2020) analysis pays little 
attention to how domestic politics interacts with the ideas and interests of transnational actors 
to shape the implementation of LEAP at national and subnational (local government) levels. This 
is an area where my research questions pay attention to and which this thesis explores in greater 
depth.  
In the emerging literature on the politics of implementing social protection in the context of low-
income countries in SSA, the ideas and interests of transnational actors can be viewed as 
relevant to social protection implementation. This is because of how transnational actors exert 
influence on social protection policy to achieve their organisational aims and how in turn 
domestic political elites respond to transnational influences in the realisation of their political 
interests. These issues reflect the overarching research focus and the research questions which 
this study aims to answer. At this stage, it is useful to outline what each research question seeks 
and to examine which bodies of literature are reviewed as a result.  
The first research question seeks to examine how the ideas and interests of transnational actors 
shape the implementation of the LEAP programme.  This question provides justification for 
reviewing the literature on transnational actors in social protection policy process. The second 
research question examines how Ghana’s competitive democratic politics shapes the 
implementation and subsequent expansion of the LEAP programme. The third research question 
investigates how local government institutions and actors in Ghana’s competitive political 
environment shape the expansion of LEAP.  As the second and third research questions focus on 
the interplay of political power and elites’ interests in the expansion of LEAP at national and 
 
33 A social assistance programme that combines conditional cash transfers with public works and aims to 
break the intergenerational cycle of poverty (World Bank, 016). 
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local government levels, the literature on political settlements and their intersection with social 
protection is reviewed. 
3.1.1   The role of transnational actors in the policy process  
Transnational Actors (TNAs) are broadly defined in international politics as  actors who influence 
policy across state borders (Uhlin, 2009). Categories of TNAs include transnational civil society 
organisations, such as Save the Children, who advocate for and provide services to 
disadvantaged people around the world and transnational epistemic communities who seek to 
influence policy in multiple countries through well-elaborated policy proposals (Béland and 
Orenstein, 2009; Haas, 1992; Uhlin, 2009). In this thesis, I explore the influence of transnational 
epistemic communities on the implementation of Ghana’s LEAP programme, focusing on the 
most active actors - the WB, DFID and UNICEF. The emphasis on these organisations is because 
they  play leading roles in shaping social protection policies in many low-income countries in SSA 
(Foli, 2016; Hickey and Seekings, 2017). They are referred to as TNAs in this thesis.   
TNA ideas in the policy process are defined as beliefs and opinions about how society should 
solve its problems (Béland,2005). Ideas are ‘specific policy solutions’ (Schmidt, 2008 p. 306), 
comprising recommendations for specific social problems.  
Béland and Orenstein (2009) stress that as external policy actors, TNAs can influence domestic 
social policy, but they ‘lack formal veto-powers’ which would allow them to exercise the right to 
make policy directly (p. 9). Nevertheless, they are able to make a strong case for policy ideas 
during policy meetings with domestic political elites (Béland and Orenstein, 2009; Foli, 2016). 
TNA ideas, thus can end up as policy proposals, programmes or worldviews reflecting 
philosophies about how social problems should be resolved. Indirectly, however, when 
presenting ideas, TNAs  have to contend with the interests of domestic elites (Hickey and 
Seekings, 2017) as these determine whether or not the ideas will be adopted or resisted (Lavers 
and Hickey, 2015). 
A mechanism which facilitates the adoption of TNA ideas is policy diffusion (Hickey and Seekings, 
2017). Policy diffusion describes the process whereby local policy choices are influenced by 
policy choices made elsewhere (Gilardi and Wasserfallen, 2019). This contrasts with policy 
translation, which explains how policy ideas from one context are modified with new meanings 
and designs to suit other contexts.  
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Gilardi and Wasserfallen (2019) explain that ‘in an interconnected world, policy diffusion has 
become a defining feature of politics’ (p. 1245), and that ‘policy makers are influenced by a 
number of factors among which are (a) the success or failure of policy elsewhere (learning), (b) 
the pressure from international organisations or powerful countries (coercion) and (c) the 
perceived appropriateness of policies (emulation)’ (p. 1248). While all three factors apply in the 
case of TNAs’ influence in social protection policy in SSA, there is evidence to suggest that TNAs 
selectively emphasise learning as a mechanism to gain advantage in the struggle to get their 
ideas accepted. TNAs present successful cases of social protection programmes, particularly of 
social assistance schemes like cash transfers, through conferences, seminars, and publications 
to persuade domestic political elites in a different country to adopt them (Hickey and Seekings, 
2017; Foli, 2016). A case in the literature is the WB and DFID presenting Ethiopia’s social 
assistance programme, which combines cash transfers and cash-for-work programmes, as a 
model for Rwanda to follow (Lavers, 2016b). 
In exploring how LEAP’s TNAs have used policy diffusion, I will examine which cash transfer 
programme has been presented to Ghana’s political elites’ as a model to follow. Furthermore, I 
will explore the forms of pressure they use to present their ideas. In the policy process, TNA 
ideas are presented in various forms. Transnational actors present ideas as proposals, 
programmes or core worldviews. 
3.1.2    Transnational ideas in social protection policy  
TNA ideas as proposals 
TNA ideas tend to be presented as proposals in response to defined problems (Béland, 2005). 
According to Béland and Orenstein (2009), policy proposals are often inspired by researchers in 
academic institutions whose work involves defining policy problems, identifying possible 
solutions and offering appropriate solutions for consideration. TNA proposals are often 
presented at the agenda setting phase of the policy process, where problems are identified and 
defined (Foli, 2016; Hickey et al., 2018). However, TNAs do not expect that policy proposals once 
presented will be adopted by domestic political elites. Two mutually reinforcing factors 
determine whether and how proposals which end up on the policy agendas of national 
governments will be adopted (Béland 2005; Béland and Orenstein, 2009). The first is whether 
there is domestic political support for a policy proposal (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993), and the 
second is whether there is validation from technocrats in the field of social policy (Hall, 1989). 
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Goldstein and Keohane (1993) argue that, without the support of powerful domestic  elites, TNA 
policy proposals might not get on policy agendas in the first place. Hall (1989), however, argues 
that it is validation by technocrats with expert knowledge which is critical for policy adoption. 
Hickey and Bukenya’s (2016) study of the adoption of social cash transfer for Uganda’s Social 
Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) programme shows how representatives of DFID, 
WB and Irish Aid relied on expert knowledge from bureaucrats to champion the policy idea of a 
social cash transfer. In the case of Ghana, Foli (2016) argues that ideas for reducing vulnerability 
to extreme poverty in Ghana were first sold to the deputy minister in charge of social welfare, 
who then became the conduit for promoting the policy in government. What Hickey and 
Bukenya’s (2016) and Foil’s (2016) studies show is that political support from domestic political 
elites was much stronger than the validation of policy proposals by technocrats working in the 
field of social protection in global south contexts.   
Identifying domestic political elites who can be convinced of the importance and impact of TNA 
policy proposals can strengthen the case for adopting such proposals. However, Gilardi and 
Wasserfallen (2018) dispute the idea that TNA policy proposals are devoid of politics.  They argue 
that ‘policy adoption is not a mere technocratic act’, but is political, and ‘processed through 
ideological lenses’. They also stress that, at the domestic level, policymakers are interested not 
only in what works, but also in what is popular. Thus if policymakers observe that a certain policy 
is popular elsewhere, they are more likely to adopt it, regardless of the policy consequences 
(Gilardi and Wasserfallen, 2019). In this thesis, I will explore how TNA proposals were adopted 
by political elites, the extent to which they served a national policy agenda and whether this 
agenda was in turn used to realise the political interests of elites.  
Transnational ideas as programmes    
In the public policy literature, ideas of policy actors are sometimes referred to as programmatic 
ideas (Campbell, 1998; Mackinder, 2020; Schmidt, 2008). According to Hickey and Seekings 
(2017), TNAs often promote social cash transfer programmes in fulfilment of their mission 
statements and organisational goals of reducing vulnerability to extreme poverty. The WB, for 
example, presents its ideas in the form of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes in 
response to social problems that require bridging economic and social vulnerability (Hickey and 
Seekings, 2017). Their programmatic ideas are based on the strong belief that receipt of cash 
grants conditioned upon regular health checks and school attendance helps to bridge economic 
and social inequalities, enabling beneficiary households to break out of the cycle of 
intergenerational poverty over time (World Bank, 2004). This belief has been supported by the 
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experiences of conditional cash transfer programmes like Mexico’s Opportunidades and Brazil’s 
Bolsa Familia (Hickey and Seekings, 2017). 
DFID’s ideas are also presented as social cash grant programmes, inspired by national social 
protection ideas from the UK (Hickey and Seekings, 2017). There is an understudied political 
dimension of this strategy, of adapting global north welfare programmes to meet the welfare 
needs of the poorest households in global south contexts. Thus, in this thesis I will also explore 
whether political elites in Ghana are open to global north ‘best practices’ of addressing poverty 
and vulnerability.  
In presenting programmatic ideas, the politics of  social protection literature suggests that TNAs 
diffuse  or  translate policy into other contexts (Hickey and Seekings, 2017;  Niño-Zarazúa et al., 
2012). For the WB, most of its conditional cash transfer programmes which emanated from 
Mexico and Brazil  were diffused across Latin America before reaching countries in SSA (Hickey 
et al., 2018; Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012). However, many countries in SSA have found it more 
appropriate to translate or adapt specific components or elements of programmes to suit their 
development priorities (de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016) rather than simply adopting programmatic 
ideas thought to have been successful in other contexts (Hickey and Seekings, 2017). 
Nevertheless, programmatic ideas are welcomed in contexts that are deemed to be similar. For 
example,  the Rwandan government’s  social protection implementing partners like the WB 
borrowed work-based elements of Ethiopia’s cash transfer programme to design the Vision 
Umurenge Programme (VUP) (Lavers, 2016b).  
However, DFID used policy translation, as opposed to policy diffusion, to promote its ideas. DFID 
allowed countries to borrow elements of other programmes to formulate specific programmes. 
For example, differences in the causes of extreme poverty and inequality between Ghana and 
Brazil meant that Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Programme was not entirely diffused in the Ghanaian 
context, but conditional elements of the Bolsa Familia programme were adapted to suit the 
formulation of Ghana’s LEAP programme (de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016; Foli, 2016).  
The experience of Rwanda and Ghana’s adoption of programmatic ideas suggests that 
transnational actors may present programmatic ideas tested in one context to countries that 
they wish to diffuse similar ideas. However, in reality, these ideas are adapted or 
recontextualised to meet local policy needs. 
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Programmatic ideas of TNAs are not simply diffused or translated into a country after successful 
implementation of ideas in other contexts. According to Hickey et al., (2018) despite calculated 
efforts to negotiate programmatic ideas, there are also pushbacks from domestic political elites, 
particularly when programmatic ideas of TNAs do not fit with the political interests or 
development philosophies of ruling governments  (Lavers and Hickey, 2015). An example is the 
resistance shown by Ethiopia and Rwanda’s ruling elites because TNAs’ programmatic ideas 
were exclusively in the form of social cash transfer programmes and did not have work-based 
elements. The latter were crucial in reflecting the ruling elites’ development philosophy (Lavers, 
2016a; Lavers, 2016b). In other cash transfer programmes cited in the politics of social 
protection literature, TNA ideas were initially resisted before being accepted for similar reasons 
of not fitting with the development ideologies of ruling elites. The  expansion of Uganda’s Social 
Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) programme (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016) and 
Tanzania’s Productive Social Safety Net (PSSN) programme  (Ulriksen, 2016) are typical cases. 
Transnational ideas as worldviews  
Ideas of TNAs sometimes represent the worldviews of policy actors (Béland, 2005; Schmidt, 
2008; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). TNA beliefs about how households should be lifted 
from conditions of extreme poverty or which is the ‘best’ way to address vulnerability to 
extreme poverty reflects their worldviews about vulnerability and poverty reduction. TNAs’ 
worldviews also illustrate how to respond to development challenges (Béland and Orenstein, 
2009; Devereux and White, 2010; Hickey and Seekings, 2017).    
According to Devereux and White (2010), since development thinking in the last two decades 
has shifted from implementing social protection as a mere development activity to a rights-
based development policy, TNAs have promoted the implementation of social protection on the 
basis that it is a right. Thus, for TNAs, enrolling vulnerable households on a cash grants 
programme was not simply to be interpreted as governments providing income support and 
linking them to services which respond to welfare concerns. Instead, cash grant programmes for 
vulnerable households were to be viewed as entitlements which ought to be provided by 
governments, although only a few countries in the global south, including South Africa, have 
implemented cash transfer programmes as a right for beneficiaries (Béland and Orenstein, 
2009).  
Social protection as a fundamental right has implications for who gets targeted. Abdulai (2019) 
explains that in the case of Ghana’s LEAP programme, there were debates at the national level 
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about whether it was right to give the poorest households cash and whether it would get them 
out of poverty. In section 5.3.3 of chapter 5, I will discuss the politics around TNAs’ push for a 
social protection bill in Ghana.  
3.1.3 Transnational actors’ interests in social protection policy 
In social protection policy, TNA interests are not explicitly defined, but gauged through their 
mission statements and organisational goals  (Hickey and Seekings, 2017;  Hickey et al., 2018). 
As  political actors, their interests can be described as ‘their  desires, aspirations and goals they 
hope to achieve’ (Mukand and Rodrik, 2018, p. 23). A goal of transnational actors is to support 
the budgets of governments in low-income countries to implement targeted intervention 
programmes. 
Supporting the implementation of targeted programmes  
The WB, DFID and UNICEF share a common goal of assisting low-income countries to design and 
implement targeted programmes that reflect the interests of their respective development 
agencies and organisations (Hickey and Seekings, 2017; Pino and Confalonieri, 2014; Whitfield, 
2009). This interest finds its way into the design of country-level Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) (Temple, 2010; Whitfield, 2009; Whitfield, 2010) which, as I mentioned earlier in  
section 3.1 on the politics of social protection, comprised the new poverty agenda which 
featured targeted cash transfer programmes intended to reduce extreme poverty. Also in 
sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4  of chapter 2 regarding the adoption of TNA ideas, I indicated that TNAs 
recommended  targeted cash transfer programmes in almost all poverty reduction plans in West 
Africa, including that for Ghana (Pino and Confalonieri, 2014). In the context of low-income West 
African countries, targeted intervention programmes were aimed at ‘prioritising the needs of 
the poor and protecting them from deprivation through access to basic social services’ such as 
education and health’ (Pino and Confalonieri 2014, p. 137). This did not seem different from 
what TNAs intended for Ghana’s cash transfer programme. 
TNAs had different motivations for focusing on programmes targeted at the poorest. For the 
WB, it was in response to criticisms of the negative impacts of its structural adjustment 
programmes and the long-term effects that their austerity measures had on the welfare of the 
poorest households (Whitfield, 2009b). The WB’s aim therefore was to mend and clarify its 
primary position as a development aid agency with one of its major aims being to improve the 
living standards of the poorest populations. UNICEF and DFID’s interests in targeted 
programmes were in response to deepening poverty and rising social and economic inequalities 
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which followed the era of structural adjustments (Hickey and Seekings, 2017). Both the WB and 
DFID sought to address and meet the immediate needs of  households hit hardest as a result of 
the WB’s austerity measures (Whitfield, 2009 b).  In this thesis, I intend to explore the extent to 
which the WB, DFID and UNICEF were able to maintain this agenda in a competitive democratic 
context. 
According to Hickey and Seekings (2017), as epistemic communities, TNAs were inspired by 
different philosophies and frameworks that underpinned poverty reduction in specific periods.   
For the WB, it was the Post-Washington Consensus framework which highlighted the role of 
governments rather than markets in tackling the welfare concerns of households disadvantaged 
by structural adjustment economic policies (Mosley, 2001; Williamson, 2005). The WB believed  
that state welfare policies had a role to play in lifting disadvantaged and low-income households 
out of poverty (Williamson, 2005).  
DFID on the other hand applied the ‘third-way’ ideology, a development framework which 
advocated a combination of right-wing (free market) and left-wing (state interventionist) 
policies to improve the wellbeing of disadvantaged households (Hickey and Seekings, 2017). The 
third way ideology was characterised by an unswerving belief in the merits of the free market 
but also in democratic socialism, and thus called on the state to enact some socialist policies to 
reduce economic inequality (Hay, 2018). Thus, to improve the wellbeing of the most 
disadvantaged households in society, DFID believed in entrepreneurship and wealth creation 
but was also in favour of increasing social justice and saw state interventionist policies as playing 
a major role in bringing this about.    
In contrast, a human rights philosophy underpinned UNICEF’s idea of improving welfare of 
disadvantaged groups. Crucially, social protection  was recognised by UNICEF as a right to be 
provided by the state (Hickey and Seekings, 2017; Hickey et al., 2018).  
Thus, although the WB, DFID and UNICEF shared a collective goal of using targeted cash transfer 
programmes to reduce vulnerability to extreme poverty, their approaches to realising this goal 
had slight variations. In this thesis, I will explore the similarities and differences in their 
approaches and the extent to which this helped domestic political elites to pursue their political 
interests while at the same time adhering to the overarching poverty reduction interests of 
TNAs.    
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In the social protection policy process, when TNAs provide financial resources to implement 
targeted programmes, they also expect that domestic political elites will implement 
programmes as intended (Hickey and Seekings, 2017). TNAs often achieve this by enforcing 
certain policy prescriptions, couched as programme conditions (Gould, 2005; Temple, 2010).  
Preserving organisational interests  
The literature on TNAs in policy notes that in providing financial assistance to aid-recipient 
countries, TNAs, particularly the WB and the IMF, apply coercive strategies in ways that allow 
them to preserve their organisational interests (Gould, 2005; Temple, 2010; Whitfield, 2010).  
Coercive strategies involve the use of force, threats and sanctions to ensure specific 
recommended policies are adhered to (Gould, 2005; Temple, 2010). Coercive strategies of the 
WB and IMF are cited in the aid literature in relation to requests for donor finance to strengthen 
the macroeconomy of poor countries. They date to the structural adjustment era of the 1980s, 
where a set of macroeconomic stabilisation policies were enforced by the WB and the IMF in 
such a way that aid-recipient countries risked losing requested loans if they did not comply 
(Temple, 2010;  Whitfield, 2010). Left with no option, governments of low-income countries had 
to comply with implementing conditional economic policies such as the privatisation of state-
owned enterprises and liberation of international trade (see Boafo-Arthur, 1999; Gayi, 1991; 
Whitfield, 2010).  
Since the 1990s, however, when participatory approaches and country ownership of policies 
were promoted by the WB and other aid agencies, less coercive and more consensus-oriented 
strategies have been employed (Lateef, 2016). The WB and other TNAs in social policy employed 
less coercive strategies like attending conferences, seminars and workshops to promote and 
persuade governments to adopt specific programmes or policies (Foli, 2016). A number of cases 
exemplify the use of less coercive strategies by TNAs on policy adoption, including Uganda’s 
SAGE programme (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016) and Ghana’s LEAP programme (Foli, 2016) where 
seminars, conferences and lobbying were employed. These have been described as ‘soft power’ 
tactics, in contrast to the previous use of  ‘hard power’ in which policy conditions were enforced 
(Abdulai, 2020). The two cases also demonstrate situations where coercive strategies have been 
employed in the implementation of cash transfer programmes to enable the WB and DFID to 
realise their organisational interests. In this thesis, I aim to explore how TNAs employ hard and 
soft forms of power.  
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As noted earlier, in section 3.1 of this chapter, most analyses of the politics of social protection 
do not adequately explore how the interests of domestic political elites affect the outcome of 
implementation. As I indicated earlier, this is a gap in the literature that my second and third 
research questions aim to answer.  
3.1.4   National actor interests in social protection policy     
National actors in public policy comprise groups that are variously referred to as policy elites  
(Grindle and Thomas, 1989) and political elites (Hickey, 2008). In democratic contexts, they 
include elected ministers of state such as ministers of finance and ministers of social protection 
who make or have oversight over major policy areas. They also include influential government 
representatives elected to act on behalf of the government (Hickey, 2008). In this thesis, they 
are referred to as domestic political elites or political elites. As this thesis explores how interests 
of domestic political elites converge or diverge from TNA interests in the implementation of the 
LEAP programme, I review literature on national actor interests as well.  
In dominant party political contexts, where political power is concentrated in the  hands of a 
small group of a dominant party or leader, elites’ interests lie in upholding their own 
development philosophy (see Lavers, 2016a; Lavers, 2016b) while in competitive political 
contexts democracies where multiple strong factions compete for political power through 
electoral processes, the interests of political elites focus on maintaining positions of power. 
Upholding the development philosophy of the government 
The literature suggests that decisions taken by domestic political elites  can be politically 
motivated or result in benefits for the ruling coalition or government (see Hickey and Bukenya, 
2016; Lavers, 2016a; Lavers, 2016b). For example, prior to adopting the Labour-Intensive Public 
Works (LIPW) model of the WB, political elites in Ethiopia ensured that the design of the 
programme aligned with the government’s development philosophy. This meant that  
beneficiary households were not left dependant on government support, but their productive 
capacity was built as a result (Lavers, 2016a). This led to the development of a programme which 
did not simply provide grants but where beneficiaries engaged in community development 
projects in exchange for the cash grant as is typical of LIPW programmes. However, to 
strengthen the programme’s alignment with the dominant development philosophy of the 
Ethiopian government, complementary linkages, including the extension of microcredit to food 
insecure beneficiary households, were included in the design of the programme (Lavers, 2016a).  
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Similarly, in Rwanda, social cash transfers  promoted by the WB and DFID  had to be redesigned 
to fit with the inclusive socioeconomic development philosophy of the government (Lavers, 
2016b). This meant that the Vision Umurenge Programme (VUP) did not exclusively offer 
unconditional cash grants to those unable to work but included a financial services component 
to allow beneficiary households to manage their grants and other sources of income received 
from microcredit institutions. The cases of Ethiopia and Rwanda demonstrate how in dominant 
party-political contexts, the adoption and subsequent implementation of social protection is 
used to uphold the development philosophy of ruling elites. In political contexts characterised 
by intense competition, the interests of elites are different. In democracies such as Ghana’s, the 
result of intense competition for power among political elites’ and the constant vulnerability to 
the loss of power (Levy, 2014; Khan, 2010) means that social protection is used to preserve ruling 
elites’ positions of power once they are elected. 
Preserving positions of power to retain office 
In their discussion of policy elites’ interests, Grindle and Thomas (1989) argue that, in developing 
countries where democratically elected governments use electoral processes to determine the 
terms of office of policy elites, the latter become ‘overwhelmed with remaining in power’ (p. 
218). This implies that domestic political elites are driven to execute certain policies and take 
actions including enlisting their supporters and party sympathisers on social protection 
programmes in order to gain the continued support and protection they need to secure their 
positions of influence (de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016). I will discuss this issue in the context of 
Ghana’s LEAP programme as I examine the degree to which the programme has become a 
conduit through which the NPP and NDC governments prosecute their political interests of 
retaining power as competition for power has become intense and power alternates between 
the two governments. 
How power is distributed and exercised in ways that allow social protection decisions to be taken 
could be understood from a political settlement analysis. A review of the political settlement 
literature and its intersection with social protection is what I next turn to. 
3.2   Political settlement and social protection   
In this section, I review relevant literature on political settlement and its intersections with social 
protection in low-income countries. 
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3.2.1   Definition and purpose 
As a concept, political settlement does not lend itself to a single, universally accepted definition, 
although there is common agreement among scholars about its focus and relevance in 
development policy.   
Slight differences exist in the way political settlement is defined and applied in different policy 
contexts. DFID’s working definition of political settlement describes the concept as the ‘common 
understanding usually forged between elites about how power is organized and exercised’  (DFID, 
2010, p. 22). It also has to do with how formal and informal power arrangements play out 
between influential groups in a country (Park and Cole, 2010). For Khan (2010), political 
settlement focuses on how the distribution or the balance of power in a polity between different 
groups shapes the types of institutions that emerge and how such institutions function in 
practice.   
In the definitions presented, there is an emphasis on the distribution and exercise of power at 
the domestic level, which resonates with this study. I find Khan’s (2010) explanation useful 
because it highlights the distribution of power between contending groups (domestic political 
elites). In this thesis, I make the argument that the distribution of power and the political 
interests of elites are interrelated and that to understand how Ghana’s LEAP is implemented 
and subsequently expanded at the local government level, it is important to adopt a political 
settlement framework.  
A political settlement framework is an analytical tool (Di John and Putzel, 2009; Lavers and 
Hickey, 2015;  Parks and Cole, 2010) used to explain the outcome of development interventions. 
It provides a lens through which to understand how development programmes are influenced 
by powerful groups (Parks and Cole, 2010). Studies that have adopted a political settlement 
framework include that of Abdulai and Hickey (2014), who focus on the politics of resource 
allocation in Ghana, and Abdulai and Hulme’s (2014) analysis of the politics of regional inequality 
in Ghana. Although TNAs may have a big input in the formulation of social protection policy, the 
prevailing political settlement can influence the outcome of social protection.  
3.2.2   Types of political settlement and implications for social protection  
The political settlement literature identifies two broad political settlement types, differentiated 
on the basis of concentration of power, which have significance for the implementation of social 
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protection. There is the dominant party or dominant ruler type of settlement and the 
competitive clientelist type of settlement (Levy, 2014).  
Dominant Party and Competitive Clientelist Settlements  
According to Levy (2014) in a dominant party political settlement, power is highly concentrated 
among a narrow ruling elite, political party or political leader who have/has very little chance of 
losing power. Domestic elites are thus less vulnerable to threats from opposing groups and are  
more likely to develop strong implementation and enforcement capabilities (Khan, 2010). 
However, a long time horizon of  elites in power is not always guaranteed and power could  be 
lost to opposing factions through violence or military coups (Hickey et al., 2018). Public 
bureaucracy is governed by personalised norms such as clientelism and patronage (Khan, 2010).  
There is also commitment to uphold the dominant philosophy or vision of the ruling coalition 
(Lavers, 2016a; Lavers, 2016b). As a result, domestic political elites in dominant type settlements  
are more likely to make policy decisions, including those regarding social protection policies, 
based on beliefs and values that they subscribe to rather than be open to views from external 
actors (see Grebe and Mubiru, 2014) Lavers, 2016a). 
The commitment to a dominant philosophy implies that elites can resist social protection ideas 
from transnational actors if it these do not align with their own dominant ideologies.  According 
to Lavers and Hickey (2015), to promote buy-in of TNA ideas for social protection 
implementation, TNAs try to  ‘persuade dominant actors that their  ideas are in line with what 
elites perceive to be their interests’ (Lavers and Hickey, 2015 p. 13). A notable case of dominant 
ruler type settlement is Uganda’s current political settlement where, despite a re-introduction 
of multiparty politics in 2015, the party system is characterized by a de facto hegemony of the 
ruling National Resistance Movement Party, which remains in power to date, with president 
Museveni as the head of the party (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016).  
In contrast, competitive clientelism is a type of political settlement which emerges when political 
power is dispersed more widely among multiple strong factions (Levy, 2014). Political 
competition between and among factions is intense and elites form coalitions with lower-level 
groups, together with which they contest their hold on power with powerful groups excluded 
from the ruling coalition (Levy, 2014). The lower-level groups are like insider clients, as I note in 
section 2.3 of chapter 2 regarding the nature of power distribution in Ghana. They protect the 
interests of elites in the ruling coalition (Oduro, Mohammed and Ashon, 2014). In exchange for 
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their clients’ support, political elites’ allocate public in ways that strengthens their relationship 
with their supporters and  secure their return to power  (Khan, 2010). Thus, like dominant party 
settlements, there is a transfer of patronage resources to insider clients in competitive clientelist 
political settlements (Khan, 2010).  
In contrast to dominant party settlements which are more likely to be displaced through conflict 
(Khan, 2010), elites in competitive clientelist political settlements are likely to be displaced in 
electoral processes. The short time horizon of governments in competitive clientelist 
settlements means political elites are less likely to hold strongly to particular ideas for 
development or stick to a particular development ideology (Lavers and Hickey, 2015) in the way 
that elites in dominant party settlements do. Competitive clientelist settlements are therefore 
more likely to consider and adopt the ideas of TNAs for social protection implementation, 
particularly if they have the potential to enable them to retain power.  
Despite the short time horizon for elites in competitive clientelist settlements, there is some 
room for implementation of certain types of social protection programmes, especially ones that 
can produce quick results. Social cash transfer programmes which are relatively quick to 
implement and offer short-term gains to political constituents in return for votes are popular 
(Abdulai, 2019; Whitfield, 2010). As Ghana’s political settlement has remained competitive 
clientelist since the early 2000s (Abdulai, 2020; Osei et al., 2015), in chapter 6 I will explore how 
the LEAP cash transfer programme has been used by elites to buy political support to retain 
political power. This feeds into the narrative that political elites are not only interested in what 
works, but also in what is popular and that electoral consequences affect political parties’ 
attitudes and responses to international programmes (Gilardi and Wasserfallen, 2019). In the 
case of Ghana, there is little research which unpacks how the implementation of LEAP has been 
manipulated to reflect political interests. Thus, in chapter 6, I will discuss how elites of the NPP 
and NDC have pursued aspects of the LEAP programme that are not entirely consistent with the 
objectives of the programme as promoted by the WB, DFID and UNICEF.  
Competitive clientelist settlements, patronage politics and ethnic politics   
The political settlement literature highlights patronage and ethnic politics as features of 
competitive clientelist settlements in low-income countries in SSA (Abdulai, 2020; Khan, 2010; 
Seekings, 2019).  
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Patronage politics derives from neo-patrimonialism (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994), a political 
regime which existed in the post-colonial African continent where governments which  
democratised but inherited weak state institutions attempted to gain legitimacy from their 
citizens through offering governmental positions in exchange for loyalty (Bratton and Van de 
Walle, 1994). In contemporary democratic political systems, patronage politics is exemplified by 
domestic elites offering governmental appointments to specific groups in exchange for their 
loyalty (Driscoll, 2018 ; Kopecký, 2011).  
As competition for electoral power intensifies, political parties build support through 
relationships of patronage, as I note in section 2.3 of chapter 2, and elites use state resources 
including social protection to secure the loyalty of specific groups, often referred to as ‘clients’ 
(Abdulai, 2020; de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016). In chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis, I will explore and 
discuss how patronage politics finds its way into the implementation and subsequent expansion 
of the LEAP programme. My aim is to produce insights into how patronage politics especially at 
the local government level encourages implementation behaviours meant to retain the political 
power of elites at the national level of governance.  
In addition to patronage politics, ethnic politics is a characteristic of contemporary democratic 
politics (Berman, 2012;de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016; Seekings, 2019) that affects distribution of 
social protection. Ethnic politics refers to a situation in which political elites tend to mobilise 
support on the basis of appeals to ethnic identity and where political constituents tend to 
support leaders from the same ethnic group (Lynch, 2015). In Ghana’s intense and competitive 
clientelist settlement, where political elites strive to stay in power, mobilisation of political 
support is often channelled through ethnic voting  (Berman, 2012; de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016; 
Grebe, 2015; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008). What is less clear, and what I intend to explore in 
this thesis, is how the two main political parties in Ghana have expanded LEAP and whether they 
have done so along ethnic lines to secure electoral support. The use of ethnic politics to secure 
electoral support is not unique to the Ghanaian case. For example, Seekings (2019) 
demonstrates how ethnic politics is exemplified in voter behaviour in Zambia and points out that 
there is often a ‘strong regional pattern of ethnicity in support for political parties and their 
presidential candidates’ (p. 11).  
The reliance on ethnic politics in mobilising political support can be problematic, particularly 
when decisions about the allocation of state resources including social protection are key items 
on the policy agenda. Allocation decisions are based less on the programme’s objectives and 
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much more on the interests of political elites (Seekings, 2019). As a result, households who do 
not belong to particular ethnic groups of influential elites are excluded from the benefits of 
social protection. Ghana’s competitive political settlement context presents an ideal situation 
for exploring how patronage and ethnic politics affects targeting.  
As I previously mentioned in section 3.1 regarding the purpose of a political settlement 
framework, it is used as a lens through which the outcome of social protection is analysed. I next 
turn to conceptual frameworks which are employed to analyse social protection. 
3.3   Social protection conceptual frameworks   
This third section first reviews conceptual frameworks which explain the provision of social 
protection before the conceptual framework for this study is presented. 
Among the conceptual frameworks are the transformative social protection, human capital and 
human rights frameworks (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008). These frameworks explain social 
protection through the lens of objectives and impact and not through the lens of the politics of 
its implementation. 
The transformative social protection framework of Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) builds 
on the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) functions of social protection: that social 
protection provides relief from deprivation, averts deprivation and enhances incomes and 
capabilities of beneficiaries. Devereux and Sabates Wheeler (2004) add a fourth function, the 
transformative function, arguing that social protection also transforms the lives of beneficiaries 
especially when appropriate policies that address the causes of vulnerabilities are pursued. 
Barrientos and Hulme (2008) also explain that social protection builds up the human capital of 
beneficiaries and is intended to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. The way in 
which social protection contributes to human capital is either directly, through skills and 
services, or indirectly, by providing cash and productive assets to enable households to invest in 
their own development. 
In addition, social protection is regarded as a basic human right and an entitlement that must 
be provided by the state to address unacceptable levels of deprivation and vulnerability  within 
a given society  (Jones and Shahrokh, 2013). 
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Although the application of these social protection frameworks can provide insights into the 
effects of social protection on poor households and who benefits from social protection, they 
are not as useful in analysing implementation of social protection through a political power lens. 
Crucially, they omit how asymmetric power relations and political interests of domestic political 
elites affect the implementation of programmes. To explain how Ghana’s LEAP was first 
implemented and the directions in which it has subsequently expanded, the objective of this 
thesis is to understand the extent to which TNAs have used their positions of power to influence 
the general direction of LEAP’s implementation and also how national and local government-
level configurations of power allow other goals that are not consistent with the objective of LEAP 
to be pursued. Lavers and Hickey’s (2015) Adapted Political Settlements Framework, which 
combines transnational influences with political settlements to analyse the implementation of 
social protection, is just the framework to help us understand these issues. 
3.3.1 The Adapted Political Settlement Framework (APSF) 
In this subsection, I describe Lavers and Hickey’s (2015) Adapted Political Settlements 
Framework (APSF) and explain how it works.   I also underline its usefulness for this study as well 
as its limitations.  
Lavers and Hickey’s (2005) Adapted Political Settlements framework (APSF) is an analytical tool 
that can be used to explain elite commitment to expand social protection in low-income 
countries. It combines transnational and domestic politics to explain how social protection 
expands in low-income countries.  According to the framework, transnational actors are able to 
influence government adoption and commitment to social protection by aligning their ideas 
with the interests of domestic elites (Lavers and Hickey, 2015). The framework thus draws 
attention to the dynamics of power between transnational and domestic political elites and how 
that impacts the expansion of social protection in developing country contexts.   
Lavers and Hickey (2015) build on Kahn’s (2010) original political settlements theory which 
focuses on political power dynamics by adding transnational factors to explain social protection 
expansion.  Thus, the APSF starts on the premise that adoption of social protection programmes 
in low-income countries is not simply influenced by power dynamics between political parties 
but also on the ideas (paradigmatic, philosophies and policy frames) advanced by TNAs. 
Furthermore,  the APSF is based on the premise that social protection expansion in low-income 
countries is not solely based on political power dynamics but can be influenced by the financial 
contribution of TNA especially if transnational finance forms a major part of the social protection 
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budget in low -income countries (Hickey et al., 2018). In other words, transnational actors can 
use their ideas and financial muscle to influence the actions or behaviour of domestic political 
elites with responsibility for social protection policy and implementation.  
Figure 3.1 is a modified version of Lavers and Hickey (2015) original APSF.  In this modified 
version, I have replaced global actors with transnational actors and shown the key channels of 
TNA influences which are through (1) political settlements (2) policy coalitions and (3) funding. 
As is the case of the original version of the APSF, the components of the framework are main 
channels of TNA influence. First, political settlements reflect the political power dynamics in the 
implementing country and comprise formal and informal institutions of power. To achieve their 
organisational goals of reducing extreme poverty and improve wellbeing of vulnerable groups, 
TNAs engage primarily with actors in formal institutions of power to influence the adoption and 
expansion of social protection. Next, TNAs in social protection policy contexts comprise a strong 
policy coalition as they combine their paradigmatic ideas, philosophies and frame problems in 
ways that make for the adoption of ideas by domestic political elites. Finally, TNA funding is 
important in terms of how much control they can have on social protection implementation and 
expansion.  The channels of influence shown in the modified version of the APSF below and how 




Figure 3.1   A modified version of Lavers and Hickey’s (2015) APSF  
 
Source: Adapted from the Adapted Political Settlements Framework. 
An explanation of the APSF framework 
As noted earlier, TNAs channel their influence through formal and informal institutional actors   
as reflected in the political settlements (1), through policy coalitions (2) and through funding (3). 
From figure 3.1 these channels of influences are illustrated by the downward pointing arrows 
from each of the numbered textboxes through to the social protection adoption and expansion 
rectangle. Transnational interests interact with interests of political elites in formal institutions 
of power to shape social protection adoption and expansion. Second, as they constitute a strong 
policy coalition, transnational actors approach the policy table with tried and tested ideas, world 
views and policy frames to influence the adoption of social protection programmes. They frame 
solutions to social problems in ways which fit with the interests of the political settlement. If 
their framing aligns with the ideology and political interests of ruling coalitions, then social 
protection programmes are more likely to continue expanding. Social protection adoption and 
expansion is also influenced by either transnational actor financing or resources generated at 
domestic level.  For example, where domestic taxation forms a significant source of revenue for 
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social protection, then domestic elites rather than transnational actors are likely to assume 
greater ownership in driving the expansion of social protection programmes.  On the other hand, 
where there is a relatively large informal economy as opposed to a formal economy then  
enough revenue cannot be generated from domestic taxes to distribute social protection. 
Transnational financing then takes on an influential role. When this happens, transnational 
actors can use their financial strength to drive social protection expansion.  
The appropriateness of the APSF to this thesis  
The APSF has relevance for each of the research questions of this study.  
In a democratic political environment where multiple actors approach policy with different 
interests, TNAs are a powerful group who push for the adoption of specific ideas. These are 
normally tried and tested ideas and models of social protection which are known to work in 
similar policy contexts. They are also guided by their organisational goals and mission 
statements which emphasise poverty reduction and improvement of the welfare of vulnerable 
groups. The APSF will help to analyse and explain how ideas proposed by three TNAs, DFID, the 
WB and UNICEF, and their organisational goals combine to shape the design and implementation 
of the LEAP programme. The analysis will be presented in chapter 5 and responds to research 
question one. 
Second, the APSF places emphasis on political settlements. It argues that transnational actors’ 
ideas combine with political interests of domestic elites to explain commitment to social 
protection. In Ghana’s competitive clientelist settlement where elites are highly vulnerable to 
the loss of power in competitive elections, retaining power is a priority of elites once they are 
elected into office (Abdulai, 2020). The APSF will help explore the different ways in which elites 
retain power and how their strategies for re-election influences LEAP’s expansion. The analysis 
will be presented in chapter 6 and addresses the second research question.    
Third, the APSF framework, with its emphasis on the distribution of power, will be useful to 
explain political power dynamics in the context of LEAP’s expansion at the local government 
level. In a competitive political environment where the period during which power is shifted to 
local government heads coincides with the term of office of the ruling government, local 
government elites become as vulnerable to losing their positions of power as the elites at the 
national level who appointed them. In such contexts , personalised norms such as patronage 
remain strong (Levy, 2014) and political elites form patronage networks with insider clients in 
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exchange for political support to retain power. The APSF will help to analyse and understand 
how these power dynamics play out in the expansion of LEAP at the local government level. The 
analysis will be presented in chapter 7 and responds to the third research question. 
Limitations of the APSF 
Despite the relevance of the APSF to this study, it is also important to point out that the APSF 
may not identify and explain important insights regarding the politics of implementing LEAP that 
emerge from the data analysis. These insights may reveal gaps in the APSF which will require 
further elaboration. In the concluding chapter of this thesis, I will revisit the framework and draw 
on the additional insights from the study to review the APSF in order to make suggestions for its 
improvement and how it might be applied in future research on the politics of social protection 
in the context of SSA. 
According to Gray (2019), ‘political settlement analysis starts with the observation that in low-
income countries, economic and political power frequently lies outside formal institutions’ (p. 
3). This means that powerful groups frequently use groups that operate outside formal 
institutions and manifest themselves in clientelism.  A limitation of the APSF is its lack of 
engagement with the informal networks that operate outside formal institutions where 
relatively powerful actors within those institutions can exert influence on expansion decisions 
and ultimately impact outcomes. In revisiting the framework in Chapter 8 of this thesis, I will 
explore how the framework can be used to identify informal institutions, the sources of power 
of the actors therein and how they influence the implementation of social protection.  
3.4    Conclusion  
This literature review has revealed the gaps in the politics of social protection literature which 
this thesis is focused on. It has directed attention to the relatively thin and limited literature on 
transnational and domestic politics of social protection implementation, areas that this research 
focuses on. The discussion in this chapter has also highlighted the concepts of TNA ideas and 
interests as critical tools of TNA influence in the policy process as well as of political settlements. 
These concepts are used to frame the research questions of this study.  The chapter also 
presented Lavers and Hickey’s (2015) Adapted Political Settlements Framework (APSF), pointing 
out its relevance for this study and its limitations.  
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The next chapter presents the methodology and methods of data collection employed in this 
study. It focuses attention on the methodological decisions I took including the research 
approach and design which helped me collect and analyse data to answer the overarching 



















Chapter 4    Methodology and Methods 
Chapter purpose and structure 
In the three chapters preceding this one, I focused the discussion on the overarching research 
topic of this study: how transnational and domestic politics shapes the implementation of 
Ghana’s LEAP programme.  I began with an introduction to the problem in chapter 1, the context 
within which the topic of interest emerged in chapter 2 and a review of the relevant literature 
in chapter 3. I also introduced the conceptual framework that will be employed in analysing 
findings from the data collected.  
In this chapter, I explain the methodological decisions I took, including the tools of data 
collection and analysis employed to gather and analyse evidence, to address the overarching 
research question of this study.  
I start in section 4.1 by re-stating the research questions this study will address. In section 4.2, I 
describe the research approach and orientation adopted for this study and justify its 
appropriateness. In section 4.3, I detail the research design, the selection of sites and explain 
reasons for the choices made. In section 4.4, I discuss the data collection procedures followed 
in 4.5 by data collection methods for addressing the three research questions. In section 4.6, I 
discuss the data analysis tools and go on to discuss the reliability and validity of my data in 
section 4.7. In section 4.8, I present reflections on my positionality as a researcher, and in section 
4.9 I summarise and conclude the chapter. 
4.1    Research questions  
In section 1.3 of the introduction chapter, I indicated the purpose of this study as aiming to 
understand how, in Ghana’s competitive democratic political environment, transnational ideas 
and interests as well as domestic political elites’ interests play out and influence the 
implementation of the LEAP cash transfer programme. I focused this objective on the 
overarching research question re-stated below as:  
How have transnational and domestic politics shaped the implementation of the LEAP 
programme in Ghana? 
To answer the overarching question, I posed three sub-questions. 
Research question one:  
How have the ideas and interests of transnational actors shaped the implementation of 
Ghana’s LEAP programme?  
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To answer the above question, I explore how the ideas and interests of the WB, DFID and UNICEF 
have shaped the design and implementation of LEAP under two ideologically different 
governments. 
 
Research question two: 
How does Ghana’s competitive democratic politics drive the expansion strategies of LEAP? 
 
This question focuses on how Ghana’s competitive clientelist settlement, characterised by 
intense and constant competition for power between the NPP and NDC, has influenced the 
expansion strategies of NPP and NDC elites.  
 
Research question three:  
How do local government institutions and actors in Ghana’s competitive political setting 
impact the expansion of LEAP?    
This question illustrates how Ghana’s local government system and powerful actors within local 
government have shaped the expansion of LEAP as political power has alternated between NDC 
and NPP governments.     
As the research questions above were intended to gather data that produced in-depth insights 
into issues around the ideas, interests of transnational actors (TNAs) and interests of domestic 
elites to explain how LEAP is implemented, I found the adoption of a qualitative research 
approach useful. 
4.2    Research approach and orientation 
Two major research approaches widely recognised in the social research literature are 
quantitative and qualitative approaches (Bryman, 2012; Creswell, 2014). Quantitative research 
is employed to test or confirm theories about social phenomena and to establish generalisable 
facts about a topic (Bryman, 2012). In contrast, qualitative approaches are employed when the 
research is focused on interpreting the meanings of concepts and thoughts and on 
understanding the experiences of research participants. In addition, a qualitative research 
approach aims to gather deep insights from multiple perspectives on topics that are not very 
well understood (Bryman, 2012; Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). In this study, I adopted a 
qualitative rather than a quantitative research approach because the objective of the study was 
to provide deep insights into the politics of implementing the LEAP social protection programme.  
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A characteristic of qualitative research which applies to this study is the source of knowledge 
construction.  In contrast to the quantitative researcher, who aligns with the positivist tradition 
and constructs knowledge from describing observed patterns, the qualitative researcher 
identifies with the interpretivist paradigm. Interpretivists construct knowledge with those they 
study and work closely with (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). I located this study within the 
interpretivist paradigm because of its tradition of enabling the researcher to co-construct 
knowledge with research participants (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). This meant that I did not 
assume simple causal relationships with predictive outcomes as the quantitative researcher 
would do. Instead, I approached and probed conversations with research participants to 
understand how and why two major governments, which had competed for and alternated 
power in the last two decades, expanded the LEAP programme as soon as they assumed office. 
To achieve this goal, my role as an ‘instrument’ was crucial. Maykut and Morehouse (1994) point 
out that in constructing knowledge, the qualitative researcher should themselves be a ‘key 
instrument’ in data collection because of how their research orientation could unearth 
understandings of the phenomena being studied.  
In addition to the qualitative researcher’s source of knowledge construction, the ontological 
position, or how they view social entities, is important in gaining deep insights into social 
phenomena (Bryman, 2012; Punch, 2003). The qualitative researcher draws on multiple 
experiences and perspectives of research participants (Bryman, 2012; Maykut and Morehouse, 
1994) to understand the topic under investigation. To understand how LEAP was implemented 
and expanded by two major governments, I explored the realities of multiple research 
participants, whose perspectives were reflected in their experiences with LEAP and what they 
understood as contributing to its implementation and expansion.  The qualitative case study 
design which I applied in this study is discussed next.  
4.3     Case study  
Bryman (2012) notes that a qualitative researcher employs a case study design to gain specific 
and in-depth knowledge about a real-world subject. Not only was the goal of the study 
consistent with the purpose of employing a case study design, but most characteristics of a case 
study design were particularly suited to this research.    
A case study lends itself to the use of more than a single source of data in contrast to other 
designs, such as a survey, which use one data source (Yin, 2003). Accordingly, in this study, a 
combination of interview and documentary sources was used.  
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In comparison with other qualitative designs like an ethnographic study,  a case study design has  
the advantage of allowing the unearthing of knowledge through dialogue with participants 
without necessarily immersing oneself into the life and work of research participants (Creswell, 
2014).   
In addition, the researcher using a case study design explores the event being studied over a 
defined period (Yin, 1989). In this study, I focused on the implementation and expansion of 
Ghana’s LEAP programme over a ten-year period as political power alternated between New 
Patriotic Party (NPP) and National Democratic Congress (NDC) governments as follows: From 
2008 LEAP was launched by the NPP government and expanded by the NDC government 
between 2009-2016. From 2017-2018 LEAP expansion continued under the administration of 
the NPP government.  
Furthermore, a case study can be employed to conduct an in-depth study of a single 
phenomenon or multiple events depending  on the objectives of the study (Mason, 2002; Yin, 
2003).  In this study, I employed a single case study design because my research focused solely 
on the politics (transnational and domestic) of implementing the LEAP programme, even though 
I conducted detailed case studies of LEAP’s implementation in selected districts, to gain a much 
broader and deeper understanding of implementation as implementation occurred under the 
NPP and NDC governments. 
Despite the depth of insights gained in studying a single case, one limitation is the inability to 
generalise from it and replicate it in other contexts (Bell, 2005;  Creswell, 2014). This view, 
however, is challenged by Bassey (1981), who argued that although generalisation of single 
events is not possible, relatability should be the guiding principle, and that specific details of a 
case study could  relate to similar studies or contexts. As I explore how transnational and 
domestic politics shape the implementation and expansion of the LEAP programme, aspects of 
the politics (transnational ideas and domestic political interests) can inform the implementation 
of social protection programmes in similar political contexts in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
4.3.1   Selecting the case study sites 
Choosing a research site for qualitative study involves a great deal of planning to connect with 
prospective research participants (Patton, 2002). In this study, two main factors were 
considered in selecting case study districts. First, the type of districts which implemented LEAP, 




The type of district which implemented LEAP: Pilot and Expansion districts   
Two types of districts which implemented LEAP are described as pilot and expansion districts in 
this thesis.  
Pilot districts in this thesis refer to the first 21 districts selected by NPP government, initially to 
test the cash transfer model proposed by the Brazilian mission team and endorsed by V & SWG. 
The pilot districts were not restricted to particular regions but comprised districts across the 
nine geographical regions of the country which had a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS (GOG, 2007). 
The pilot implementation period lasted a period of five years from 2008-2013. Cape Coast 
Metropolitan Assembly in the central region and Akuapem South district in the eastern region 
were among the pilot districts for the LEAP programme. LEAP was first implemented in 2008 in 
Cape Coast under the NPP administration and in 2012 in the Akuapem South district under the 
NDC administration. During the period, the LEAP Operations Manual which outlined the role and 
responsibilities of district and community actors was not yet operational.  Assemblymen and 
social welfare directors were thus responsible for identifying and selecting households for the 
programme. 
Following the pilot implementation period, LEAP was not abandoned in these districts but 
continued under the NDC government from 2009.  Implementation continued in the pilot 
districts as the programme expanded to three new vulnerable households which comprised the 
disabled, old people and pregnant women in addition to OVCs across the country in accordance 
with the LEAP design plan (GOG,2007 ; World Bank, 2016). Districts which benefitted from LEAP 
under NDC’s administration beginning from 2009 and beyond the pilot period when NDC was 
re-elected for a second term, from 2013 are described as expansion districts in this thesis.  In 
addition, districts which were selected for LEAP under the NPP government when the latter 
gained power from the NDC in 2017, fall into the category of expansion districts in this thesis. 
Mfantseman Municipal and Akuapem North districts in the central and eastern regions of Ghana 
were expansion districts both of which began LEAP operations in 2017 under NPP’s 
administration. 
Table 4.1 below summarises the LEAP pilot and expansion case study districts, year of 




Table 4.1 Selected pilot and expansion districts, year of implementation and government in 
power 
DISTRICT NAME DISTRICT TYPE GEOGRAPHICAL 
LOCATION  
YEAR OF LEAP 
IMPLEMENTATION IN 





Expansion Eastern region 2017 NPP  
Akuapem South 
District  
Pilot   Eastern region 2012 NDC  
Cape Coast 
Metropolitan  
Pilot  Central region 2008 NPP  
Mfantseman 
Municipal 
Expansion Central region  2017 NPP  
Source: field work data 
My decision to select two pilot and two expansion districts, was to detail in my analysis, the 
genesis of LEAP’s implementation and how implementation of LEAP compared between pilot 
and expansion districts. My aim was to get a deeper sense of the nuances in implementation 
through the experiences of research participants under NPP and NDC administrations in pilot 
and expansion districts as power alternated between the two governments. 
In addition to the type of districts, I considered factors which facilitated the data collection 
process in my choice of case study districts. 
Factors which facilitated the data collection process 
Three factors, geographical accessibility of the district, familiarity with the culture of the district 
and the political status (stronghold or non-stronghold) of the district, were crucial in my 
decisions regarding the choice of case study districts.    
Geographical accessibility was key in choosing districts. Since the design of my research was not 
suited to prolonged periods of stay in any particular setting (Bryman, 2012), I had to think of 
districts with easy accessibility to  social welfare offices and LEAP communities, ideally by public 
transport. Districts in the eastern region were my first choice because there were several pilot 
and expansion districts that I could choose from and interview participants could be easily 
reached by public transport from a town where I stayed. Akuapem North Municipal was 
therefore selected as an expansion district and Akuapem South District as a pilot district.  
Another factor that influenced my choice of case study districts was familiarity with the culture 
of the district. It made more sense to me to select research sites in districts where I was more 
familiar with the cultural norms, practices and local dialects.  Bryman (2012) notes that cultural 
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connections of the researcher can help the trust building process, which in turn enables data to 
be gathered by the researcher.  Growing up and working in Ghana taught me the importance of 
societal values and emotional attachment people have towards cultural practices such as 
greeting in the dialect of a community. Having the ability to communicate reasonably well in the 
dialect of a community meant that, as I conducted interviews, I would understand specific 
vocabulary used and would not need an interpreter. An added advantage for me was that I 
would maximise the time I spent with research participants but could also direct the 
conversation in ways that still allowed participants to express their views on their own terms. 
Based on this, LEAP districts in the central region of Ghana were selected. My familiarity with 
the Fante language spoken in many districts in the central region stems from my formative years, 
tertiary education as well as my early years of teaching in three different districts in the central 
region. Thus, I chose Cape Coast Metropolitan as the pilot district and Mfantseman Municipal as 
the expansion district. 
Lastly, the political status of the district was also important. I had been thinking hard about the 
sensitivity of my topic and how it could affect the quality of data I collected.  As I indicated in 
section 3.2.2 of the literature review chapter, historically, districts in the Ashanti and Volta 
regions of Ghana are recognised as political strongholds of the NPP and NDC parties (Ayee, 2011) 
while districts in other regions of the country including Eastern, Central  and Greater Accra were 
recognised as swing voting regions from time to time. My concern was that in sampling a district 
which was known to be a political base for either party, I would be expected to direct the 
interview in ways that only produced strong and positive views about implementation 
experiences with the result that my research questions might not necessarily be answered. 
Therefore, I selected districts in swing voting regions. The Central and Eastern regions of Ghana 
were not known to be political strongholds of either the NPP or the NDC at the time of my data 
collection.  
The result of these decisions were the pilot and expansion districts case study districts I selected 
summarised in table 4.1 above. The location of the case study districts in relation to the map of 
Ghana is shown in Appendix 1. 
4.4. Data collection preparation  
Having decided on the case study sites, I next focused on the procedures and protocols to 
prepare me for data collection. First, I planned the different sampling strategies I would apply in 
the selection of research participants. Second, I followed up the necessary protocols in Ghana 
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to gain permission to conduct research. Third, I developed and tested an interview guide. Fourth, 
I ensured that relevant research ethics in terms of consent and anonymity were addressed prior 
to data collection. These procedures were all considered in the light of my timeframe for data 
collection, which is presented below. 
Table 4.2    Fieldwork time frame  
Period  Activity 
November - December 2017 
December 12th, 2017 
Arrival in Ghana 
Ethical approval application received.  
- Mapping out and planning research sites; commute; research participants  
December 20th, 2017 - January 
15th, 2018 
Preparation for data collection  
- Sampling  
- Data collection protocols  
- Developing an interview guide 
- Ensuring compliance with ethical procedures  
January 16th - April 30th, 2018 Interviews and documentary data collection  
May 1st - June 30th, 2018 
July 2nd - 3rd, 2018   
- Interview data validation  
- Return to Sussex University  
Source: Author’s compilation from fieldwork 
4.4.1    Sampling strategies  
A number of sampling strategies were considered in this study. Purposive and snowball 
strategies were employed prior to data collection, while opportunistic sampling was applied 
during interview data collection.  
Purposive sampling  
Bryman (2012) and Creswell (2014) note that most qualitative researchers emphasise the 
importance of purposive sampling to their work, particularly when the aim of the study is to gain 
detailed knowledge rather than make statistical inferences about the phenomena being studied. 
Research participants are therefore selected ‘in a strategic way, so that those sampled are 
relevant to the research questions that are being posed’ (Creswell, 2014, p. 146). Considering 
this criterion, I sampled five broad groups of research participants. Two groups at the national 
level were LEAP advisors representing TNAs and relevant officials of government ministries and 
departments and civil society groups. The three groups sampled at the local government level 
comprised LEAP officials at the district and community levels and beneficiaries. All groups 
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sampled had some exposure to the implementation of the LEAP programme over the ten-year 
period which this study covers.  
To allow for variation in my sampling frame as recommended by Patton (2002),  I also selected 
those who were indirectly involved in LEAP’s implementation but could provide some insights 
into the transnational and domestic politics of implementing LEAP. Representatives of civil 
society groups including research fellows fit into this category. My intention for selecting this 
group was that, in addition to the political lens which policy officials provided, technocratic 
perspectives would provide varied and enriched data on the politics of implementing the LEAP 
programme. I also considered snowball sampling to draw in hard-to-reach research participants.   
Snowball sampling 
Bryman (2012) describes snowball sampling as a technique employed in purposive sampling 
when the researcher is trying to sample hard-to-reach populations. As a democratic country, 
changes in political power in Ghana are often associated with changes in political appointments 
and sometimes changes in public servants’ positions. This meant that policy officials and public 
servants who held relevant information regarding the adoption process or aspects of 
implementation might have moved on to other positions. Snowball sampling was just the 
strategy to reach such participants. 
Snowball sampling helped me trace two technocrats who were part of the V&E SWG formed 
prior to the adoption process. As well as hoping to get background information, my plan was to 
enquire about up-to-date documentation on the implementation of LEAP. 
To add to my sample size, I also embraced opportunities to sample individuals whom I had not 
planned to interview but nonetheless could provide data to answer my research questions.  
Opportunistic sampling   
Patton (2002) notes that opportunistic or emergent sampling occurs when the researcher makes 
sampling decisions during the process of collecting data. My decision to interview an official 
from a LEAP support institution, such as the Ghana Single Household Registry, a government 
department which managed Ghana’s household poverty data, was unplanned at the onset of 
my study. Nonetheless, an understanding of his role through informal conversations with policy 
officials suggested he might have views and experiences which could potentially answer my 
research questions.   
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The result of the sampling strategies employed, considering other methodological decisions 
including the research approach (qualitative), orientation (interpretivist) and design (case 
study), was the sample size of 53 I obtained.  Research participants sampled for this study were 
grouped under national and sub-national or local government levels and ranged from Ministry 
officials and transnational policy advisors at the national level, to community LEAP implementing 
committees at the community level. This is summarised in table 4.3 below. 














Source: Author’s compilation from fieldwork 
Having selected the research participants for this study, the next task was navigating access to 
research participants. 
4.4.2    Gaining permission to conduct research in Ghana  
As is the requirement of data collection in Ghana, identifying the right person to grant 
permission for data collection was necessary. Thus, prior to starting my fieldwork in Ghana, I 
formally wrote to the administrative head of the Ministry of Gender and Social Protection, 






DFID, World Bank, UNICEF advisors  
Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection 
(MOGCSP) officials  
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning officials 
LEAP Management Secretariat (LMS) officials  
LEAP support institutions co-ordinators  














District Social Welfare Officers 
District LEAP Implementation Committee members (DLIC) 






Community LEAP Implementation Committee members 







TOTAL NUMBER  53 
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setting out the broad parameters of what my research would focus on and the duration of the 
research. During my meeting with him, I discussed potential research participants and he made 
suggestions including specific individuals to speak to, which I found very useful. Permission was 
granted following my meeting with the Chief Director, allowing me to conduct research at both 
national and subnational (local government) levels. A copy of this letter is attached in Appendix 
2. 
As part of the data collection process, follow up letters on the Chief Director’s approval were 
issued by the deputy director of LEAP to social welfare officers in my case study districts. The 
aim was to make a formal request to access relevant data. To quicken the data collection 
process, I personally sent copies of the letters, shown as an attachment in  Appendix 3, to District 
Social Welfare Officers (DSWOs). These processes were necessary as they allowed me to meet 
with, introduce myself to and explain the purpose of the research to local government staff 
ahead of the actual data collection process. After I gained permission to conduct my research, I 
next thought of developing an interview guide. 
4.4.3.    Developing an interview guide and testing questions  
As a qualitative researcher looking to make sense of participants’ experiences regarding the 
politics of implementing the LEAP programme, I found developing an interview guide necessary. 
Generating relevant data based on my conceptual framework and research questions for 
different groups of participants was a task that required some planning to get the most out of 
research participants’ experiences.  
A key principle in developing an interview guide is that broad topic areas guide the researcher 
in ways that do not  require the researcher  to follow the order of interview questions as would 
be the case in survey research, for example (Bryman, 2012 ). Consequently, I developed a less 
rigid schedule that provided some structure to my study but at the same time kept track of the 
broad themes that I needed to investigate. The interview guides I developed to generate 
relevant data were tailor made to fit the varied roles and experiences of the research 
participants but did not deviate from the overall goal of the study. Thematic areas ranged from 
design and implementation challenges for LEAP advisors and officials at the national level to the 
socio-cultural politics for community actors at the local government level.  The guide was not 
intended to be followed, but only to help focus and re-direct questions when the need arose. 
I followed the rules of writing interview questions suggested in the social research literature. 
One was to avoid leading questions as these direct the respondent to answer in a particular way 
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and do not give enough latitude to the respondent (Bryman, 2012; Rubin and Rubin, 2012).  In 
addition, I avoided writing very general questions that produced a range of interpretations and 
kept away from writing double barrelled questions (May, 2011; Rubin and Rubin, 2012).  Instead, 
I designed questions that required only one response at a time. 
All questions were open-ended to allow research participants the freedom to express their views  
whilst keeping in mind the broad research questions (May, 2011) of this study. 
Guided by the conceptual framework and research questions of this study, I developed interview 
guides for four groups of research participants in line with the multilevel analytical strategy 
employed in this study. One for actors at the national/policy level comprising transnational and 
domestic elites and three different guides for participants at the local government level 
comprising district and community actors and beneficiaries. Samples are attached as Appendix 
4. 
To ensure the reliability of the interview questions, the draft interview guide was first given to 
my supervisors to review and provide feedback. It turned out that some questions were too 
general and would do little to answer my research questions. Accordingly, I revised them and 
got them reviewed a second time by a colleague PHD candidate who had employed semi-
structured interviews and was in his final stages of data collection. He advised that I clarify some 
questions before testing them. Following a second revision to the guide, the interview questions 
were ready to be tested. 
I tested the guide first on a retired public-sector official who had previously worked with 
transnational companies including Nestle and Unilever, and later on a government official whose 
line of work involved the management of social intervention programmes including the Ghana 
School Feeding programme.  Although both pilot interviews gave me a sense of the policy area 
I was about to investigate, I still felt handicapped because the pilot interview sessions did not 
adequately produce the in-depth answers I was looking for.  Looking back on questions and their 
corresponding answers, it seems that I was not asking ‘why’ and ‘how’ things were happening. 
Thus, I had to adapt my interviewing technique.  
What I learnt through the pilot interview sessions was that in some cases, more information was 
needed to get a deeper understanding and, in such situations, I had to probe and follow up in 
order that I sufficiently address the broad areas and themes of my research questions.  A number 
of social research scholars including May (2011) and White and Drew (2011) highlight the 
importance of probing in qualitative interviewing, noting that the researcher can probe beyond 
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the responses and follow up on issues that emerge for a deeper understanding of the social 
phenomena being investigated.  Once I was confident that I could alter my questioning 
techniques and had a draft interview guide, I was ready to collect data. However, I had to 
address the ethical issues associated with collecting empirical data.  
4.4.4.   Ethical considerations 
All research with human participants involve some degree of risk to the researcher and research 
participants (Bryman, 2012; May, 2011). As a result, I followed all the ethical guidelines before 
and during the data collection process to minimise potential risks to myself and to research 
participants. This comprised gaining ethical approval prior to the start of data collection and 
addressing consent and anonymity issues.   
First, I had already gained ethical approval from the Research Ethics Committee at the University 
of Sussex to conduct fieldwork. This was necessary to ensure that I had considered the possible 
risks of conducting research to myself and research participants involved in this study and was 
confident that I had taken steps to minimise possible risks. The date I received ethical clearance 
and the start date of data collection are indicated in my fieldwork timetable in table 4.2 above. 
Second, consent forms designed by the Ethics Committee of my university were given to 
research participants prior to interview data collection. This form outlined the title of my 
research project, the rights of research participants to participate voluntarily in the study and 
measures I intended to take to maintain confidentiality of research participants. In cases where 
research participates were unable to read and sign, I explained to them and gained their consent 
before the start of interviews.  
Another ethical issue was maintaining confidentiality. Prior to interview data collection, I 
assured research participants of the confidentiality of their responses considering the sensitivity 
of the topic I was investigating. I explained that data analysis would not contain any personal 
details or names. Instead, their identities would be concealed in interviewee reference codes.  
However, as total anonymity was impossible, I gained consent to use their roles and positions in 
order to provide some context to the analysis of the interview data. Furthermore, I hinted that 
the names of the two major governments and their political manifestos were in the public 
domain, so it was impossible to anonymise them. The reference codes I developed were a 
combination of the interviewee’s organisation or administrative level from which they were 
sampled, the sequence in which they were interviewed, and the rank or position of the 
interviewee. This is explained briefly in three stages as followed.  
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First, I assigned codes to the organisation or administrative level from which interviewees were 
sampled. For example, DP was used to represent transnational actor, M for ministry official and 
D for district official. Table 4.4 below outlines the codes adopted for broad participant groups at 
national and local government levels.  An explanation of the coding system follows.   
Table 4.4.   Research participant codes 
 














Source: Author’s compilation from field data  
Next, I added a number to represent the sequence in which participants were interviewed. For 
example,  
• DP 1   First Development Partner official interviewed 
• M 2   Second Ministry official interviewed 
Third, I assigned codes to the rank or position of the research participant. This was indicated by 













LEAP Secretariat  LS  
LEAP Support Institutions LSI 
Civil Society Organisations CS 
DISTRICT  D 
Akuapem North  AN 
Akuapem South AS 
Cape Coast  CC 
Manya- Krobo  MK 
Mfantseman  MF 
COMMUNITY C 
LEAP BENEFICIARY HOUSEHOLDS LB 
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participants interviewed, the forward slash was followed by a dash representing the initial of 
the district. 
For example,  
• /DSW- MF   stands for District social welfare director of the Mfantseman Municipal  
• /HME    stands for Head of Monitoring and Evaluation  
•  /DLIC-AN stands for District LEAP Implementing Committee member of Akuapem North 
district 
To summarise, a quotation from D5/DSW- MF can be traced to the fifth person I interviewed at 
the district level, in the person of the District Social Welfare Director at Mfantseman Municipal. 
A table showing an interviewee list together with their reference codes can be found as an 
attachment in Appendix 5. 
4.5    Data collection methods  
As previously noted in section 4.3 regarding the features of a case study, multiple sources of 
evidence are used (Yin, 2003). In this study, three data collection sources were utilised to answer 
the research questions. These were semi-structured interviews, observations specific to LEAP 
events and documents.  
While semi-structured interviews and documents were employed to generate relevant 
information from policy officials at the national level to answer research questions 1 and 2, a 
combination of interviews, documents and LEAP event-specific observations were employed to 
gather data from LEAP officials and beneficiaries intended for research question 3. The 
participant groups that I administered the interviews to, observed and collected documents 
from, allowed me to gather insights into my topic of interest. The data collection methods, 










Table 4.5   Data collection methods, corresponding research questions, and research 
participants 
Data collection methods  Research questions and research 
participants  




RQ 1   
• LEAP programme advisors of the WB, 
DFID and UNICEF 
• Social Protection Ministry officials  
• LEAP directors at the LEAP Management 
Secretariat  
• Officials at LEAP Support Institutions   
• Civil Society Organisations 
Semi-structured interviews, documents  
 
RQ 2  
• Social Protection Ministry officials 
• Ministry of Finance officials  
• LEAP directors at the LEAP Management 
Secretariat  
• Officials at LEAP Support Institutions   
• Civil Society representatives 





• Civil Society Organisations 
• District Social Welfare Officers 
• District LEAP Implementation 
Committees 
• Community LEAP Implementation 
Committees/ Community Focal Persons 
• Beneficiary households 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from field work   
 4.5.1     Semi-structured interviews  
I selected semi-structured interviews as one of the methods to investigate my topic of interest. 
In contrast to highly structured interviews which adopt closed-ended questions and restrict the 
responses of interviewees, semi-structured interviews employ open-ended questions and allow 
some flexibility in interview responses. The flexibility in interview responses allows the 
researcher to follow up on specific issues raised, to dig deeper and understand the realities of 




While most of my semi-structured interviews involved face-to-face interaction, there were a few 
instances where skype interviews were suggested by research participants because of their 
inability to honour scheduled interviews. The suggestion for an alternative means of data 
collection draws on Deakin and Wakefield (2014), who posit that conducting skype interviews 
provides ‘an opportunity to talk to otherwise inaccessible participants’ (p. 5). At first, I was a bit 
apprehensive about using skype to collect interview data since I entertained concerns that I 
would lose the non-verbal cues normally interpreted in face-to-face interaction. However, with 
the use of the camera facility in skype interviews, I could interpret the winks and frowns of 
research participants. Berg and Lune (2007) note that the use of the video facility in a skype 
interview enables the researcher to capture gestures and other non-verbal language in much 
the same way as face-to-face interviews allow.   
As well as one-to-one semi-structured interviews, there were unplanned group interviews. 
Group interviews were conducted with research participants at both national and local 
government levels. At the national level, a group interview resulted from two research fellows 
in the same institution sharing their experiences of exposure to LEAP. At the district level, group 
interviews were unavoidable, particularly in situations where the open plan layout of social 
welfare offices did not allow for privacy in conversations.  As district level LEAP officials including 
social welfare directors shared their space with implementing officials, it was difficult to single 
out and have a one-to-one interview with an official without colleagues sitting close to the 
research participant listening and providing their views on questions not directed at them. This 
situation confirms May’s (2001) explanation that group interviews can occur in circumstances 
over which the researcher has little control. 
Although unplanned, group interviews saved me the time and cost of planning one-to-one 
scheduled interviews. However, the challenge for me sometimes was my inability to keep 
conversations focused on my thematic areas. Often the topic generated other interesting topics 
which pulled responses into other directions. However, I often managed to steer the discussion 
in the direction of my research questions. 
To maximise the outcome of interview responses, warm up questions and a variety of 
communication and listening techniques  (Bryman, 2012) were employed. Warm up questions 
were often used in the first few minutes of the interview but differed for various groups of 
research participants. Questions like ‘tell me about your role as a community LEAP official’ for 
community LEAP officials and ‘what would you say is the number one cause of extreme poverty 
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in this district’, for district social welfare directors were intended to put research participants at 
ease and allow the conversation to flow more naturally (Bryman, 2012). 
I also employed verbal techniques to push the conversations into directions that allowed 
research participants to provide more detail on the topic. Verbal cues, such as ‘Oh, I see’, ‘wow’ 
and ‘that is interesting’, and non-verbal cues (Bryman, 2012), such as raising my eye-brows, 
nodding and tilting my head (which I was not always conscious of), were strategies that 
produced more detailed responses from my interview participants than I anticipated. Silent 
probing was also a skill which I developed, particularly as I interviewed research participants at 
the national level, and which appeared to improve over time. This was particularly useful when 
research participants shared their views on the political interests of domestic elites. Often, I 
allowed them to talk, tolerated their pauses and was careful not to interrupt them with 
questions other than ones related to what they were focused on addressing.  
Notetaking of interview responses was an essential part of my data collection. Most interview 
data at the district level was collected through notetaking to remind me of what was said and 
by whom. However, where I could not take down so much information in a short period of time, 
I gained the consent of interview participants to use a Dictaphone. The use of the Dictaphone 
proved useful, particularly at district and the community levels where interview data was 
recorded in the Akan (Akwapim Twi) language and later played back to retrieve exact quotes 
and then written out. Although the Dictaphone enabled me to retrieve specific quotes and 
words which I could not quickly write down, it was impossible to disguise voices. Thus, when 
interview participants expressed apprehension about the confidentiality of information they 
provided, I did not use it.  Another disadvantage of the use of the Dictaphone at the national 
level was that interview participants were a bit more guarded in what they said, ‘especially when 
sensitive material is being discussed’ (Vulliamy, Lewin and Stephens, 1990, p. 105). 
In addition to the specific challenges associated with the use of the Dictaphone were practical 
challenges in accessing interview participants. Accessing community officials and beneficiaries 
was not a straightforward task. Most community LEAP officials and beneficiaries not only lived 
far from the district social welfare offices where I could  conduct interviews, , but  they were 
also often only available for interview on scheduled LEAP payment days, which were planned 
for two to three days in a specified week throughout the country (MESW, 2012). This meant that 
when I missed the opportunity to interview community officials and beneficiaries, I had to make 
efforts to schedule meetings outside LEAP payment days.  
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For example, as I could not interview LEAP community officials in the Central region at the same 
time as I interviewed their counterparts in the Eastern region, I offered a little financial incentive 
to each participant in recompense for travel costs and for giving up their time. Besides this, I did 
not offer any monetary incentive in exchange for interview data.  
In addition to the challenge of accessing community actors, I was mindful of the busy schedules 
of policy officials and directors of LEAP at the national level of governance. Despite scheduling 
and often re-scheduling meetings to suit them, research participants did not always commit to 
arranged times, which was quite frustrating for me.  This realisation sometimes led me to replace 
scheduled appointments with walk-in interviews, meaning that interviews were unarranged. In 
such circumstances, I often arrived at their office premises early, before their busy days began, 
and stayed at the reception to be noticed on their arrival at the office. Where this did not pay 
off, I prompted receptionists to remind officials of my presence until I was called in to conduct 
my interviews. Although this arrangement was not the most ideal, there were some positive 
outcomes. It appeared that the quality of data I collected in unarranged interviews was at times 
better than when interviews were planned, as participants were less tense, less guarded and 
engaged on the spot.  
Interview location also affected the power dynamics of  data collection and consequently the 
quality of data generated. Elwood and Martin (2000) note that the interview site can be crucial 
in determining the outcome of the interview. They further argue that the interview location 
shapes the social interactions and power relations between the researcher and the research 
participant. What I noticed with interviews conducted away from an office setting was that 
research participants often appeared somewhat less defensive and more relaxed, as the 
interviews felt like conversations. In contrast, interviews carried out in offices felt slightly 
unnatural and a bit rigid. While these differences made me aware of the role that the location 
of the interview could play in the outcome of my data, it was not always feasible to schedule a 
meeting outside the office.  
4.5.2    LEAP event-specific observations  
In social research, observation as a method of data collection involves the researcher watching, 
listening, and taking down notes on behaviour and activities as they take place (Bryman, 2012).  
In qualitative research, observation can be used as a stand-alone method or in combination with 
other methods such as unstructured interviews and document collection. Although my research 
design did not lend itself to observing the behaviour of research participants, there were notable 
events in the implementation of the LEAP programme that I found myself paying close attention 
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to. They were events that took place in LEAP communities which I felt had the potential to 
unearth some insights, including into power relations at the local government level, which could 
help answer my third research question.  
One such event was a LEAP sensitisation exercise where district LEAP officials sensitised selected 
communities about the LEAP programme. In these engagements, my role could be described as 
a participant observer as I listened and noted interactions between community officials and 
social welfare officers without partaking in the event. In contrast was the LEAP bi-monthly 
payments where I did not merely watch as a non-participant researcher would do (Creswell, 
2014; May, 2011), but also asked beneficiaries and community LEAP officials questions about 
certain practices that occurred on payment grounds.                                      
Observing LEAP events and following up with interviews gave me an opportunity to understand 
the power relations that underpinned certain actions at the community level. In addition, I 
understood the effect of cultural values such as respecting the views of elders and the potential 
implications that cultural values had for the selection of beneficiary process in communities.  
Although I was able to document data that I could not possibly access exclusively from a formal 
interview setting, intertwining observations with interview data this way was quite exhausting. 
As well as complementing interviews with event-specific observations, I found documents a 
valuable source of data to complement my interview data.  
4.5.3   Documents  
Scott (1990) describes documents as written texts produced by individuals or groups during their 
everyday practices. In social research, written texts comprise policy documents, annual reports 
and newspaper reports from both public and private sources (May, 2011). LEAP programme 
documents authored by LEAP’s TNAs and Ghana government ministries which had relevance for 
the research questions and conceptual framework of this study were selected to complement 
interview data. These documents and the corresponding research questions they are focused 






















Source: Author’s compilation from field data 
All LEAP policy documents listed in table 4.6 to complement the interview data have relevance 
for the research questions of this study and the conceptual framework that guides analysis in 
this study. For example, the ‘LEAP Business Case’, authored by DFID, outlines DFID’s poverty 
reduction ideas borrowed from global south contexts, as well as its mission statement, with 
which it aimed to support the Ghanaian government’s plans to reduce extreme poverty. This 
had relevance for research question 1.  In contrast, the ‘guide to district assemblies’, which 
explains the origins of Ghana’s local government and the discretionary powers of institutional 
heads of local government, directs attention to the relationship between the national and local 
governments. This document has relevance for research question 3.  Besides their theoretical 
significance, documents had practical relevance.  
A benefit of using policy documents is that they ‘tell us about the aspirations and intentions of 
the periods to which they refer’ (May, 2011, p. 177). The political manifestoes of NPP and NDC 
governments, listed in table 4.6, directed attention to policies and programmes which NPP and 
NDC intended to implement to enable them to maintain their hold on power.  
  Document name Research question  
LEAP Business Case 
LEAP Memorandum of 
Understanding 
LEAP Finance Agreement 
between Ghana and World Bank  
RQ 1  
 
 
RQ 1   
RQ 1 
LEAP Budget, 2013-2018 
Political Manifestos  
(1) NPP: 2007/2008; 2016/2017  
(2) NDC: 2007/2008; 2016/2017  
RQ 2 
RQ 2 
A guide to district assemblies in 
Ghana  
Local government and 
decentralisation in Ghana  
Fourth republican constitution  
LEAP Operations Manual  
RQ 3  
 
RQ 3  
RQ 3  
RQ 3  
84 
 
Additionally, documents ‘can allow comparisons to be made between the researcher’s 
interpretations of events and those recorded in documents relating to those events’ (May, 2011, 
p. 175). In this regard, documents, offered me an opportunity to compare what was documented 
and what happened on the ground.  
Document collection was painfully slow and frustrating. The main challenge for me was 
inaccessibility of documents due to the sensitive nature of the topic I was researching. It 
appeared that although LEAP documents authored by relevant ministries were available, policy 
officials who accessed them were unauthorised to disclose them to the public. This was 
particularly the case with the LEAP budget. As I sensed research participants felt slightly uneasy 
about releasing these documents, I no longer pursued their procurement from the LEAP 
Management Secretariat but planned to speak to directly to policy officials from the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning.  Relevant documents in relation to the draft Social Protection 
Bill were also not made available to me, similarly because of the sensitivity issue. 
In addition to the sensitivity issue was the poor record keeping of the Ministry, which made it 
difficult to pin together specific events and get a clear sense of the emergence of the LEAP 
programme. As a result, I had to rely on the limited narratives of elites and technocrats who 
were involved in policy dialogue with TNAs and complement their narratives with secondary 
literature.  
Despite the challenges at the national level, electronic copies of documents like the LEAP 
Operations Manual and the LEAP budget from the Ministry of Finance were made accessible to 
me, but only after persistent phone calls, email messages and finally a skype interview with an 
official who held them.  
At the district level, the situation was similarly grim, although the problem was with 
unavailability of relevant policy documents rather than sensitivity around certain documents. 
District level officers admitted they did not have access to LEAP policy document but had only 
limited data on beneficiary payments provided them by participating financial institutions34 
(PFIs), although such information differed markedly between district types. While pilot districts 
often had detailed and up-to-date information on payments in specific districts, expansion 
districts had very limited information regarding beneficiary household payments. 
Notwithstanding these challenges, I was happy with the limited documents I accessed and the 
 
34 Participating Financial Institutions are the designated financial institutions, mostly rural banks, who 
were instructed by LMS to disburse beneficiary grants.   
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maximum cooperation I received from nearly all research participants. In both interview data 
and documentary data collection, I sincerely acknowledged my appreciation for the time 
research participants gave up and the valuable information they provided. 
4.6.    Data analysis 
As I point out in section 4.5 above, a major data source for this study was semi-structured 
interviews. However, I concurrently undertook event-specific observations with interviews. As 
a result, observation memos and fieldwork notes were analysed together with interview 
transcripts, while documents were analysed separately. 
I applied a thematic approach in analysing interview data and a combined thematic and content 
analysis approach for documents.  
4.6.1    Interviews  
According to Bryman (2012), thematic analysis is a method of analysing qualitative data and 
involves the search for common themes comprising topics and issues that come up repeatedly 
in the data. This contrasts with discourse analysis which is focused on analysing written and 
spoken language in real life situations. A thematic approach is most suited to data analysis  which 
seeks people’s views, opinions and experiences (Bryman, 2012), hence its adoption here.  
In generating themes from interview data, I followed Bryman’s (2012) steps required in 
analysing qualitative data. I thus first familiarised myself with the data. Next, I re-read to find 
out if key phrases and remarks used by research participants had some theoretical significance 
to my topic and research questions I set out to investigate. Third, I identified key words and 
concepts that came up repeatedly and applied open coding to organise and label the data. 
Fourth, using NVIVO data analysis software to ensure consistent coding, I began to highlight and 
label sections of interview transcripts that contained key phrases of significance to my 
conceptual framework and research questions.  Yin (2003) maintains that relying on theoretical 
propositions is one of the strategies for analysing case studies to develop explanations of social 
phenomena. The codes, or nodes (the term used to describe labelled text in NVIVO language), 
ranged from ‘electronic targeting’ in TNA transcripts to ‘scaling up LEAP’, associated with 
domestic political elites’ transcripts. Codes that did not have relevance for my research 
questions were discarded. Finally, I reviewed the codes or themes I had generated to ensure 
that they would be useful and were sufficiently backed up by the data I had. Sometimes, when 
I was unsure whether codes, I had generated accurately represented the data I had, I returned 
to the data and re-labelled.  
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Although developing themes using NVIVO software was subjective and often time-consuming 
(Bryman,  2012), the themes that I developed were well supported by my data.  
4.6.2    Documents  
A content analysis approach is used to analyse the presence of concepts, phrases and meanings 
of certain words in given qualitative data (Bryman, 2012). In the use of content analysis, 
researchers can quantify and analyse certain words and themes that are frequently used in 
policy documents. In this study, I was guided by my research questions to code and interpret 
sections of documents where phrases which had some relevance for my research questions 
frequently appeared. 
Using NVIVO’s word frequency and visualisation tools, I examined the frequency and importance 
of key words from the nodes or themes I had previously developed. I found the word cloud 
visualisation tool useful, as the size of the words (how big they were) and their location (how 
close they were to the centre) drew my attention to their importance.  Words such as ‘continue’ 
and ‘sustainable’ in relation to LEAP’s implementation, which recurred in the NDC’s 2016 
political manifesto, were key to understanding the expansion of LEAP and helped me to examine 
the implications of such key concepts for the political interests of NDC’s elites. 
4.7   Reliability and validity of the findings 
Reliability and validity are concepts used to assess the quality of collected data (Bryman, 2012). 
When research is valid, then its findings measure what it claims to measure. On the other hand, 
research that is reliable can be reproduced under the same conditions (May, 2011). Data needs 
to be reliable as well as valid if they are to be of any value and use. Nonetheless, reliable data 
does not necessarily make for valid data. 
Although reliability and validity are concepts originally developed by positivists to measure the 
consistency and accuracy of quantitative data, some scholars of qualitative research have raised 
concerns about their effectiveness in qualitative research. Subsequently  slight adaptations have 
been made to their use. Guba (1985) and Lincoln and Denzin (2005) proposed that different 
criteria be used for testing the consistency and accuracy of research findings in qualitative 
studies. Trustworthiness and authenticity are two primary criteria that have since been used to 
assess qualitative data. These two criteria resonated with my research.  
In establishing that my research findings were accurate and credible, I designed my research in 
a way that allowed for perspectives from a diverse group of research participants, hence my 
adoption of a case study design. Bryman(2012) explains the importance of different perspectives 
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for the credibility of qualitative research, noting that ‘if there can be several possible accounts 
of an aspect of social reality, it is the credibility of the account that a researcher arrives at that 
is going to determine its acceptability to others’ (p. 390).  
In addition to my research design, which allowed for perspectives from multiple levels of 
governance, conducting a respondent validation as indicated in table 4.4, was necessary to check 
the accuracy of data from selected research participants. As well as respondent validation, 
triangulation which involves utilising multiple data sources to gain a deep understanding of the 
phenomenon being studied (Creswell, 2014; Lincoln and Denzin, 2005) was a method I 
employed. The use of interviews and LEAP event-specific observations allowed me to check the 
accuracy of the primary data collected against information from policy documents. I also cross-
checked the accuracy of respondents’ accounts by asking different respondents’ similar 
questions.   
4.8    Positionality 
Merriam et al. (2010) explain that the positionality of the researcher is where the researcher 
stands in relation to the researched. Researcher positionality thus relates to the identity of the 
researcher. It includes their background and experience in relation to the researched topic.  In 
qualitative research, a reflection on the positionality of the researcher  is important because it 
not only influences the researcher’s  interpretation and understanding of the research topic but 
also impacts the outcome of the data gathered (Cotterill and Letherby, 1994).  
In this study, the way in which research participants perceived my positionality, comprising my 
ethnicity (Akan speaking), citizenship (British-Ghanaian) and socioeconomic status (lower-
middle class), were factors I recognised were going to be important in the data collection 
process. These background factors also had potential to affect the outcome of the data I 
collected. However, my positionality in this regard did not affect data collection in the way that 
I expected. 
Surprisingly, a crucial factor that cropped up particularly at the local government level and had 
the potential to ruin or enhance the outcome of the data I collected was the ‘insider-outsider’ 
element of researcher positionality. The ‘insider’ versus ‘outsider’ component of the 
researcher’s status relates to whether the researcher is or is not a member of the group being 
studied (Merton, 1972). In researching the politics of implementing LEAP, I perceived myself as 
both an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’. As a Ghanaian, I approached data collection with a deep 
understanding of the socio-cultural and political environment of LEAP’s implementation. Thus, I 
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was able to present myself in a way that allowed me to access and discuss information relating 
to how LEAP was implemented by two competitive governments. This put me in the ‘insider’ 
space.  Nonetheless, I also considered myself an outsider to the Ghanaian political culture, with 
no affiliation to any of the political parties in the country, having stayed outside of Ghana for 
over ten years. This ‘outsider’ position distanced me from the political environment and allowed 
me to bring ‘fresh eyes’ to the political influences of elites and local government actors on the 
implementation of the LEAP programme. 
However, it was my ‘outsider’ rather than the ‘insider’ position which presented some 
challenges, particularly in relation to responses I anticipated from some participants. The 
knowledge by some research participants in some districts,  that I was a Ghanaian who had lived 
abroad and then returned to conduct research on a topic that many viewed as having political 
intentions raised suspicions about my intentions and affiliation to a particular political party. As 
noted by Cotterill and Letherby (1994), suspicion of the researcher’s intentions in any study may 
be less pronounced where research participants consider the researcher to be an insider. In my 
situation, suspicions about my intentions were more pronounced because I was perceived as an 
outsider. Some local government officials were a bit hesitant and guarded when it came to 
providing what was often regarded as ‘sensitive information’. This was because, it was not clear 
to them if I was a card-bearing member of the opposing political party. This suspicion was even 
more noticeable when as I used non-verbal cues to get a bit more detail on domestic elites’ 
actions regarding the direction of expansion – towards their political stronghold areas. Often 
during the interviews, some research participants would ask, ‘You know in Ghana, everything 
wears a political colour, so what is yours?’ In response to questions like this, I assured them I 
was only a researcher, trying to learn and understand how LEAP is implemented. Despite 
suspicions about my position, I still managed to get the required data as some research 
participants were convinced that I required the data purely for research purposes.   
4.9     Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed the methodological decisions I made to help obtain relevant data to 
answer the overarching research question of this study. I learnt that a qualitative research 
design rather than a quantitative design would help to provide deep insights into how 




I shed light on the data collection processes and methods I employed in this study as well as the 
challenges I encountered in data collection and how I addressed them. I explained my position 
as both an insider and an outsider and understood how being in the insider space presented less 
challenges in terms of data collection than being in the outsider space.  
The next chapter, chapter 5, presents findings from the analysis of fieldwork data in response to 



















Chapter 5   The role of Transnational actors’ ideas and interests and 
domestic elites’ interests in implementing Ghana’s LEAP. 
Chapter purpose and structure  
This chapter presents an analysis of the ideas and interests of three transnational actors (TNAs), 
the World Bank (WB), the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) 
and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), in the implementation of Ghana’s LEAP 
programme. It also analyses domestic elites’ interests in shaping the implementation of LEAP. 
Analysis in this chapter aims to address the first research question of this study: ‘How have the 
ideas and interests of transnational actors shaped the implementation of Ghana’s LEAP 
programme?’  
In terms of the methodological approach utilised in this chapter, data was sourced primarily   
from semi-structured interviews and documents as I indicate previously in section 4.5 of chapter 
4. Interviews were analysed using a thematic approach while document analysis combined a 
thematic and content analysis approach as I note earlier in section 4.6 of chapter 4. Furthermore, 
the multilevel analytical strategy adopted in this study, which involved analysing data from a 
tiered governance level, implied that in answering research question 1 (RQ1), analysis of ideas 
and interests of transnational actors and interests of domestic elites was conducted primarily at 
the policy or national level as summarised in figure 5 below. 
Figure 5.1: Analytical strategy for chapter 5 
Source: Author 
Analysis of findings is guided by Lavers and Hickey’s (2015) Adapted Political Settlements 
Framework (APSF) which, as I indicated earlier in the literature review chapter, emphasises the 
ideas of transnational actors in influencing the uptake of social protection in low- income 
countries.  The framework makes two propositions which I test in this chapter. First, that 
successful social protection uptake depends on how well TNA ideas fit with the ideas of existing 
political settlements and  their underlying interests (Lavers and Hickey, 2015). In this chapter, I 
examine whether and how TNAs ideas for design of the LEAP programme align with those of 
Ghana’s political elites’.  I also examine the circumstances under which TNA ideas and interests 
lose prominence in implementing the LEAP.  Second, Lavers and Hickey (2015) propose that 
RQ1            Policy /national level -  1st Analytical chapter  
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TNAs operate as a distinct faction with their own holding power, interests and ideas with which 
they influence social protection uptake (Lavers and Hickey, 2015). In this chapter, I investigate 
how transnational actors manage to influence social protection uptake in a highly competitive 
political context where multiple actors approach social protection implementation with 
different interests.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 presents an analysis of TNAs ideas. The 
programmatic ideas of the WB, DFID and UNICEF employed to design LEAP are analysed.  Section 
5.2 examines TNA interests. Implementation strategies recommended by TNAs to facilitate the 
realisation of their organisational interests are analysed. Section 5.3 examines the limits of TNA 
ideas and interests. The political interests of domestic political elites, which predominate over 
TNA interests and limit TNA actions, are discussed. Section 5.4 summarises the key findings from 
the analysis, highlights the insights offered and concludes the chapter. 
5.1   TNA programmatic ideas for the design of LEAP 
Programmatic ideas refer to programmes or measures that underpin specific policy ideas and 
are intended to achieve long -term goals (Campbell, 1998; Schmidt, 2008). Programmatic ideas 
are often proposed at the formulation stage of the policy process (Hickey and Seekings, 2019). 
In the implementation of LEAP, the programmatic ideas of the three TNAs were evident in the 
specific programmes that were proposed and subsequently adopted by domestic political elites 
(GOG, 2007). Two interrelated programmatic ideas were proposed by a consultative group made 
up of the TNAs, local consultants and a Brazilian mission team prior to the adoption phase of 
LEAP (GOG, 2007; see also section 2.3.6). First, a cash transfer programme which linked 
beneficiaries to existing health and education programmes, and second, a cash transfer 
programme with complementary government-sponsored productive economic activities. These 
ideas contributed significantly to how LEAP programme is designed and how it currently 
operates. The adoption of the ideas means that LEAP operates as a cash grants programme 
which links all beneficiary households to existing health and education programmes. The LEAP 
programme is also intended as a programme which complements cash grants with productive 
economic activities to help beneficiaries exit poverty in the long-term.   
As the analysis will show, development ideologies and frameworks which explained poverty 
reduction in the early 2000s underpinned the programmatic ideas of TNAs (Hickey and Seekings, 
2017). It is therefore important to explain these development ideologies and approaches here. 
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DFID’s approach to poverty reduction was heavily influenced by  the “Third Way Ideology” which 
combined minimum social welfare programmes with market-driven economic policies (Giddens, 
2013). The basic principle behind this ideology was that governments support disadvantaged 
and vulnerable groups with market-driven policies such as skills-focused programmes with 
which they build human capital and lift themselves out of poverty.  
For the WB, the Post-Washington consensus ideology was the development framework which  
guided their poverty reduction strategy in the late 1990s (Hickey and Seekings, 2017). The Post-
Washington consensus ideology emphasised the role of  state and non-state institutions like civil 
society organisations in delivering social welfare services such as health care to vulnerable 
households (Stiglitz, 2001). This ideology contrasts with the Washington consensus ideology in 
which  there was an exclusive reliance on the adoption of market-focused programmes by the 
private sector to improve welfare  (Williamson, 2005). 
In contrast, UNICEF adopted a rights-based approach to welfare. As a United Nations agency, its 
mandate was to ensure that the delivery of social welfare programmes like education and 
healthcare for vulnerable and disadvantaged populations was considered a right by 
governments (Hickey and Seekings, 2017; UNICEF, 2019). How these ideologies and welfare 
approaches revealed themselves in the programmatic ideas of TNAs is discussed in the following 
sections. Section 5.1.1 discusses a cash transfer programme with linkages to health and 
education programmes and section 5.1.2 analyses the other programmatic idea, a cash transfer 
programme which complements productive economic activities. 
5.1.1    A cash transfer programme with linkages to existing health and education 
programmes 
In response to how the LEAP programme addressed the welfare needs of the most vulnerable 
households in Ghana, DFID referred to its support for programmatic ideas proposed by the 
consultative group and then adopted by Ghanaian political elites. The idea of the LEAP 
programme to operate as a cash transfer programme which linked beneficiaries to existing 
healthcare and education programmes was strongly endorsed by DFID. 
From the perspective of DFID’s LEAP advisor: 
‘DFID supports a programme which provides cash grants to vulnerable groups, and then they 
are linked to complementary services such as the Ghana Health Insurance Scheme (GHIS) to 
reduce health and economic inequalities and to enable them stand on their feet’ (Interview 
with DP1/ DFAd, 19th January 2018). 
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DFID’s goal, to reduce extreme poverty and improve the wellbeing of disadvantaged groups 
(DFID Ghana, 2012) aided its support of the LEAP programme. As I previously noted in section 
2.3 of chapter 2 regarding the failure of economic growth to address extreme poverty  (Oduro, 
2010), Ghana’s political elites pursued programmes which directly targeted vulnerable 
households and empowered them to exit extreme poverty (Abane, 2017; Debrah, 2013; MMYE, 
2007; Peprah et al., 2017). Accordingly, a cash transfer programme which linked targeted 
households to health and education programmes proposed by TNAs was adopted by domestic 
elites. 
DFID emphasised the potential role that such a programmatic idea played in reducing the 
challenges which made households vulnerable to extreme poverty. The goal of the LEAP 
programme is to build the capacity of extreme poor households so that they were empowered 
to contribute to economic growth (GOG,2007). In achieving this goal, the NPP government then, 
saw as important linking beneficiaries to previously established social welfare programmes 
particularly in health and education (GOG, 2007). Thus, in support of this programmatic idea, 
DFID emphasised the investments the Ghanaian government had made in implementing the 
Ghana Health Insurance Scheme and the Ghana School Feeding programmes. This meant that 
the wellbeing of the targeted households were improved in the short-term, but also in the long- 
term, the human capital of poor households was built so they contributed to economic growth. 
This programmatic idea supported by DFID reflects the Third Way Ideology which, as earlier 
mentioned, emphasised the role of government in providing welfare support for vulnerable 
groups (Giddens, 2013). The Third Way approach to welfare differed from a socialist ideology in 
that it did not intend for governments to provide extensive welfare support to create 
dependency. Instead, the Third Way philosophy was that, with minimum welfare assistance and 
linkages to government programmes, governments helped vulnerable households to pull 
themselves out of poverty. DFID advisor’s response above, which describes linking LEAP 
beneficiaries to health and education programmes to enable vulnerable groups to stand on their 
feet, aligns with this thinking. By linking LEAP beneficiaries to healthcare and education 
programmes, their productive capacity was built, productivity levels were likely to increase and 
so was growth in future incomes.  
The idea of a cash grants programme linking beneficiary households to existing government 
programmes was borrowed from the design of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Programme (BFP).  The BFP 
had a human capital focus. It was designed to allow beneficiaries comply with specific education 
and health conditions (Hellmann, 2015; Lindert et al., 2007). However, not all the conditional 
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elements were borrowed. LEAP is currently implemented as a quasi-conditional cash transfer 
programme and not typically as a conditional cash transfer programme as in the case of the BFP 
programme. This is because not all beneficiary households are required to comply with health 
and education programmes as is the case with the BFP programme. For example, the elderly 
with no productive capacity do not have to comply with education conditions (MMYE, 2007). 
However, all beneficiaries of LEAP are automatically linked to the existing Ghana Health 
Insurance Scheme (GHIS) (Abane, 2017; Jaha and Sika-Bright, 2015;  Roelen et al., 2017).  In 
addition, children in LEAP beneficiary households who reside in districts that implement the 
Ghana School Feeding (GSF) programme are enrolled to benefit from the programme if they  are 
eligible (MESW, 2012).  
This LEAP-GHIS linkage, established in 2013 by the NDC administration, was intended to allow 
beneficiaries to access basic healthcare at no cost. It is to date the formal link between  LEAP 
and other social intervention programmes (Roelen et al., 2017). With reference to the 
government’s healthcare programme, DFID’s advisor stressed its importance in DFID’s approach 
to reducing vulnerability to extreme poverty.   
As well as DFID, UNICEF endorsed LEAP’s design as a cash transfer programme with linkages to 
healthcare and education. UNICEF’s mission is to promote the rights and wellbeing of children 
and improve the communities in which they live (UNICEF, 2019). As a short-term objective of 
the LEAP programme was to improve consumption of vulnerable households through regular 
cash grants (GOG, 2007), it can be argued that UNICEF aligned its ideas with the objectives of 
the LEAP programme. However, for UNICEF, the role of cash grants went beyond simply 
improving wellbeing.  As UNICEF’s LEAP advisor pointed out:  
‘UNICEF’s philosophy is to use cash and complementary services to reduce poverty. By 
supporting the government of Ghana to implement LEAP as a cash grants programme which 
links beneficiaries to social welfare programmes like health and education, the message of 
UNICEF is that access to the LEAP grant and its complementary programmes is their right’ 
(Interview with DP2/UNAd, 26th February, 2018).  
Thus, from UNICEF’s point of view, the LEAP programme was a mechanism through which 
vulnerable children and their households exercised their rights, especially in accessing social 
intervention programmes in relation to healthcare and education. The rights-based approach of 
UNICEF (UNICEF, 2012), emphasised in the response above, directed policy attention to make  
access to LEAP a right for beneficiary households and through that, ensure beneficiary 
households accessed other social intervention programmes. Ensuring that the LEAP programme 
was a right for targeted households was thus crucial. UNICEF’s position was that the Ghanaian 
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government would be held to account if this right were denied beneficiaries. However, at the 
time of my data collection (between January and June 2018), a social protection bill which 
backed up this right and committed ruling governments to ensure this right had yet to be 
established. As a result, LEAP and other targeted intervention programmes were not yet 
understood as a right by their beneficiaries. However, there were plans to pass the social 
protection bill, although this was not without its challenges. The challenges of establishing a 
legal framework to guide social protection in Ghana, and the politics around its passage, will be 
discussed later in section 5.3.3 of this chapter. 
From the analysis of the interviews with the key TNAs, it emerged that it was crucial for LEAP to 
be designed in ways which enabled the goal of the programme to be achieved. By supporting 
this programmatic idea, DFID and UNICEF directed policy attention to focus on welfare 
programmes which improved the wellbeing of poor households in ways that contributed to the 
goal for which LEAP was intended. Although the WB shared this focus, its emphasis was 
different. WB placed much more emphasis on programmatic ideas which enabled poor 
households to access opportunities to generate income directly and lift themselves out of 
extreme poverty.  
5.1.2    A cash transfer programme with complementary productive economic 
activities 
On her views about the WB’s ideas for designing LEAP, the WB’s social protection specialist 
referred to its recommendations following the outcome of the PSIA study in 2004. A cash grants 
programme complemented by productive economic activities was recommended with the aim 
of eliminating extreme poverty in the long-term. These ideas were primarily what the WB 
singlehandedly recommended as an alternative to growth-enhancing programmes (NDPC, 2004; 
NDPC, 2008) and adopted by NPP’s elites following further consultations with the  Vulnerability 
and Social Exclusion Sector Working Group (V&SWG) group (see section 2.3.6 of chapter 2)  
which deliberated on ideas to reduce  extreme poverty (GOG, 2007).  
To clarify how the programmatic ideas of the WB were utilised by the programme, the World 
Bank’s social protection specialist emphasised the importance of complementing cash grants 
with skills as she referred to a WB sponsored project for selected LEAP households:  
‘What the WB is doing to get beneficiaries out of poverty, is give them more than cash. We 
have therefore selected some LEAP beneficiary households and are trialling productive 
economic activities. By this I mean economic activities which generate skills, like basket 
weaving and shea butter production’ (Interview with DP3/WBAd, 21st March 2018).   
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The World Bank’s mission statement, which is to end extreme poverty and improve living 
standards by investing in people (World Bank, 2012), seems to have guided its programmatic 
ideas. For the WB, LEAP was designed as a cash grants programme with complementary 
activities intended to build beneficiaries’ productive capacity and enable them to exit extreme 
poverty. In terms of objectives, the WB’s ideas for LEAP were thus not very different from what 
was endorsed by DFID and UNICEF. While both programmatic ideas were intended to allow 
targeted households to exit extreme poverty, the analysis suggests that their emphasis was 
slightly different. For DFID and UNICEF, it was investments in healthcare and education, while 
skills-focused activities were prioritised by WB. 
The World Bank attached value to skills-based programmes because of its belief that building 
the productive capacities of vulnerable households was key to enabling vulnerable groups to 
exit poverty (World Bank, 2012). This belief was consistent with the Post-Washington Consensus 
ideology of the WB which also emphasised building the human capital of households through 
the development of skills (Williamson, 2005). 
Like the programmatic ideas of DFID and UNICEF, which were borrowed from BFP’s design (GOG, 
2007), programmatic ideas of the WB which emphasised the role of productive economic 
activities were similarly borrowed from the BFP. The BFP had design components which 
comprised skills-based programmes intended to reduce reliance on government support and  
instead increase reliance on market-oriented activities to help vulnerable households exit 
extreme poverty  (Hellmann, 2015). Similarly, Ghana’s LEAP programme was designed with an 
exit strategy in mind.  Projects such as ‘micro-credit schemes and rural enterprise’ (GOG, 2007, 
p. 31) were examples of this.  
Some of the programmatic ideas of the WB, however, required testing. This was to assess their 
appropriateness as sustainable poverty reduction measures. As was explained by the social 
protection consultant:  
‘we want to make sure that we are giving caregivers of beneficiaries something to do which 
will lift them out of poverty in the long term. But we first have to test the possibility of some 
skills like basket weaving and soap making that will wean beneficiaries off the programme’ 
(Interview with SI3/ GHR 4th April 2018).  
This view suggests that traditional economic activities such as those cited similarly provided a 
potential route out of poverty. However, testing these ideas highlighted a ‘fear’ that 
beneficiaries could become dependent on the cash grant element of LEAP and not acquire the 
productive skills that would break the cycle of intergenerational poverty.  
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The importance of testing the programmatic ideas was similarly stressed by the WB’s social 
protection specialist. However, she argued against applying this programmatic idea to all 
beneficiary households as she noted: ‘We need to be careful [about] the skills we advise for LEAP 
beneficiaries. I’m also a big proponent to say not everyone is an entrepreneur so let’s not bunch 
everyone up and say let’s start a small shop. It’s not going to work” (Interview with DP3/WBAd, 
21st March 2018).  
From the analysis, programmes providing poor households with skills to move out of conditions 
of extreme poverty were a priority for the WB. Testing these programmatic ideas was necessary 
to find out if entrepreneurial activities were a route out of poverty for all households or if 
alternative strategies needed consideration. This was because putting some households on an 
‘entrepreneurial’ route out of extreme poverty risked failure for other beneficiaries.  
The programmatic ideas outlined above, based on skills, were also subscribed to by DFID. In 
establishing DFID’s position on skills, the LEAP advisor noted: ‘In line with UK’s thinking, poverty 
reduction is much more sustainable when cash grants complement trade and other productive 
inclusion activities, than when cash grants are exclusively transferred to disadvantaged groups’ 
(Interview with DP1/ DFAd, 19th January 2018).  
DFID’s view on exiting extreme poverty reflected the Third Way ideology which, as I noted earlier 
in the introduction to this section, emphasised government-supported programmes (Hay, 2018), 
in this case skills-focused programmes, to allow vulnerable populations to acquire jobs and 
secure stable incomes. This meant that in the long-term, vulnerable groups lived without 
government support. 
The analysis presented so far in this second subsection focuses primarily on the views of the WB 
and DFID in relation to exiting extreme poverty and does not include perspectives from UNICEF. 
This is because their approaches to poverty reduction have slight variations. While WB and DFID 
emphasise programmes, UNICEF places more emphasis on rights to access these programmes. 
Thus, in later analysis on the passage of a legal framework to protect the rights of vulnerable 
households (section 5.3.3) UNICEF’s perspective will feature. 
As regards the views of the WB and DFID, it can be inferred from the analysis that both TNAs 
believed that cash grants programmes played a role in reducing vulnerability to extreme poverty 
and in eliminating extreme poverty. However, they were not convinced that cash transfers alone 
would fulfil this objective. There was a sense that exclusive cash grants would not deliver 
effective poverty reduction unless it was accompanied or complemented by other programmes, 
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in this case, skills-focused programmes that built beneficiaries’ human capital. This belief 
explains why in more recent times the idea of a ‘cash plus programme’ (Roelen et al., 2017), in 
which beneficiaries of cash grants are linked to services, has become relevant. However, 
although there is evidence from the global south that ‘cash plus programmes’, particularly those 
that link cash transfer programmes to health services, improve wellbeing  (Bastagli et al., 2016), 
there is not as yet adequate evidence to suggest that such cash grants programmes which link 
beneficiaries to productive economic activities will enable households to exit from extreme 
poverty. Factors such as the type of economic activity and whether such programmes are 
conditional or unconditional could determine the outcome of such programmes on vulnerability 
and poverty reduction (Bastagli et al., 2016). 
In addition to programmatic ideas which shaped the design of LEAP, the analysis suggests that 
the organisational interests of the three TNAs played an important role in shaping how the LEAP 
programme was implemented. 
5.2   The WB, DFID and UNICEF’s organisational interests  
There was some indication from the interview and documentary data that achieving their 
organisational interests provided strong motivation for all three TNAs to participate in the 
implementation of LEAP. To ensure their goals were realised, the three TNAs invested in 
strengthening institutional and human capacity, discussed in Section 5.2.1, and in improving 
LEAP’s delivery systems, analysed in section 5.2.2. 
5.2.1.   Strengthening institutional and human capacity  
The WB seemed particularly concerned with institutional capacity. According to a director of the 
LEAP programme:  
‘World Bank …saw institutional weakness. They felt the programme should have its own 
secretariat and management. So, this LEAP Management Secretariat (LMS) as you see, was 
fully funded and established by the WB. The vehicles and office equipment were all provided 
with World Bank’s funds’ (Interview with LS2/LND, 7th February 2018). 
One of the key elements of the WB’s Post-Washington Consensus ideology was promoting the 
government’s role in improving mechanisms used to deliver social programmes, rather than 
diminishing the role of government, as was the case with the Washington Consensus ideology 
(Williamson, 2005).  This would explain why the WB focused a lot more of its resources on 




The research participant in this case was familiar with the priorities of the WB and its 
mechanisms of support, having previously managed WB projects in various social services 
sectors in Ghana. The WB prioritized building effective and accountable institutions because it 
believed that this was the way to maximise the impact of programmes it supported.   
In support of the WB’s priorities, the WB’s social protection specialist stressed the importance 
of strengthening structures for the effective delivery of government-led programmes such as 
LEAP. Her argument was that ‘management of government programmes was more effective 
when institutional structures were strengthened’ (Interview with DP3/ WBAd, 21st March 2018).   
As an organisation which placed value on strengthening institutions, the WB drew on the 
principles of the New Institutional Economics (NIE), which views institutions as vehicles for 
effective  governance (North, 1991; Williamson, 2005). Furthermore, from the evidence 
provided, the WB’s emphasis on democratic governance (Rodrik, 2006), which ensured 
openness and accountability in the management of its financial investments in developing 
countries, explains why it established a secretariat from which its financial investments could be 
managed.  
Although at the time of LEAP’s launch there was a department within the Ministry of Manpower, 
Youth and Employment with administrative units like human resources and finance which 
managed social welfare programmes, the WB decided not to use this existing department for 
the management of LEAP. Instead, it invested in a new structure outside the already existing 
government department. The result was the establishment of the LEAP Management Secretariat 
(LMS) which began operations in 2015. The organisational layout of LMS, shown in figure 5.2 is 







Figure 5.2. LEAP Management Organisational Structure 
LMS is the management wing of the LEAP programme. As illustrated in the organogram in figure 
5.2 above it is headed by the LEAP National Director (LND) and assisted by a LEAP Deputy 
Director (LDD) who has general oversight over the programme’s implementation. The 
secretariat has administrative units with heads (directors) and support staff who manage 
different aspects of LEAP’s implementation. Organised in no order, the administrative units 
include but not are not restricted to a Management Information Systems (MIS) unit which holds 
a comprehensive database of beneficiary households for the purpose of analysing LEAP 
household data. There is also a Case Management Unit (CMU) which is similar to customer 
service unit, mandated to investigate and resolve beneficiary complaints, while the Monitoring 
and Evaluation (M&E) unit monitors programme implementation and evaluates programme 
outcomes and impacts35. ‘The payments unit works closely with accountants to effect funds 
transfers from World Bank and DFID through Ghana’s Ministry of Finance to designated district 
financial institutions to make payments to beneficiary households’ (LS2/LND, 7th February 2018). 
Thus, the WB effectively set up a parallel structure outside the government’s ministerial 
structure to manage its investment in LEAP.    
 
35 ‘Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty Programme, Ministry of Gender, Children and Social 
Protection’, LEAP Programme Organisational Structure, LEAP Programme Ghana. Accessed 8th January, 




LND     LEAP National Director 
LDD      LEAP Deputy Director 
MIS      Management Information Systems 
CMU    Case Management Unit  
M & E   Monitoring and Evaluation 
101 
 
In addition to the WB, DFID’s interest was in strengthening capacity. However, unlike the WB, 
which invested in setting up a parallel institutional structure, DFID’s investment was directly 
towards building human capacity within the Secretariat. From the perspective of the LEAP 
Director, 
‘DFID’s interest was in improving the programme’s financial records and budgeting processes 
when it joined LEAP…DFID brought [in] a Technical Assistant because the LEAP Management 
Secretariat needed an expert who would help in managing its accounts’ (Interview with 
LS2/LND, 7th February 2018). 
From the evidence presented, it seems that simply setting up a secretariat was not enough. DFID 
had identified a knowledge and skills gap at the secretariat which required attention. This 
explains why it recruited a financial consultant to support the work of the secretariat. DFID 
recruiting a financial consultant to manage finance-related issues raises questions about the 
extent to which both DFID and the WB were genuinely committed to strengthening national 
institutions in the countries that they supported.  The rhetoric did not match the practice on the 
ground. DFID’s practice of transferring knowledge and expertise through its technical assistants 
(Hickey et al., 2009) reflected the Third Way ideology which emphasised the transfer of skills 
and capacities to build knowledge capital in the country seeking financial assistance (Giddens, 
2013).  
As the data suggests, DFID directly invested in transferring knowledge to government 
institutions which it supported. However, it seems that this practice was aimed at protecting 
DFID’s financial interests.  It aligned with its [DFID’s] Business Case to support LEAP, arguing that, 
‘human resources including expert finance knowledge would be needed to improve financial 
management” (DFID Ghana, 2012, p. 11). This explains why, in practice, it recruited one of its 
technical assistants from Malawi, instead of drawing on expertise from a government ministry 
or department in Ghana.   
DFID’s policy makes it clear that contracted technical assistants will provide quality expertise 
and work alongside local counterparts (Hickey et al., 2009), thus the expectation was that the 
financial consultant worked alongside a finance leader or other related personnel at the 
secretariat. However, the financial consultant did not work alongside a local counterpart in the 
existing government department to ensure capacity within them could be strengthened. In 
addition, ‘The technical assistant from DFID’s Malawian office had been contracted to work over 
a three-year period from 2015 till 2018’ (LS2/LND, 7th February 2018). 
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Although the interview data defines the role of the technical assistant, it was not clear who the 
direct counterpart of the technical assistant was  and how the transfer of knowledge was to be 
carried out over the contracted period for the secretariat to secure transfer of expertise. 
Furthermore, it was not clear if the contracted period of three years was long enough for any 
designated local counterpart to learn and develop the necessary skills and  build the capacity 
required to implement specific financial tasks when the consultant’s contracted period ended. 
Thus, in theory, DFID could say it was addressing human capacity, but in reality, because there 
was no local counterpart working directly with the financial consultant, it is doubtful how this 
was going to be achieved. It appears more likely that recruiting and sponsoring a technical 
assistant was more about protecting its financial investments in LEAP than improving the 
capacity of national institutions to take on the financial management of the LEAP programme.  
5.2.2    Strengthening LEAP’s delivery systems: targeting and payments  
From the perspectives of the WB and DFID, there were many instances of unprofessional 
conduct of front-line workers at the community level which threatened the effective delivery of 
LEAP. As I note in chapter 2, section 2.3.6, the front-line workers in communities were members 
of community committees36 whose role involved identifying potential households in 
communities and ensuring grants were disbursed to all beneficiary households in accordance 
with LMS’s regulations. A detailed analysis of their roles will be presented in chapter 7 of this 
thesis.  
The main concern was that community committees manipulated LEAP’s targeting and payment 
systems in ways that undermined efforts to achieve poverty reduction. A shift from manual to 
electronic systems of targeting and processing payments was thus regarded as a more effective 
practice.  
A shift from manual to electronic targeting  
The WB pushed for a shift from the existing manual targeting system to an electronic targeting 
system because the manual system was flawed and open to the influence of community and 
national level politics. From the perspective of the WB’s social protection specialist:  
‘if you have in place a fluffy mechanism that will select as many people as possible, you will 
get votes swaying in the ruling government’s favour. So, if the government does not make a 
programme like the LEAP about poverty reduction but instead about staying in power, then 
 
36 Committees established by district LEAP officials to support implementation of the LEAP programme at 
the community level. The members of these committees serve the programme on a voluntary basis. 
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it will allow the weak systems to influence votes’ (Interview with DP3/WBAd, 21st March 
2018). 
The response above directly concerns the ineffectual targeting mechanism utilised by LEAP and 
its potential to affect the goal of the programme. It also indirectly concerns community officials 
misapplying the carefully designed eligibility criteria used to select households for the LEAP 
programme. Although there were procedures for monitoring the conduct of front-line workers 
(MESW, 2012) ‘monitoring was weak and irregular’ (LS4/ HP, 22nd February 2018). As will be 
demonstrated in chapter 7, regarding the selection of households to expand LEAP, community 
officials often selected those personally known to them. The result was an increase in exclusion 
and inclusion errors when final beneficiary household numbers were presented to the 
management of LEAP. This led LMS to conclude that ‘community officials manipulated the 
eligibility rules to suit their own ends’ (Interview with LS4/HP, 22nd February 2018).   
Shifting from a manual to an electronic targeting system entailed the migration of beneficiary 
household data held by the LEAP Secretariat’s MIS to a centralised electronic register detailing 
the poverty characteristics of all households in Ghana. Also referred to as a single household 
register system, it is,  
‘a database of the socio-economic profile of all poor households. The establishment of the 
single household registry would make it easier to select beneficiary households for particular 
targeted programmes. It minimised the effect of community influences on targeting’ 
(Interview with SI3/GHR, 4thApril 2018).  
Replacing the manual system with an electronic system of targeting involved collecting and 
digitally recording primary data on the vulnerability characteristics of all households in Ghana 
and regularly cross-checking the consistency of this information across social sectors (Ablo, 
2016). This new system was a tried and tested targeting approach borrowed from Brazil’s BFP 
(MMYE, 2007). The single household register was intended as a Common Targeting Mechanism 
(CTM) to be used by all social sectors and from which all social intervention programmes would 
draw their beneficiary lists. For LMS, its purpose was  to identify and prioritise households living 
in poor and/or vulnerable  conditions and to ensure that social protection resources allocated 
to LEAP effectively reached the people with the greatest needs (Ablo, 2016). This system thus 
minimised community officials’ intercepting of targeting process.  
However, this new electronic system involved a carefully planned methodology and ‘significant 
financial outlay which the Ghana government had not made allowance for’ (SI3/GHR, 4th April 
2018). As such ‘the WB single-handedly invested in the required infrastructure and initiated the 
process of "building a household register system for LEAP in 2016”’ (SI3/GHR, 4th April 2018). 
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Beneficiary household data collection for the register, like census data collection, began in the 
three northern regions of Ghana, with plans to extend data collection to other administrative 
regions of the country. However, ‘changes in government in 2017 stalled the data collection 
process’ (Interview with S12/GSOP, 3rd March 2018; S13/GHR, 4th April 2018), and by the end of 
my fieldwork in June 2018, the register of households was still incomplete, rendering the 
common targeting mechanism ineffectual. Manual targeting involving community committees 
thus remains to date the main mechanism for selecting households for LEAP. 
Concerns about community targeting were similarly raised by DFID. As noted by DFID’s financial 
consultant, ‘targeting at the community level can be open to abuse…you hardly know who is 
selecting who’ (Interview with LS6/FS, 13th March 2018). This view also highlights the effects of 
community influences on the outcome of targeting. However, as DFID’s technical assistant, his 
perspective went beyond the effects of community influences on targeting. His views pointed 
to much bigger concerns about potential fiduciary risks borne by DFID. This was clarified by the 
LEAP Deputy Director:   
‘You see, DFID needed to protect its financial investment in the LEAP and therefore made 
electronic targeting of LEAP households mandatory. LEAP’s donors, DFID and the WB pushed 
the NDC government to switch from manual to electronic targeting and threatened they will 
pull out their funding if they did not switch. They were not sure the right persons were being 
targeted for the programme’ (Interview with LS1/ LDD, 6th February 2018).  
The evidence presented demonstrates that DFID as well as the WB had reached a consensus 
that if the political influences on the selection of households persisted, and financial assistance 
intended to support households never reached them, this would undermine their financial 
assistance, hence the push for electronic targeting.  
While the literature presented about community targeting indicates that, as an approach, it did  
not always guarantee the poorest households were reached as intended (Coady, Grosh and 
Hoddinott, 2004), there is also the view that other alternatives to targeting still presented some 
inclusion and exclusion errors (Devereux, 2016). In the case of LEAP, the WB and DFID recognised 
that the switch to an electronic system using the single household registry based on four 
different categories still risked the chance of including non-eligible groups and excluding eligible 
groups. However, the perception that inclusion and exclusion errors would be reduced, 
especially as community officials were eliminated from the process, led the WB and DFID to 
maintain their preference for electronic targeting to the extent of making the switch to 
electronic targeting mandatory. DFID also threatened to ‘suspend or reduce its financial 
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assistance to LEAP’ (DFID, 2013, p. 10) if the government failed to address structural problems 
in targeting.  
In addition to the WB and DFID, UNICEF saw the need to strengthen LEAP’s targeting system. 
The Head of Payments at LMS recalled the proposal by UNICEF at a meeting with directors over 
the move from a manual to an electronic selection of households. According to him: 
‘UNICEF’s advisor argued that an electronic targeting system ensured that only vulnerable 
groups who have the right to social protection could be targeted. He proposed the use 
ESOKO’s data entry clerks which UNICEF employed in selecting beneficiaries for the LEAP 
1000 project37. Household data collected went straight onto the LEAP server without being 
manipulated and then a final list of selected households was generated’ (Interview with 
LS4/HP, 22nd February 2018). 
For UNICEF, the use of a CTM enable the selection of only the most vulnerable households who 
had rights to access the LEAP grants. The recommendation to use ESOKO, a private data 
collection agency, was based on UNICEF’s ‘experience of using the data entry clerks to collect 
data for UNICEF-sponsored programmes, including the “LEAP 1000”’ (Interview with LS1/LND, 
5th March 2018). Data entry clerks from ESOKO replaced community committees who had 
previously administered survey questionnaires to select beneficiary households for the LEAP 
programme.   
A benefit of replacing community committees with data entry clerks was that beneficiary data 
collected on hand-held devices was automatically linked to a LEAP server. This meant that there 
was a reduced chance that clerks would manipulate data. Moreover, the use of a private 
company was also meant to convince domestic elites and  technocrats of the  robustness of an 
electronic system and its effect on the outcome of targeting (UNICEF, 2012).   
UNICEF’s recommendation, however, had cost implications. They primarily comprised ‘training 
ESOKO’s data entry clerks which were covered by UNICEF in the first year of their three-year 
contracted period’ (LS4 /HP, 22nd February 2018). With such an arrangement in place, the NDC 
government in power in 2016 had no option but to use ESOKO to administer PMT.  The use of 
ESOKO not only had cost implications but presented problems for district and community level 
officials. A more detailed analysis of the effects of ESOKO’s involvement in the selection of LEAP 
households will be presented in section 7.4 of chapter 7.  
 
37 A UNICEF-sponsored LEAP extension project in which selected households comprising extremely poor 
pregnant women and mothers with infants under 18 months were administered cash grants over three 
years to explore how cash transfers reduced child poverty and improved the nutritional status of infants. 
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As well as strengthening the targeting system, my analysis showed that the three TNAs 
recommended strengthening LEAP’s payment system. 
A shift from manual to electronic payments  
Like with the selection of beneficiary households, there were concerns about the manual system 
of disbursing cash grants, hence a recommendation to shift from a manual to an electronic 
means of payment. As recalled by the Head of Payments at LMS:  
‘the possibility of paying the wrong person was extremely high especially as numbers of 
beneficiary households increased. Ghana Postal Services’ disbursing clerks were not looking 
at the photos. It was a simple thumb print, collect cash and go strategy. There was also the 
time and administrative costs of processing payments. So, the WB and DFID suggested the 
biometric system’ (Interview with LS4/HP, 22nd February 2018). 
The key element in the electronic payment system  was the use of biometric technology to verify 
beneficiary characteristics, such as finger prints and entitlements (World Bank, 2016b) in 
contrast to the manual system of simply checking recipients’ photo identity cards. 
The use of such biometric technology to deliver cash grants aligned with both the WB’s and 
DFID’s ideologies. The application of biometric technology was consistent with the Post-
Washington Consensus ideology because the WB’s development ideology placed value on the 
use of  technology to improve the delivery of government services (Williamson, 2005). Similarly, 
for DFID, the Third Way ideology promoted the renewal of systems through technology to 
improve public provisioning of services (Hay, 2018). 
Like with the electronic targeting system, the switch to electronic payments recommended by 
DFID and the WB was not only intended to protect beneficiary grants but was also intended to 
reduce their fiduciary risks. In the case of DFID, as a bilateral aid agency accountable to its 
taxpayers, the electronic payment system was preferred over the manual system because it 
ensured that grants went to the right persons. In addition, ‘employing electronic payments as 
the LEAP programme expanded, ensured that DFID’s financial  investments were achieving value 
for money’ (DFID Ghana, 2012, p. 27). According to the DFID official, electronic payment 
systems, because they reduced or eliminated errors, would ensure that DFID’s financial 
investment had a higher chance of meeting expected outcomes, hence ensuring the value of its 
investment in LEAP.  For the WB, which prioritised cost-effectiveness in its investments in low-
income countries, the use of biometric technology in processing payments was a 
recommendation for LEAP because it had been tried and tested in Kenya’s OVC programme 
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(World Bank, 2012) and was believed to be a cost-effective method of disbursing cash grants to 
beneficiary households.  
To ensure the LEAP programme implemented an electronic payment system, pressure was 
brought to bear on the previous NDC government, as the deputy director of LEAP recalled: ‘The 
WB pushed [my emphasis added] the previous NDC government to switch from a manual to 
electronic payments process or else it will not continue funding. All the development partners, 
UNICEF, DFID and WB pushed [my emphasis added] for electronic payments” (Interview with 
LS1/LDD, February 2018).  
So although the literature suggests that TNAs in social protection policy have since the early 
2000s employed persuasive mechanisms to achieve their interests (Foli, 2016; Ulriksen, 2016), 
and that ideas were negotiated rather than enforced (Hickey et al., 2018), the evidence 
presented here suggests that this has not necessarily been the case in the Ghanaian context. 
Regarding the strengthening of payments, the WB seems to have forced the electronic payment 
system on the Ghanaian government rather than negotiating with programme implementers of 
LEAP regarding how payments could be strengthened. 
The use of the word ‘pushed’ by LEAP’s deputy director to describe the attitude of the WB (and 
DFID) is a reminder of the coercive mechanisms it employed in the 1990s during the structural 
adjustment lending period. Also, as noted, electronic targeting was used as leverage to ensure 
it could account for how its funds were used to deliver expected results – in this case appropriate 
targeting of beneficiary households.   
The threat to withdraw  its funding if managers of the programme did not implement electronic 
payments is an example of how the WB and DFID seem prepared to use hard forms of power 
(Abdulai, 2020) to ensure certain preferred practices are implemented. This is in sharp contrast 
to the suggestions of some scholars that the use of soft power, comprising persuasive 
mechanisms like negotiation, is currently the mechanism most TNAs employ to sell their 
preferred policy choices (Foli, 2016; Hickey et al., 2018).  
Although the WB and DFID endorsed the shift from manual to electronic payments, and both 
organisations were prepared to withdraw their financial support if the government did not make 
this shift, in reality funding for LEAP was not withdrawn, even when some districts had not yet 
begun to use biometric technology in disbursing grants. At the time of my data collection, ‘about 
twenty percent of all LEAP implementing districts had not invested in the necessary infrastructure 
to enable them to use biometric technology to process payments’ (Interview with LS4/HP, 22nd 
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February 2018). This suggests that the threat of withdrawing support as well as continued 
financing of the programme was perhaps used as a ‘carrot and stick mechanism’ to protect 
organisational interests and at the same time influence the behaviour of domestic elites in ways 
that allowed them to comply with the demands of TNAs.  
In the implementation of LEAP, the WB, DFID and UNICEF did not always get an opportunity to 
promote their ideas in the way they expected. There were situations where the political interests 
and agendas of domestic elites were prioritised over TNAs’ poverty reduction ideas. This in effect 
placed limits on what was accomplished on the ground. This is the focus of the next section.   
5.3    Domestic elite’s interests and limits to TNA influence 
The evidence presented suggests that the priorities and interests of ruling elites threatened the 
influence of TNAs on the implementation of LEAP. Three factors which contributed to this are 
analysed as follows: first, the commitment of the ruling government to a political manifesto 
promise, discussed in section 5.3.1; second, attempts by the NPP to increase voter support 
numbers, discussed in section 5.3.2; and third, a political tactic to delay commitment to LEAP, 
namely in passage of a draft social protection bill, discussed in section 5.3.3. These factors 
suggest that TNA interests sometimes lost prominence but also conflicted with the interests of 
domestic elites.  
5.3.1    Commitment to a political manifesto promise  
While the evidence suggests that all three TNAs wanted to see LEAP implemented as a targeted 
cash grants programme intended to reduce poverty and vulnerability, the ruling NPP 
government’s immediate priority was to fulfil its political manifesto promise. This attitude was 
particularly frustrating for the WB, as explained by its social protection specialist:  
‘A recent meeting attended by me and other development partners at the Ministry of Finance 
indicated the government has currently put the free Senior High School (SHS) programme 
high on its agenda. So, it’s all about the free SHS since the NPP government gained power.  
Priorities have shifted, and some other programmes must suffer. Of course, children will have 
to be educated to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty. But in the current climate 
when certain decisions are prioritised over others then it becomes more of a political agenda 
rather than a development agenda’ (Interview with DP3/ WBAd, 21st March 2018). 
For the WB’s social protection specialist, commitment to the LEAP programme meant ensuring 
LEAP was implemented as intended, in this case to reduce extreme poverty, a mission of the WB 
as a development organisation. However, it seems that the actions of the ruling NPP government 
threatened this goal because of how it prioritised delivery of a political manifesto promise over 
the objectives of the LEAP programme.  
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In the 2016 elections, the NPP promised that, if elected, they would introduce ‘free’ senior 
secondary education for all who obtained the minimum entry grades required to access 
secondary education (GOG, 2018). This political manifesto promise, according to the WB’s social 
protection specialist, risked the government not fulfilling the poverty reduction goal of LEAP 
because it entailed the government channelling resources and effort to fulfil this political 
manifesto promise.   
The NPP’s political manifesto priority was similarly viewed by DFID’s LEAP advisor: 
‘NPP government believes the success of the free SHS will win them more votes than the LEAP 
programme, so the incentive to commit and put resources into the SHS programme is 
stronger. The current government has not committed to the LEAP as much as it commits to 
ensuring the success of the free SHS programme, because they know LEAP will not give them 
as much votes as the free SHS programme’ (Interview with DP1/DFAd, 7th April 2018). 
Drawing on the literature on the characteristics of competitive clientelist settlements, it is typical 
of  governments to focus on and prioritise  ‘projects that cover a broad geographical area which 
tend to  have visible impact rather than targeting public resources to more deprived areas’ 
(Abdulai, 2020, p. 4). It seemed that the launch of the free SHS, which benefited the entire 
country, overshadowed TNAs’ poverty reduction interests of ensuring that 2.2 million 
households who lived in extreme poverty were targeted using a cash transfer programme. The 
free SHS programme had visible political payoffs because all school-aged children including 
those from deprived households who previously could not access public secondary education 
could now do so. Consequently, with the huge direct costs of education covered, affected 
households were more likely to vote the NPP back into power. In this regard, it could be argued 
that the NPP government prioritised the interests of re-election over the poverty reduction 
interests of TNAs as the success of the free SHS programme had a strong vote-winning potential 
for the NPP government.  
Although the way the importance of the free SHS programme was outlined in its 2016 political 
manifesto seems not very different from how the NPP intended to implement the LEAP 
programme, there is a sense from the analysis that the NPP’s commitment to the former was 
greater because the free SHS programme had vote-winning potential.  
In their 2016 political manifesto, the NPP promised ‘to redefine basic education to include 
vocational and technical schools and make it available for free on a universal basis to all 
Ghanaians’ (CODEO, 2016b, p. 31). The same was not said about the LEAP programme. The NPP’s 
plan for the LEAP programme was not to ensure that it reached all poor households. Instead, its 
plan was to ‘refocus the LEAP programme by adopting effective, accurate means-testing 
110 
 
mechanisms to properly select beneficiary households’ (CODEO, 2016b, p. 37). These were the 
systems of delivery that were discussed earlier in section 5.2.2. Establishing these systems was 
rather costly and had less visible impact from the electorate’s perspective. Thus, what was most 
important for the NPP government was to deliver a programme which had much more visibility 
and yielded immediate returns for the electorate (Whitfield, 2010).   
The free Senior High School (SHS) programme was the NPP’s trump card in the 2016 elections 
and fulfilling this promise was interpreted by the WB and DFID as one reason why it did not 
prioritise LEAP in the same way as the previous NDC government. According to Lavers and Hickey 
(2015), if social protection does not contribute significantly to the stability of the political 
settlement, then ruling elites are less likely to commit to its uptake. It seems that the LEAP 
programme did not have as much significance for the stability of NPP’s rule than did the NPP’s 
political manifesto promise.  
In addition to fulfilling a political manifesto promise, the NPP’s restriction of grants to beneficiary 
households selected by the NDC similarly limited the influence of TNAs over LEAP’s 
implementation.  
5.3.2   Attempts to increase voter support numbers.  
In sharing their views on the threats to and challenges of implementing the LEAP programme, 
DFID’s advisor raised concerns about a current issue – the restriction of grants to eligible   
households selected by the NDC government and processing grant payments for  households 
selected under NPP’s administration. He noted:  
‘We the development partners are aware of the politics that is going on and we are not 
enthused at all. We have so much confidence in the poverty reduction potential of the 
programme and all we want to see now is the backlog of payments to be addressed before 
processing payments for the next batch of enrolled beneficiaries’ (Interview with DP1/DFAd, 
16th June 2018). 
The politics that was going on in this case was a strategy employed to increase voter support 
numbers. This involved the incentive for NPP’s administration to process LEAP grants for 
households selected under its administration but restrict the processing of grants to households 
selected under the NDC’s administration. According to the selection rules of the LEAP 
programme, processing grants takes a few months once a beneficiary is enrolled on the 
programme (MESW, 2012). For DFID however, processing and distributing grants to selected 
households was  one way the cash grants element of LEAP responded to the consumption needs 
of vulnerable households and prevented them from sliding into extreme poverty. However, this 
objective was far from prioritised by the NPP’s elites because the NPP government had other 
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agendas than prioritising the short-term objective of the LEAP programme. In a competitive 
clientelist political setting where  vulnerability to the loss of power to opponents was high (Levy, 
2010), ruling elites go to great lengths to employ strategies which give them a  political 
advantage over their opponents (Abdulai, 2019; Abdulai, 2020; Appiah and Abdulai, 2017). In 
the case of LEAP’s implementation under the NPP government, processing grants of households 
enrolled under its administration was a strategy to increase voter support numbers for NPP and 
thus used to give them a political advantage over NDC. 
The conduct of the NPP government in prioritising the processing and distribution of grants to 
households it selected over households selected by the NDC was confirmed by a research 
participant at LMS, who noted, ‘those beneficiaries enrolled by NPP government in 2018 were 
paid immediately, while those enrolled in 2017 are still awaiting their grants’ (LS1/ LDD, 16th 
June 2018). The selective distribution of LEAP grants was in effect NPP government’s attempt to 
buy political loyalty from households it enrolled, to increase its voter support numbers. Cases of 
political patronage similar to the case described are not uncommon in the expansion of LEAP. 
Such cases will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis.  
There was some sense that TNAs like the WB saw the attitude of the NPP government as a threat 
to realising the poverty reduction potential of LEAP, but one which they could not control.  
LEAP’s TNAs were also not in much control of the timing around which a draft social protection 
bill would be passed. 
5.3.3    A political tactic to delay commitment to LEAP 
Challenges in disbursing regular cash grants to beneficiary households in 2013 (DFID Ghana, 
2013) led NDC’s elites to draft a social protection bill to secure binding commitments from future 
governments and protect the rights of all social protection beneficiaries  including those of the 
LEAP programme. However, there were delays in passing the social protection bill when NPP 
took over the implementation of LEAP from 2017, thus threatening the achievement of TNAs 
organisational goals. This is because TNAs saw the passage of the social protection bill as aligning 
with aspects of their respective ideologies.  
While the WB approached the benefit of the bill from a governance perspective, DFID and 
UNICEF saw the passage of the bill through a human rights lens.  For the WB, ‘a social protection 
bill, will protect beneficiaries under various governments’ (DP3/ WBAd, 21st March 2018). The 
protection of beneficiaries by various governments reflected the WB’s Post-Washington 
Consensus ideology (Williamson, 2005) of institutionalising government programmes. The 
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institutionalisation of legal framework for social protection would ensure that any government 
in power would be required to manage and allocate appropriate financial resources to address 
the welfare needs of its most vulnerable and poorest households. 
For DFID, passing the bill would signal the government’s responsibility to maintain regular cash 
grants, as explained by DFID’s advisor:  
‘a social protection bill in place will protect the rights of all vulnerable citizens to social 
protection. In addition, it is a wakeup call for the current government, because that legal 
backing comes with funding, to put in the resources and money for regular funding to protect 
their rights to access social protection’ (Interview with DP1/DFAd, 16th June 2018). 
The emphasis on the protection of citizens’ rights by governments reflects an idea promoted by 
DFID’s Third Way ideology (Hay, 2018). The passage of a social protection bill would obligate 
governments to establish a social contract with their most vulnerable citizens (Devereux and 
White, 2010). This meant that not only would governments that administered LEAP be expected 
to support eligible households with regular cash grants but, most importantly, beneficiaries of 
targeted interventions could also demand their rights from the government.  
The protection of the rights of vulnerable households was similarly a position espoused by 
UNICEF. For UNICEF, the passage of the bill ‘ensured that fewer children and women will be 
vulnerable to poverty’ (DP2/UNAd, 26th February 2018).  Since children and their caregivers were 
regarded as the most vulnerable groups (UNICEF, 2012), protecting their rights to social 
protection was UNICEF’s  priority.  
Despite the benefits of instituting a legal framework, it appeared that the draft bill was far from 
its passage. The justification for the NPP administration not passing the draft bill ranged from, 
‘we are making revisions to budget allocations before we forward to cabinet’ (M2 /ChD, 18th 
January 2018) to, ‘the draft social protection bill is with the lawyer’ (DP2/UNAd, 26th February 
2018) to, ‘[the] bill is currently under review and it takes time’ (DP3/WBAd, 21st March 2018). 
These explanations demonstrate that factors beyond the control of TNAs threatened a cause 
which they [TNAs] defended.  
To DFID, delaying the passage of the social protection bill was ‘a political tactic to delay 
commitment to the LEAP programme’ (Interview with DP 1/DFAd, 16th June 2018).  It meant that 
the NPP administration was not very committed to protecting the rights of vulnerable 
households, focusing instead on popular policies to secure re-election. Programme directors 
who understood the political context from which LEAP emerged similarly supported this claim, 
noting that ‘the bill will be passed in the third or fourth year so that NPP can take credit for it’ 
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(LS4/HP, 22nd February 2018; LS1/LND, 11th May 2018; LS2/LND, 7th February 2018). In keeping 
with the re-election incentive of elites in competitive clientelist settlements, passing the bill later 
in the third or fourth year of their administration, rather than in the second year (as I collected 
field data in 2018) drew beneficiaries’ attention to a government that would commit to their 
needs when re-elected into power.  
In contrast to DFID’s perspective, the WB and UNICEF viewed delays not through a political lens 
but through a practical lens as signalled by the WB’s perspective: ‘WB and UNICEF hired a lawyer 
who led the process of review. We all read it, tweaked it and that took some time’ (Interview 
with DP3/WBAd, 21st March 2018). Thus, from the evidence, a combination of practical and 
political factors worked against the passage of the draft bill, although the re-election incentive 
appears to have been a stronger factor in contributing to the NPP’s delay than practical factors. 
A follow up on the state of the bill, two years after my fieldwork, indicated that at a news 
conference, the NPP made plans to pass the bill in 201938, that is, in their third year in office, as 
was claimed by programme directors.  
5.4    Summary of findings and conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to examine how the ideas and interests of the WB, DFID and 
UNICEF as well as domestic elites’ interests shaped the implementation of the LEAP programme.  
The analysis demonstrated that the programmatic ideas and organisational interests of the 
three TNAs produced the framework for the design and implementation of the LEAP 
programme. However, domestic elites’ interests and agendas placed limits on the extent of TNA 
influence on the implementation of LEAP.  
Three sets of findings from the analysis contribute to the evidence I present above. First, in line 
with Lavers and Hickey’s argument about how the uptake of social protection occurs, the 
analysis suggests that TNA ideas aligned with the ideas of Ghana’s political elites. This is because 
although the two major governments had one common political interest, which was to retain 
power, they also ensured that while in power, a national poverty reduction agenda was 
addressed. Given that both NDC and NPP governments had previously implemented economic 
growth-focused programmes which did little to reduce extreme poverty, Ghana’s political elites 
did not hesitate to take up the ‘tried and tested’ cash transfer programmes recommended by 
TNAs. The adoption and subsequent implementation of TNA ideas and their linkage with ruling 
 




governments’ social programmes gave further weight to the indication that TNA ideas aligned 
with the national government’s policy agenda of reducing extreme poverty.  
Second, in line with the APSF’s notion that TNAs operate as distinct factions with their own ideas, 
interests and holding power, the analysis shows that TNAs exerted significant influence on the 
implementation of LEAP. This was possible because TNAs utilised hard forms of power such as 
enforcing specific implementation strategies and threatened to pull out their financial support 
if the ruling government failed to comply. Despite the threats, TNAs did not pull out their support 
and often, continued as implementing partners with the government of Ghana even when the 
government in power could not meet their demands. This suggests that TNAs were prepared to 
make slight alterations to their approaches and perspectives to ensure that their organisational 
goals aligned with Ghana’s political settlement. In effect their perspectives were not static, and 
their positions altered slightly as implementation unfolded under NDC and NPP administrations. 
Despite TNA directing implementation of LEAP, there were limits to their influence. The analysis 
suggests that in situations where the interests and agendas of domestic elites were prioritised 
over LEAP, TNAs influence particularly those of DFID and WB were reduced greatly. Their ideas 
continued to shape the implementation of LEAP. However, the ruling government’s 
commitment to its political manifesto, for example, endangered its commitment to the LEAP 
programme and thus placed limits on TNA influence on LEAP’s implementation. 
Third, in providing the overall framework for the design and implementation of LEAP, TNAs were 
guided by specific ideologies and development approaches. These ideologies underpinned their 
recommendations for specific programmes and explained why ‘tried and tested’ programmatic 
ideas, which were often borrowed from the design of LEAP-type programmes in global south 
contexts, were effective in reducing extreme poverty. DFID, WB and UNICEF’s focus on 
approaches to poverty reduction and improving the wellbeing of vulnerable groups did not 
change much since becoming implementing partners with the government of Ghana. While DFID 
and UNICEF promoted access to social services and social protection as a right for LEAP 
beneficiaries, WB kept to strengthening the human capital base and improving access to markets 
for vulnerable groups.  
The next chapter provides an analysis of the expansion of LEAP by elites of NPP and NDC 
governments. The chapter investigates how Ghana’s intense competitive democratic politics 
shapes the expansion of the LEAP programme.  
115 
 
Chapter 6     Competitive clientelism in the context of LEAP expansion. 
Chapter purpose and structure  
This chapter illuminates how the nature of competitive politics in Ghana influences the 
behaviour of political elites in expanding LEAP to enhance their positions of power.  Analysis of 
the data also shows that the influence of domestic political elites become more prominent, and 
that of TNA actors less so, in the actual implementation process.  The chapter discusses how this 
comes about in response to the second research question of this study: “How does Ghana’s 
competitive democratic politics drive the expansion strategies of the LEAP programme?” 
Like chapter 5, data for this chapter drew primarily on semi-structured interviews and key 
documents as I indicate previously in section 4.5 of chapter 4. Interviews were analysed using a 
thematic approach while a thematic and content analysis approach was used in the analysis of 
documents as described earlier in section 4.6 of chapter 4.   
In keeping with the multilevel analytical strategy adopted in this study, analysis of data focused 
on responses of research participants drawn primarily from the national level of governance.  
The analytical strategy for this chapter is thus summarised in figure 6.1 below. 
Figure 6.1    Analytical strategy for chapter 6 
Source: Author 
The analysis was guided by Lavers and Hickey’s (2015) Adapted Political Settlements Framework 
(APSF) as presented and discussed in section 3.2 of chapter 3. Regarding the expansion of social 
protection, Lavers and Hickey (2015) make two propositions which I test in this chapter. First, 
the framework indicates that elites in competitive clientelist settlements are more likely to use 
social protection as a patronage tool, particularly around elections (Lavers and Hickey, 2015). 
Thus, I examine whether and how NPP and NDC elites use LEAP as a tool of political patronage. 
Second, the commitment to expand social protection depends on the significance of social 
protection for the stability of the prevailing political settlement (Lavers and Hickey, 2015). In 
that respect, I examine whether the expansion of LEAP is of particular significance to the stability 
of the NDC’s or NPP’s ruling governments. 
RQ 2                National level   2nd Analytical chapter  
116 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 presents the sequence and scale of 
LEAP’s expansion between 2008-2018. Section 6.2 analyses the strategies used by the NDC and 
NPP governments to sustain LEAP’s expansion. Section 6.3 examines the factors which 
threatened the effective expansion of LEAP. Section 6.4 summarises the findings that emerge 
from the analysis and concludes the chapter. 
6.1    The sequence and coverage of LEAP from 2008-2018 
LEAP was launched by the NPP government as part of its growth and poverty alleviation strategy 
in 2008,  a few weeks  before the general elections (Debrah, 2013; NDPC, 2008). However, it was 
the NDC government which carried out the first expansion when it won power in 2009. This 
continued until 2016, when the NPP regained power from the NDC and continued scaling up the 
programme from 2017 (Grebe, 2017).   
This is captured in figure 6.2 below. 
Figure 6.2   Sequence of LEAP’s expansions from 2009-2018 
Source: Author’s compilation from fieldwork  
The expansion plan of LEAP stipulated that ruling governments will continue to scale up its 
coverage to enable all 2.2 million extremely poor Ghanaians to escape extreme poverty and 
conditions of vulnerability (MESW, 2012). Both NPP and NDC governments therefore made 
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increased the number of beneficiary households39 from 1,65440 to 213,044 during its two-term 
administration. In 2017, when the NPP regained power, it continued with the expansion and 
added an additional 186,992 households in its first year in government. The total number of 
households covered by LEAP with each implementing government over the period that this case 
study covers is illustrated in figure 6.3 below.  
Figure 6.3    Expanding LEAP:  NPP and NDC, 2009-2018 
Source: Author’s compilation from field work  
Figure 6.3 shows that over the ten-year period which this case study covers, the LEAP 
programme saw a significant increase in the number of households benefitting from the 
programme. It also shows that when the NPP launched LEAP in 2008, a total number of 1,654 
households were covered by the programme. Between 2009 and 2016, when the social 
democratic NDC government was in power, it expanded coverage from an initial 1,654 
households to 213,014 households. Thus, the NDC added about 27,000 beneficiaries a year 
during its 8-year rule, whereas the NPP in its first year alone increased beneficiary numbers 
seven-fold. Explanations which emerged from my analysis in sections 6.1. and 6.2 will reveal that 
Ghana’s prevailing political settlement is central to understanding how and why NDC and NPP 
governments expanded LEAP in the way they did during their terms in office. It is important at 
this stage to reiterate the defining features of competitive clientelism. 
 
39 The average number of persons in a LEAP household is 5 (LS1/ LDD, 6th February 2018; LS3/DCM, 7th 
February 2018) 















































As I previously defined in section 3.2.2 of the literature review chapter, in competitive clientelist 
political settlements, there is intense and constant competition for power between strong 
factions. The vulnerability of ruling governments to the loss of power to other strong factions in 
competitive elections is high (Levy, 2014), and as a result ruling governments often form strong 
clientelist networks with lower-level groups like political constituents to hold on to power (Levy, 
2014). In effect, the fear of losing power in competitive elections drives elites in competitive 
clientelist settlements to use their discretionary power to allocate public resources, including 
social protection, to their loyal supporters. This way, electoral support from loyal supporters is 
secured to enhance the ruling coalition’s ability to maintain power (Khan, 2010). The short time 
horizon for elites in competitive clientelist settlements means that they are more likely to adopt 
survival strategies (Levy, 2014) including implementing programmes that can produce quick and 
visible results and offer short-term gains to political constituents in return for vote-buying 
(Abdulai, 2019;  Whitfield, 2010). 
In the analysis which follows in 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, a major reason why NDC and NPP elites expanded 
the LEAP programme was to secure electoral support and increase their chances of re-election. 
6.1.1    Expanding LEAP under NDC, 2009-2016 
It emerged from the analysis that the NDC did not simply expand LEAP for the purpose of 
achieving national poverty reduction goals but considering their vulnerability to the loss of 
power to NPP, expanded LEAP to serve their short-term political interests of securing voter 
support to retain power.  This factor appears to have driven and sustained expansions as analysis 
in section 6.1.2 will show. 
An official in charge of electronic payments who saw an increase in the number of electronic 
payments processed prior to the 2016 elections explained that LEAP’s expansion was always 
motivated by increasing vote capture. She explained:  
‘The expansion for either government is good for their campaign figures. The fact that under 
a particular government, several extreme poor households have been reached is seen as 
something that will increase voter support for the programme’ (Interview with SI1/ GPs, 20th 
March 2018). 
The interesting point here is that a social protection programme can become a vote-winning 
social policy and a vehicle for strengthening a party’s political base or attracting new supporters.  
If one party believed the other party was using a social protection programme to make it 
attractive to voters, then it would be more likely to behave in a similar way.   
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This perception that the NDC expanded LEAP to secure electoral support was a strongly held 
view, as expressed by another research participant. According to her: 
‘The NDC government expanded, expanded and continued to expand till the last month, prior 
to the elections. The social protection minister made sure beneficiaries will understand that 
it is their administration that expanded the LEAP and had included them in its coverage. She 
also made sure they did not vote on an empty stomach. As a result, a campaign team went 
to some of the poorest households in the country and gave them GHC 541  and GH1042  
promising that they will make sure they are not hungry when they are voted back in power’ 
(Interview with D2/DSW-MK, 29th January 2018). 
It was not possible to corroborate this claim, but nevertheless, it demonstrates the strength of 
feeling about the lengths to which political elites would go to ensure that beneficiaries see the 
LEAP cash transfer as an indication of government commitment to their welfare. Having 
managed social welfare programmes under both NPP and NDC administrations, the research 
participant was familiar with the behaviour of elites in relation to expansions, particularly as 
elections loomed. The offer of monetary incentives in exchange for electoral support is an 
example of the outcome of political competition in a democratic country (Banful, 2011) where 
the fear of losing power to a political opponent can trigger behaviours and actions to protect  
the government’s political advantage. In this case, money was being used as an inducement to 
secure electoral support ahead of the general elections, although earlier research on voter 
support in Ghana has found very little evidence of electoral dividends in favour of political elites 
who used  financial incentives as a bait for electoral support (Lindberg and Morrison, 2008). Yet, 
the intensity of activities to promote the idea that LEAP was an example of how a government 
cared for its poor was seen to reap electoral dividends.  Cash was concrete and at the time of 
the elections could be used by the political elite to promote their popularity with poor voters.  
This issue was expressed or implied in many of the interviews with district-level officials.  In 
particular, it was claimed that the NDC used cash to reassure the poorest households who were 
also its political constituents of the continuance of the programme if they continued to vote for 
the party.   
In support of the argument that the NDC scaled up LEAP as part of its strategy to increase its 
voter support numbers, a research participant argued:  
“Expansions intensified just before the NDC left office. The social protection minister 
expanded and carried out more expansions till the last minute. Even in November 2016, she 
 
41 Equivalent of US$ 0.87. 
42 Equivalent of US$ 1.73. 
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was trying to win votes from witch camps43 in the Northern region (Interview with D4/DSW-
AS, 2nd March 2018) 
The timing of LEAP’s expansions which coincided with preparations for the national elections is 
consistent with the assumptions of the APSF that competitive clientelist settlements often use 
social protection as a patronage tool, particularly when elections are looming (Lavers and 
Hickey, 2015). This is a consistent issue raised by interviewees who saw increased activity around 
the time of elections as an indication of ruling governments’ attempts to use the programme to 
serve their political interests.   
Ghana fits the description of a democratic country whose elites concentrate their campaign 
activities on their core voters rather than on groups from whom voter support is unlikely (Stokes, 
2011). The NDC first concentrated on its core supporters who comprise vulnerable and 
extremely poor households in the Northern region of the country (Ayee, 2017). In emphasising 
the party’s commitment to its social democratic principles, the NDC party indicated in their 
political manifesto that it was going to use social protection programmes like LEAP to ‘protect 
and support the vulnerable, the disadvantaged and the marginalized in society’ (CODEO, 2008a, 
p. 3).  
Inhabitants of witch camps were disadvantaged and marginalised women who had been 
accused of using black magic to cause misfortunes in their communities (World Atlas, 2021). 
They lived in segregated communities and had no access to any kind of government support or 
social amenities. Such were the groups that the NDC as a social democratic party targeted in the 
lead up to the elections. While some viewed the NDC elite’s focus on disadvantaged groups as    
a strategy to preserve its party’s ideological commitment, other research participants 
interpreted it as a bait for electoral support.  
A contrary view that ideological motive was a stronger driver of the NDC’s actions than the short-
term political interests of securing electoral support to retain power, was emphasised by a 
research participant who argued that their actions were ‘purely ideological and not to gain votes’ 
(Interview with M1/ DPME, 16th January 2018). This view was advanced by a bureaucrat who 
previously worked under the NDC administration and on donor-supported development 
projects including PAMSCAD. He seemed somewhat sympathetic to the social democratic 
 
43 Witch camps are settlement where women suspected to be witches flee for safety. Ghana is the only 
country in the world with established witch camps, which house more than 1,000 women. The vast 
majority of these women are widows who have been accused by relatives of using black magic to cause 
harm including the killing of their husbands. Residents of witch camps do not have access to any 
government support or social amenities (World Atlas, 2021).     
121 
 
philosophy of the NDC government, which was to ‘advance the interests of marginalised and 
disadvantaged groups’ (CODEO, 2016a, p. 26). However, according to political settlement 
theory, governments that exhibit the characteristics of competitive clientelism are likely to 
invest in strategies and policies designed to promote short-term political gain (Lavers and 
Hickey, 2015), in this case, expanding social protection to groups more likely to provide electoral 
support. Thus, LEAP served a dual purpose for NDC’s elite, to preserve the party’s ideological 
commitment and to secure electoral support from marginalised groups loyal to the NDC party, 
although the intensity of campaign activity close to the time of elections implied that securing 
electoral support was a stronger factor than preserving political ideology.   
6.1.2    Expanding LEAP under the NPP, 2017-2018  
As I point out earlier in section 6.1, by comparison, the NPP expanded the coverage of LEAP in 
its first year in office much more than did the NDC in its first year and on average over its two-
term administration. The pace at which the NPP expanded LEAP was explained from both a 
governance and an electoral support perspective. From a governance perspective, a research 
participant argued that the NPP had a strategy for maximising the benefits of expansion from 
year one to the next electoral year:  
“NPP have a little over three years to demonstrate their commitment to expansions as NDC 
did. In the first year, they are slowly picking up and begin to plan on where and how to pick 
up where their predecessors left.  In their second year, they implement all the plans and 
policies which will secure them political support. In the third year they maximise all the 
strategies that have potential to increase their chance of staying in power and begin to plan 
for elections” (Interview with DP 3/ WBAd, 21st March 2018). 
The explanation provided above, indicating how the NPP intended to structure LEAP’s 
implementation, contrasts with evidence regarding the speed at which elites in competitive 
clientelist settlements implement social protection.  Studies on elite commitment to LEAP in 
Ghana suggests that the recognition of elites of their own vulnerability in the short-term means 
that, once in power, their immediate concern is to maximise ways of securing electoral power 
with which they can retain their positions of power (Abdulai, 2019; Abdulai, 2020). Thus, the 
strategy was to secure voter support at their earliest opportunity.  
NPP’s elite thus employed a strategy in their first year which seemed consistent with the 
approach outlined by the research participant which could be interpreted through a political 
patronage lens. As part of this strategy, NPP’s social protection minister visited the Upper East 
region to check the status of a re-certification project initiated by the WB. According to the LEAP 
Deputy Director who accompanied her on the visit, ‘the social protection minister brought back 
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a few of the woven baskets the women had made to Accra, promising to find markets for them 
in the south’ (Interview with LS2/LDD, 20th February 2018). 
The location of the minister’s visit, in the Upper East region of Ghana, and the objective of her 
visit arguably had political relevance. The Upper East region remains a NDC political stronghold 
(Ayee, 2017). The promise by the NPP’s social protection minister to find markets for the NDC’s 
core supporters could be interpreted as an action to poach NDC supporters, buy their allegiance 
and increase the NPP’s popularity and voter support base. This action is consistent with the 
behaviour of elites in competitive clientelist settlements aiming to secure electoral support 
(Abdulai, 2019), in this case by buying allegiance from an opponent’s core supporters. 
 The electoral support argument was further strengthened by a research participant who 
argued: 
“Going up to the north and buying woven baskets and other products from vulnerable 
women who took part in pilot skills project is political patronage. Why will the minister go to 
the Upper East region? With which money did she buy the products? Why does she have to 
find markets for them? (CS2 /IMANI, 17th April 2018). 
Although from the perspective of the LEAP deputy director, the choice of the region was not 
decided on political grounds but ‘was a joint decision reached by directors of the programme 
and World Bank based on cost-effectiveness’, there was an incentive for promising to create 
livelihoods for supporters of NPP’s political opponent. Not only was the Upper East region home 
to the second largest number of LEAP beneficiary households in Ghana (Hamel, 2018), it was 
also a political stronghold region of the NDC party (Aryee, 2017).  
The actions of the NPP minister illustrate the clientelist nature of relations in competitive 
clientelist political settlement contexts. In its 2016 manifesto, the NDC pledged to support LEAP 
beneficiaries with ‘diverse economic activities including micro enterprises’ if voted into power 
(CODEO, 2016a, p. 37). The NPP’s social protection minister, it would seem, attempted to 
support the livelihoods of LEAP households in the Upper East region by promising to find 
markets for their products.  In addition to this competitive behaviour, the visit to an opposition 
stronghold to personally buy products could be interpreted as an attempt to attract NDC 
sympathizers to build new clientelist networks. Building clientelist networks with an opponent’s 
supporters was just one of the strategies employed to ensure the survival of her party. 
The perception from interviewees was that, for both the NDC and the NPP, expanding LEAP was 
not simply a fulfilment of social protection policy, but also an opportunity to repurpose LEAP for 
political gain. LEAP presented a survival strategy for NPP. Therefore,  expansion of the LEAP 
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programme as an opportunity to buy loyalty from core and non-core political party supporters 
demonstrated the conferral of patronage to insider clients (Levy, 2014) and was a clear 
reflection of patronage politics.   
Retaining power was thus the key factor that drove the NDC and NPP to expand the LEAP 
programme in succession. This factor was equally crucial in the way that both governments 
committed to sustain the expansion of the LEAP programme. 
6.2    Sustaining expansions: strategies employed by NDC and NPP governments 
While in power, both NDC and NPP governments employed strategies aimed at sustaining LEAP’s 
expansion. Four strategies emerged from the analysis and are analysed as follows.  Section 6.2.1 
discusses the NDC’s and the NPP’s focus on expanding LEAP to political strongholds areas. This 
is followed by plans to withhold graduation in section 6.2.2. Section 6.2.3 examines commitment 
to regular financing of LEAP, and 6.2.4 is focused on rebranding LEAP. These strategies were 
adopted with one major goal in mind: retaining political power. 
 6.2.1    Focus on political stronghold districts  
Research participants felt strongly that a factor in how NDC and NPP governments conducted 
expansion was the desire to cover political stronghold districts where electoral support was 
guaranteed. A district social welfare officer observed that: 
‘the NDC government was not just expanding but expanding the LEAP programme to districts 
in their strongholds… and then they left out all the areas belonging to NPP. So, for example 
in the Eastern region, they expanded heavily in the Manya Krobo and Yilo-Krobo areas. 
Others were Keta, Tongu areas in the Volta region, Nsawam and some Greater Accra areas. 
These are all areas of their stronghold. Which districts are for NPP? Akuapem area, where 
you have visited, and Saltpond – they totally left those areas out although those areas 
similarly had poor districts. The NDC social protection minister was just not interested in 
empowering those who would not vote for her government’ (Interview with D4/DSW-AS, 
March 2018). 
This narrative reflects the intensity of competition which characterises governments in 
competitive  clientelist settlements and of the strength of desire by ruling coalitions to stay in 
power (Levy, 2014). It is also consistent with voter support behaviour in Ghana which is  
characterised by  strong ethno-regional politics where the two major political parties draw their 
loyal supporters from particular administrative regions (Ayee, 2017; Lindberg and Morrison, 
2008). As noted previously, the NDC’s core support was in the Volta Region and the three 
Northern regions comprising the Upper West, Upper East, and Northern regions. Thus, the point 
raised about areas on which expansion focused (districts in the Volta region) appears to support 
this claim.  On the other hand, the Ashanti Region has historically been a stronghold of the NPP 
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party  (Abdulai, 2019;  Ayee, 2011;  Ayee, 2017). Other administrative regions including Greater 
Accra, Central, Eastern and Western regions tend to be swing voter regions of the NPP and NDC 
parties (Ayee, 2017).  
A map showing NPP strongholds, NDC strongholds and swing voter regions is presented in figure 
6.4 below. 
Figure 6. 4     NPP and NDC Political strongholds and swing voter regions in 2016 
Source: Author 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
From the map above, NR (Northern region), UE (Upper East region) and VR (Volta region) 
shaded in indigo are NDC strongholds, AS (Ashanti region) shaded in red is the NPP stronghold, 
while ER (Eastern region) and CR (central region) were swing voter regions during the 2016 
elections. 
Evidence from the analysis suggests that LEAP expansions were not based purely on a 
determination of need irrespective of geographical location, as envisaged in the LEAP 
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programme plan.  NDC and NPP governments expanded to their political stronghold regions as 
they alternated power between 2009-2018. According to the literature on voter support in 
Ghana, political stronghold regions account for about eighty percent (80%) of the total votes 
gained, whereas non-stronghold areas account for a relatively low amount, about eighteen 
percent (18%) (Lindberg and Morrison, 2008), thus the reliance of political parties on 
stronghold regions. 
The way in which the two governments expanded the reach of LEAP, going beyond specific 
deprived districts and communities to broad geographical areas, reflects the behaviour of elites 
in competitive clientelist settlements who tend ‘to focus on a broader geographical coverage in 
the distribution of social assistance, rather than target limited public resources to more deprived 
areas’ (Abdulai, 2020, p. 4). Although households targeted by NDC and NPP administrations 
represented a broad spectrum of potential voters, they both went further to include their 
political stronghold areas to broaden their voter support base, with the NPP reaching out to 
even more households than the NDC did in their first year in office. 
Documentary data on districts covered by LEAP, the administrative regions of the districts and 
corresponding incidence of poverty, shown in table 6.1, corroborates the claims made by 
research participants.  
All districts in table 6.1 below were targets of the LEAP programme because their poverty status 
qualified them for selection according to the eligibility criteria for selecting LEAP districts. For 
example, their mean monthly income was between $6 and $25, defined by Ghana’s poverty 
map44 as extremely poor and poor districts (Ghana Statistical Service, 2015). In addition to 
income indicators, qualitative indicators of welfare were suboptimal. Households in districts 
participating in the LEAP programme had poor school attendance rates, limited access to 
healthcare and high incidence of child labour (MMYE, 2007). Cape Coast Metropolitan was 
selected for LEAP expansion because of the rising incidence of child prostitution as of 200945. 
Similarly, the high incidence of disability among school-aged children, including hearing and 
vision impairment, in South Tongu (Ghana Statistical Service, 2015) qualified the district for LEAP 
expansion.  
 
44 A map of Ghana which defines regions and districts as extremely poor, poor and non-poor according 
to district average income.  
45 Information from interview with D8/DSW-CC, 15th February 2018. 
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Interestingly, there are striking differences in LEAP expansion districts, suggesting that other 
factors were at play in where expansion was concentrated during the period in which either the 
NDC or NPP was in power.  
The first is the difference in poverty rates in the NPP’s and NDC’s districts of expansion. The 
second is the relatively high number of communities selected for expansion between 2017 and 
2018 during the NPP’s term in office. The third is the specific regions which were considered 




Table 6.1     LEAP expansions by NDC and NPP governments in districts of political strongholds: 
2009-2018 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from interviews and documents  
* Example of my case study district; ** Extracted from list of expansion districts provided by LEAP Management 
Secretariat 
 
In terms of the incidence of poverty, districts which benefitted from LEAP during the NDC’s term 
of office were much poorer than districts which benefitted from expansion covered by the NPP’s 
administration. For example, South Tongu in the Volta Region – an NDC stronghold, had a 
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poverty incidence of between 30-45 percent and a daily household income of between US $0.78 
and US $1.30 (Ghana Statistical Service, 2015). In contrast, Ejisu Juabeng and Adansi North in 
the Ashanti region, districts which traditionally vote for the NPP, were relatively less poor. On  
average about 20 percent  (2 out of 10) people in the Ashanti Region lived below the extreme 
poverty line (Ghana Statistical Service, 2015) although disaggregated data shows that some 
districts in that region, for example Sekyere Afram Plains, had a poverty headcount of 49 
percent, which is as high as that of districts covered by the NDC administration (Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2015).  
Under the NPP’s administration, 42 communities, which is a relatively high number, were 
reached in the Ashanti region alone between 2017 and 2018. To put this into perspective, 
between 2009 and 2016, the NDC administration covered an average of 25 communities in 
selected districts of each administrative region. Implementing governments were required by 
LMS to cover up to 50 communities in each administrative region (MMYE, 2007a), so it seems 
that both governments complied with this requirement.  
To understand this pattern of expansion, it is important to restate the political philosophies of 
each party. As described earlier in section 6.1, the NDC considers itself a social democratic party 
whose philosophy focuses on the interests of the most vulnerable (Anebo, 1997; Ayee, 2017). 
Historically, vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, particularly in the Volta region of Ghana, 
have provided electoral support to centre-left parties. Since the NDC became one of the two 
major political parties in Ghana, their commitment to improving the welfare of disadvantaged 
groups has been reflected in their election manifestoes. For example, in the 2016 manifesto, the 
NDC pledged to use ‘social protection intervention measures to improve the lot of the most 
vulnerable and marginalised citizens’ (CODEO, 2016a, pp. 21, 24). The NDC has relied on districts 
such as South Tongu and Adaklu to strengthen their electoral advantage in the Volta Region. The 
selection of these two districts for LEAP expansion is therefore consistent with the electoral 
advantage they enjoy in this region.   
In contrast, the more liberal democratic NPP has its political stronghold in the Ashanti region, a 
relatively wealthy region, derived in part from its rich agricultural lands and industrial mineral 
wealth, both of which contribute significantly to  Ghana’s food production and foreign exchange 
earnings (Berry, 1995). Historically, districts in the Ashanti region have consistently offered 
electoral support to NPP governments (Ayee, 2011). Thus, the expansion of LEAP under the 
NPP’s administration to include districts such as Adansi-North and Ejisu Juaben would appear to 
reflect this strong electoral support.  
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An interesting issue regarding expansion, not captured in table 6.1 and yet with implications for 
retaining power, is the order in which the parties expanded LEAP for political gain. As expressed 
by an interview participant, ‘the NDC extended LEAP coverage to non-stronghold political areas 
much later than it did in its own stronghold regions’ (DSW-AS, 2nd March 2018).  As party 
allegiance is more likely to switch between elections in swing voter regions than in political 
stronghold areas (Lindberg and Morrison, 2008), electoral support is less guaranteed in swing 
voter regions than in political stronghold regions. It is thus not surprising that the NDC 
concentrated its expansion efforts first on districts in its stronghold regions, shaded indigo in 
figure 6.4 above, before extending coverage to other districts. Archived newspaper sources from 
Ghana Web46 corroborate evidence that LEAP beneficiary households in South Tongu district 
began collecting their cash grants in 2011, suggesting that the process of selection and 
enrolment of beneficiaries began prior to 2011, not long after the NDC began its second term of 
office. Cape Coast Metropolitan, shaded in green on the map and a swing voter region at the 
time, was covered much later.  
In the same way that the NDC expanded LEAP from 2009, soon after it took office, the NPP also 
expanded LEAP from January 2017 as soon as it started its term of office. The NPP government 
concentrated expansion efforts on districts in their stronghold regions before districts in 
opposition strongholds such as Akatsi North and Akatsi South in the Volta region.      
What is noticeable from the secondary data in table 6.1 is the NPP’s coverage of a high number 
of LEAP communities in its Ashanti region stronghold, where districts were relatively less poor. 
This seemed to contrast with LMS’s directive to the local government (district) implementing 
officers ‘to focus on [the] poorest districts out of 50 districts when expanding beyond year one’ 
as indicated in the LEAP design report (GOG, 2007, p. 41).  
An LMS official who provided this data could not explain the reason for the abnormally high 
number of communities covered in relatively less poor districts in the eighth year of LEAP’s 
expansion. The most plausible explanation, therefore, is that district implementing officers 
responsible for carrying out the directives of LMS47 might have been influenced by powerful 
actors at the local government level to select relatively non-poor districts in addition to poor 
 
46  See  https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/regional/Positive-impacts-of-LEAP-programme-
on-its-target-beneficiaries-470277 
 
47 District Social Welfare Directors and District Implementing Committees are responsible for carrying out the 




districts. This could have opened the door to expand in areas that were relatively richer 
alongside areas with loyal supporters to maximise the party’s chances of securing electoral 
support and retaining power. In summary, it seems that both the NDC and the NPP attempted 
to skew expansion towards districts where they had political advantage in terms of voter 
representation.   
As NDC and NPP governments alternated power and expanded the LEAP programme, the 
incidence of extreme poverty has since fallen in all regions including political and non-political 
stronghold regions, although the incidence of extreme poverty in the northern sector of the 
country remains high in comparison with the southern sector and rest of the country. 
Figure 6.5 below is a map of Ghana showing the incidence of extreme poverty in geographical 
areas of Ghana between 2012-2017, including NPP and NDC political strongholds.  
Figure 6.5    Incidence of extreme poverty in Ghana between 2012-2017. 
 
Source: Adapted from Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) Ghana poverty report 
Another factor which emerged from my analysis as a strategy of the NDC and NPP governments 
for retaining power was withholding beneficiaries from graduating out of the LEAP programme. 
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6.2.2    Withholding plans for graduation  
From the interviews, there was a strong view that both NDC and NPP governments were 
reluctant to graduate beneficiaries out of the LEAP programme because ‘graduation did not 
align well with their political interests to retain power’ (interview with CS2 /IMANI, 17th April 
2018). For political elites of the two political parties, keeping beneficiaries on the programme 
rather than graduating them was an indicator of the ‘success’ of the programme. It provided 
evidence of the number of beneficiary households reached under their respective 
administrations and impacted by the LEAP programme, as shown in figure 6.1 above.  
Graduation is about creating pathways out of extreme poverty for vulnerable households who 
are enrolled on a targeted intervention scheme (Mariotti, Ulrichs and Harman, 2016). It involves 
state or non-state actors implementing sequenced interventions including targeting, providing 
appropriate measures to reduce vulnerability to poverty and living independently from a 
government-supported programme. To graduate beneficiaries out of extreme poverty is 
therefore an indication of the success of a poverty reduction intervention. Graduating 
beneficiaries out of a social intervention programme also demonstrates that the possibility of 
beneficiaries slipping back into poverty is limited (World Bank, 2020). One would therefore see 
graduation as fulfilling the goal of the LEAP programme. However, the way in which both 
governments shied away from graduating long-term beneficiaries suggests that there could be 
political factors impeding graduation from LEAP. From the interviews, a general view which 
emerged was that both NDC and NPP social protection ministers were not committed to 
developing plans to graduate LEAP beneficiaries, particularly those that had been on the 
programme for an extended period, as indicated in the LEAP operations manual.   
Explanations for why elites withheld plans for graduation differed among research participants.  
One research participant argued that graduation was simply not a priority of the government: 
‘no graduation because of the current government’s priorities’ (interview with LS1/LDD, 16th 
June 2018). This research participant had significant experience working in the social welfare 
sector and managed social welfare programmes, including LEAP, under different governments.  
He was therefore familiar with the political interests of the governments that alternated power 
in Ghana’s highly competitive political environment. He also recognised that the political 
interest of staying in power was more of a priority than ensuring that households graduated 
from LEAP. Similarly, for another research participant, expansion, rather than graduation was a 
priority. For this research participant, who worked under both administrations:  
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‘the previous social protection minister should have been thinking of preparing beneficiaries 
for graduation in their third year in office. However, she deviated from the design of the 
programme which was to re-certify and then graduate beneficiaries who had been on the 
programme for four years or more. Instead what did she do in her third year? Expand and 
expand’ (Interview with D4/DSW-AS, 2nd March 2018). 
It can be inferred from the response above that the NDC’s social protection minister’s interest 
and agenda in using the LEAP programme to secure re-election for her government and protect 
her own ministerial position meant that graduation was not considered a priority. Graduating 
vulnerable supporters out of LEAP would have endangered her position in office and weakened 
her government’s chances of staying in power. Expansion was instead an interest of both NDC 
and NPP governments because, as noted in section 6.1, it increased their voter support numbers.  
Besides withholding plans to graduate LEAP beneficiary households, commitment to regular 
funding was important in how the LEAP programme was sustained and thus how both 
governments secured electoral support to retain power.  
6.2.3   Commitment to regular financing of LEAP  
Ensuring regular funding for LEAP had significant implications for the programme’s 
sustainability. It also meant that NDC and NPP governments could guarantee voter support from 
their constituents in ways that increased their chances of retaining power. 
However, between 2011 and 2012, irregular funding for the programme and subsequent 
‘irregular cash disbursements for an eight-month period’ (DFID Ghana, 2013; DFID, 2013) raised 
concerns for DFID about LEAP’s performance. DFID had agreed with the government of Ghana 
(then the NDC) in 2012 to support LEAP expansions with a grant of £36.5 million (DFID Ghana, 
2012) and so was unclear as to why the NPP government was unable to disburse cash grants as 
planned (DFID Ghana, 2012). As part of DFID’s contribution to the LEAP budget, the purpose of 
the grant was to cover fifty percent of LEAP’s total budget (DFID Ghana, 2016; DFID Ghana, 
2018). 
To ensure that the structural causes of irregular financing were addressed by the NDC 
government, DFID put LEAP on ‘a one-year Programme Improvement Plan as part of its annual 
programme review’ (interview with LS2/LND, 7th February 2018). The purpose was to underline 
underperformance of the LEAP programme and consequently to compel the NDC government 
to implement financing reforms. Following this directive, DFID signed an agreement with the 
NDC government ‘to provide financial flows to LEAP in a timely and predictable manner’ (DFID, 
2013, p. 5), threatening that it would ‘withdraw support for the programme and other 
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associated funds earmarked for budget support’ (DFID, 2013, p. 10) if the government failed to 
comply with these financial agreements. 
DFID threatening to withdraw its support illustrates the exertion of hard power, in contrast to 
the use of soft power, by TNAs to ensure the adoption of policy ideas (Lavers and Hickey, 2015). 
It demonstrates the lengths to which DFID would go to ensure that its directives were followed 
by implementing governments. The exertion of power combined with the fear of losing DFID’s 
support for the LEAP programme appears to have driven the NDC government to review and 
reform the mechanisms for financing the LEAP programme and to improve the performance of 
LEAP. The effect of the reform was that it moved the financing of LEAP from less stable means 
based on varying levels of total domestic output to a much more stable and fixed means of 
financing LEAP. The result was a regular and more predictable disbursements of grants from the 
government from 2014 (Abdulai, 2020). 
To clarify the relevance of the reform and its effects on implementation, the Chief Director at 
the Ministry of Gender and Social Protection indicated that the threat of losing DFID and other 
TNA financial support motivated the government to categorise the financing of LEAP as 
recurrent expenditure to ensure its sustainability. He explained: 
 ‘we have implemented changes in the way LEAP was financed, from goods and services 
(expenditure which varies with changes in levels of total domestic output and tends to be 
irregular) to a much more fixed category called compensations, ensured regularity and 
sustainability in grant disbursements’ (Interview with M2/ ChD, 18th January 2018). 
This meant that regardless of changes in total domestic output and governments in power, LEAP 
payments were treated like salaries and beneficiary households could be guaranteed regular 
cash transfers on a bi-monthly basis.   
The speed at which the LEAP financing reforms occurred (within nine months of the signing of 
the MOU by the NDC government) seems to contradict elite behaviour in political settlements 
that exhibit characteristics of competitive clientelism.  According to Khan (2010), competitive 
clientelist settlements are less likely to be incentivised to invest in reforms which strengthen the 
delivery of public services. However, it seems that losing counterpart funding from DFID would 
have made it difficult to sustain the LEAP programme, damaged the government’s political 
image – especially among its most loyal supporters, and weakened its chances of retaining 
power. From the way in which DFID threatened to withdraw its financial support if the 
government failed to implement funding reforms, it could be inferred that DFID had become 
part of the political settlement in Ghana, exerting a lot of control over how LEAP was financed. 
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Their relatively high initial contribution (50 percent) to the total LEAP budget enabled this 
influence.  
When the NPP government gained power in 2017, the newly reformed funding framework, in 
which LEAP was financed from a more stable revenue source, allowed a continuation of regular 
financing of the programme and subsequently regular disbursing of cash grants to LEAP 
households. As was remarked by a research participant, ‘there’s been consistency in payments 
and we have never missed a payment cycle since NDC implemented a new funding framework 
for LEAP’ (interview with SI1/ GPs, 20th March 2018). The behaviour of the NPP in utilising what 
its political opponent had established demonstrates the competitive nature of power relations 
between elites. Both governments showed commitment to the LEAP programme in two ways. 
The first was how the NDC complied with DFID’s directive to reform LEAP’s funding framework, 
which was then utilised by the NPP, and the second was how the NDC and the NPP continued to 
honour financing agreements to sustain expansions.   
Figure 6.6 below shows the government of Ghana (NDC and NPP’s contribution) and TNA 
contributions to the total LEAP budget from 2014 to 2018. 
Figure 6.6    LEAP financing  2014-2018: Government of Ghana and TNA’s Contribution 
Source: Ghana LEAP Budget, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Accra, Ghana  






























2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
% spend from DFID % spend from  World Bank
% spend from USAID/UNICEF % Donor funding
% Govt of Ghana (GoG) funding
135 
 
As figure 6.6  shows, except for 2016 when ‘preparations for elections resulted in slight reduction 
of Ghana government’s contribution to the LEAP budget’ (interview with DP3/ WBAd, 21st March 
2018), the government consistently maintained its 50 percent contribution (DFID Ghana, 2013; 
DFID Ghana, 2018) and increased its contribution in accordance with DFID’s finance agreement 
with the Government of Ghana. Total contributions of the government of Ghana increased from 
56 to 92 percent as the contributions of the TNAs (the WB, DFID, UNICEF) declined from 45 to 8 
percent over the same period.  
In comparing TNA’s individual contributions with the Ghanaian government’s contributions to 
the LEAP budget, there was a decline in the former while there was an increase in the latter.  
Not only did the WB’s contribution fall from 15 percent in 2014 to 7 percent in 2018, but DFID’s 
contribution also declined from an initial 30 percent in 2014 to 0 percent in 2018.  UNICEF’s 
support, although the smallest, also declined from 4 percent in 2014 to 0 percent in 2018. On 
average, donor (TNA) contribution to the total LEAP budget over the period was 38 percent, 
while the government of Ghana’s contribution (under NDC and NPP administrations) was a 
relatively larger 62 percent. The combined contributions of the two governments confirms the 
point made by research participants that ‘each government that came into power put in the 
funding as was required to sustain expansions’ (interview with LS4/ HP, 22nd February 2018; SI1/ 
GPs, 20th March 2018).  Successive governments made efforts to keep the LEAP programme 
regularly financed because they both aimed to retain their positions of power. With this focus, 
governments recognised that sustainable funding for the LEAP programme ensured regularity 
of cash grants for beneficiaries who would in turn keep them in their positions of power. 
An important point about TNAs’ financing of social protection programmes in relation to the 
exertion of their influence needs to be made here. The analysis presented supports the claim 
that TNA influence on the expansion of social protection is greatest when a significant amount 
of funding is provided by them (Lavers and Hickey, 2015). This also suggests that TNAs do not 
exert much influence on social protection when their financial contribution is insignificant. As 
this study shows, a gradual decline in TNA contributions and an increase in Ghana government’s 
(NPP and NDC) contribution, suggests a decline in TNA influence on the expansion of LEAP. This 
means that with NDC and NPP governments increasing their funding to expand LEAP, there is a 
greater degree of political ownership of the LEAP programme, and the two governments are 
currently much more in control of LEAP than when they contributed a relatively smaller amount 
to the total LEAP budget. Their increased contributions to the LEAP budget also indicate that 
NPP and NDC governments can implement LEAP in ways which preserves their political interests.   
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In addition to maintaining regular financing to sustain expansions, my analysis showed an 
attempt by the NPP government to rebrand LEAP to ensure a closer identification with its 
political message and an alignment with the goal of LEAP. 
6.2.4    Rebranding LEAP  
When the NPP began its term of office in 2017, the LEAP programme was given a new name to 
emphasise a new goal of the programme, although the design of the programme remained 
largely unchanged. ‘New LEAP’, or ‘LEAP 2’, was in line with the NPP’s proposals to rebrand as 
outlined in its 2016 manifesto. The intention as explained in its manifesto was ‘to refocus the 
LEAP’ (CODEO, 2016b, p. 51) due to an alleged perception that the previous NDC government 
had used the LEAP programme for its own political gains. Thus, in refocusing the LEAP, its 
emphasis shifted from a cash grants only programme which provided support to address 
beneficiaries’ short-term needs, to a programme that focused on the goal of LEAP: to empower 
beneficiaries to exit the programme and exit extreme poverty sustainably (MMYE, 2007). 
Analysis on why the NPP was keen to rebrand LEAP suggests that it was to characterise LEAP as 
empowering beneficiaries out of poverty and away from unending dependency. According to 
the Chief Director at the Social Protection Ministry, the government wanted to get beneficiaries 
to understand that the overall objective of LEAP was to empower them to access other public 
services and participate in productive economic activity in order to exit extreme poverty. In 
explaining the NPP government’s position, he argued that:  
‘LEAP has been around for some time, and its perceived as a cash grants only programme. 
As we expand the LEAP, we also want to stress the empowerment bit. This is the New LEAP 
that we talk about… It is new because beneficiaries will have the opportunity of accessing 
other complementary programmes like the productive inclusion activities that will enhance 
the impact of the cash’ (Interview with M2/ChD, 18th January 2018).  
Furthermore, he argued that the previous NDC government did not do enough to move the 
programme away from being purely a dependency-driven cash grants scheme. In overhauling 
the scheme, the NPP government therefore emphasised the role of complementary 
programmes like skills training instead.  However, there was also the perception that the name 
‘New LEAP was suggested by UNICEF and WB to assist the NPP government to distinguish itself 
from NDC’s implementation of the original LEAP’ (interview with DP2/ UNAd, 26th February 
2018).  
From another perspective, it was not a new idea: ‘What they call “New LEAP”, or “LEAP 2”, has 
always been there. Empowering households with productive inclusion activities has always been 
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there. The current government has done nothing new. It’s all politics’ (Interview with M1/DME, 
16th January 2018). 
The original design had envisioned LEAP as a programme which complemented cash grants with 
specific empowerment  projects for different categories of vulnerable groups (MMYE, 2007a). It 
appears therefore that the NPP government seized upon this dormant element of the 
programme to appeal to a new category of voters who appreciated the empowerment 
component of LEAP and would support the NPP government in realising this agenda. The new 
category of voters would depend less on cash grants and, with the skills gained, contribute to 
the growth agenda of the NPP government. 
By focusing on New LEAP, the NPP aimed to ‘dissuade the general public from thinking that LEAP 
offered free handouts in return for electoral support’ (interview with SI1/GPs, 20th March 2018).  
It can be inferred from the interview response that the NPP was not happy with the public image 
of LEAP as an exclusive cash grants programme. The LEAP programme remained, but the 
emphasis on its empowerment component was to set a new agenda for LEAP, one which aligned 
much more with the NPP’s liberal democratic ideology.  
Despite the strategies that sustained expansions, there were some threats to effective 
expansion of LEAP.  
6.3.    Threats to effective expansion   
There was a sense from the analysis that, although the NDC and NPP elites attempted to re-
purpose LEAP’s expansion to achieve their political interests, there were factors which 
threatened their ability to effectively expand the LEAP programme. Two factors which emerged 
from the analysis were remoteness of communities and inadequate district-level capacity.  
These two factors threatened the survival of NDC and NPP governments alike. 
6.3.1    Remoteness of LEAP communities  
Reaching the poorest and most vulnerable households with the LEAP programme added to NPP 
and NDC parties’ voter support numbers and strengthened the possibility of elites’ retaining 
their positions of power. However, for district-level officials, the remoteness of LEAP 
communities posed a big threat to expanding the LEAP programme. From the perspective of a 
district social welfare director, 
‘Our communities are scattered, and usually district-level officials have to travel long 
distances on a combination of motor bikes and on foot to get to these remote villages. 
Sometimes in planning to sensitise and target households, we find that a remote community 
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like Akraman has only one beneficiary household, and then the next community like Kuntu 
which has only seven beneficiaries may be 8km away. Going to these places becomes so 
cumbersome if you don’t have real passion for the job, you will not do it’ (Interview with 
D5/DSW- MF, 12th February 2018) 
 
Drawing on her background during the interview, the experienced social welfare director 
pointed out that making visits to communities far removed from town centres and locations 
with geographical accessibility was a challenge.  She also appreciated the implications for the 
political survival of the ruling government when households living in extreme poor conditions in 
remote communities were supported with the LEAP programme. It projected the image of the 
government as one that commits to the welfare concerns of marginalised groups. The point 
about remoteness was similarly made by another district official in the same region.  
In narrating her views about threats to the LEAP programme, especially as it had expanded over 
the previous year, the district official noted remoteness of beneficiary communities, although in 
relation to accessing grants rather than in targeting, which the other district official had 
indicated. 
‘The real challenge for us, is reaching beneficiary households in very remote areas with the 
cash grants. The banks cannot go to those communities, but rather beneficiaries have to 
travel and get to designated pay points to collect their grants. Even though we have been 
advised to select payment points which are less than 5km from the communities, some 
communities are very far and there is little you can do about it’ (Interview with D9/ DS- CC, 
16th February 2018). 
As with most district-level officials involved at the frontline with beneficiary households, the 
district official in this case recognised how remoteness risked not only the achievement of 
programme objectives, but also the political interests of governments. An effort by financial 
institutions to deliver cash grants closest to remote communities where LEAP beneficiaries could 
access their grants could be interpreted by beneficiary households as a concerted effort by the 
ruling government to support them. It also signalled an extraordinarily strong campaign message 
to their opponents.   
Nonetheless, it appears that remoteness did not threaten the stability of the ruling NPP 
government in the same way that other factors did. The communities mentioned did not have 
much political significance for the NPP at the time of my data collection. They happened to be 
communities in the Central region, which at the time of my data collection was one of the swing 
voter regions, shaded in green in figure 6.1 of the previous section. Furthermore, the number of 
beneficiary households in those communities was insignificant. Remoteness of LEAP 
communities would have threatened the NPP’s political interests if such communities had been 
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in the NPP’s political stronghold regions with a relatively high number of beneficiary households. 
From my analysis, the real threat was inadequate capacity at the district level 
6.3.2    Inadequate district-level capacity 
District-level officials, directors of the LEAP programme and TNAs admitted that inadequate 
district-level capacity threatened the expansion efforts of elites. A LEAP district official described 
tasks as cumbersome due to having to use less qualified personnel. 
‘We do not have enough trained social welfare officers to support the work we do here at the 
district. We need personnel who have real passion for the work and are up to the task. But 
we do not have enough of them. So, in the pilot implementation exercise of the LEAP, I had 
to quickly train administrative staff to collect beneficiary household data. It was really 
cumbersome’ (Interview with D5/DSW- MF, 12th February 2018). 
The experienced social welfare director in this interview shared her frustrations regarding 
managing implementation tasks without trained and qualified social workers. Inadequate 
district-level capacity in relation to social protection delivery was not peculiar to Ghana’s social 
welfare sector but seemed prevalent in low-income countries (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012), 
particularly those with democratic governments supported by DFID (DFID, 2011; DFID Ghana, 
2012). The inadequate capacity problem aligned with the notion that in competitive clientelist 
settlements, ‘political elites are less likely to invest in the long-term task of building bureaucratic 
capability’ (Levy, 2014, p. 40). The behaviour of political elites in not investing adequately in 
capacity at subnational levels of governance is due to their short-term horizon compounded by 
the fact that, they are likely to be displaced in competitive elections. The LMS thus provided a 
short-term solution to the capacity problem at the district level, as explained by another district-
level official: 
‘we have always had a problem of capacity at the district level. That is why the LMS brings 
their own people when we carry out expansions. For example, survey questions to identify 
eligible households for LEAP were administered by data collectors contracted by LMS. 
Monitoring the data collection exercise was similarly sub-contracted by LMS to a private 
company called ESOKO’48 (Interview with D10/ DLIC-AN, 24th February 2018).  
The view that inadequate district-level capacity was a permanent threat to the expansion of 
social welfare programmes suggests that, unless the problem was addressed, expanding the 
LEAP programme would remain a threat to the political interests of NDC and NPP governments. 
Without qualified personnel to support expansion activities, the LEAP programme failed to reach 
the poorest households, including those that provided electoral support to NDC and NPP 
 
48 A data collection agency recommended by UNICEF. The challenges associated with employing the 
services of ESOKO will be analysed further in chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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governments. Inadequate technical capacity is recognised as a challenge in most low income 
countries contemplating social protection implementation, and is one reason why TNAs  support 
social protection initiatives in poor countries (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012). The case of ESOKO, a 
data collection agency used and recommended to the government of Ghana by UNICEF, shows 
how TNAs managed to exert influence on LEAP even when domestic political elites seemed in 
control of LEAP’s expansion.  
Similarly, in expressing her apprehension regarding capacity constraints at the district level, the 
WB social protection specialist pointed out what she viewed as the underlying causes of the 
problem and how inadequate capacity threatened TNAs’ efforts to expand LEAP. From her point 
of view: 
‘The challenge for us is that we are dealing with a social welfare department that manages 
ridiculous caseloads and are accountable to the local government ministry. The social welfare 
department works with non-governmental organisations and other ministries on various 
projects related to children’s health, poverty, and education so they have plenty on their 
plate. Besides, they report to the local government and not to the social protection ministry. 
There is also the problem of lack of co-ordination in some of the ministries which manage 
social programmes. So, we can strengthen the systems in those ministries but until we fix 
that I’m not sure of how we can scale up’ (Interview with DP3/WBAd, 21st March 2018). 
The social protection specialist underlined the complexities of strengthening capacity at the 
district level, which threatened LEAP’s expansion. As a WB official, she seemed to prioritise 
systems strengthening, a shared TNA value (DFID Ghana, 2018; Rawlings, Murthy and Winder, 
2013; World Bank, 2016) which enables the facilitation and co-ordination of social welfare 
programmes. From her point of view, strengthening systems at the local government level was 
a complex task involving the co-ordination of different sector ministries and was therefore to be 
resolved by domestic political elites and not by TNAs.  
6.4    Summary of findings and conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to examine how Ghana’s competitive democratic politics 
shaped expansion strategies of NPP and NDC elites. The analysis showed that Ghana’s 
competitive clientelist political settlement was instrumental in driving and sustaining the 
expansion of the LEAP programme. In particular, patronage politics shaped the direction of 
expansion and the strategies which were employed by elites to sustain expansion of the LEAP 
programme between 2009 and 2018.   
Two findings which contribute to the evidence presented and have relevance for the APSF are 
presented below.  
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First, the expansion of the LEAP programme was used by NDC and NPP elites to secure electoral 
support. NDC and NPP governments began to expand LEAP soon after entering office and 
continued expansions well into their fourth year in office. In line with the highly competitive 
partisan political environment, each government in power focused first on expanding to their 
political stronghold regions before expanding to non-political stronghold areas. This was to 
secure their voter-support numbers. In addition, strategies employed to sustain expansions 
which comprised withholding graduation and a commitment to regular financing of the LEAP 
programme were intended to maintain voter support numbers and ultimately retain political 
power. 
Second, in line with the APSF, expansion of LEAP was significant to the stability of both NPP and 
NDC governments, although LEAP’s expansion seemed more significant to the survival of NDC 
government than to that of the NPP.  NDC’s elite expanded LEAP both to strengthen her party’s 
ideological stance and to secure electoral support from marginalised and disadvantaged groups 
most loyal to her party. In addition to the findings are insights from the analysis which provide 
deeper understanding of social protection expansion in competitive clientelist settlement 
contexts. 
 
One key insight concerns how domestic elites re-purposed LEAP to suit their political interests. 
The pressures created by competitive clientelism, including the time scale over which elites are 
incentivised to undertake reforms, means that social protection reforms, in the case of LEAP’s 
funding framework were re-purposed by NDC for political gain. This contrasts with the intentions 
of elites in some potential developmental coalitions whose interests is to ensure the socio-
economic development of the country, but similar to the intentions of elites in much more 
vulnerable authoritarian type settlements, where social protection reforms are implemented to 
achieve the long- term goal of the ruling coalition. In the latter dominant type settlement, strong 
factions excluded from the ruling coalition can destabilise the ruling coalition through force, thus 
making the elites vulnerable to violent overthrow (Khan, 2010). In this case, social protection 
reforms, are implemented to ensure the stability and long-term vision of elites to stay in power. 
 
Another insight from the analysis concerns how TNAs managed to exert some influence on the 
expansion of LEAP even when domestic politics was driving LEAP’s expansion. The analysis of 
LEAP’s expansion showed that in situations where TNAs felt their investments were threatened, 
they were still able to exert influence by using hard power in ways that altered the behaviour of 
NDC elites. DFID’s threats to withdraw its financial support if domestic elites failed to implement 
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reforms to funding resulted in the NDC reforming the financing structure of LEAP, which has 
since 2014 been utilised by the NPP to disburse cash grants for LEAP households. This means 
that although TNAs’ influence can be limited in competitive clientelist settlements, they can still 
manage to exercise some control. 
The next chapter continues with an analysis of the expansion of LEAP at the local government 
level. The analysis is conducted through the lens of the LEAP beneficiary selection process and 
shows how powerful actors in local government use the beneficiary selection process to buy 




















Chapter 7   Ghana’s local government system and actors in the politics of 
expanding LEAP  
Chapter purpose and structure  
This chapter presents an analysis of LEAP’s expansion at the local government level. It examines 
how the local government system and the activities of key institutional actors impact the 
expansion of the LEAP programme. Analysis in this chapter is conducted through the lens of the 
beneficiary household selection process.  This is because it is the politics of expansion through 
the selection process which determines whether and how LEAP delivers on its intended goal of 
lifting vulnerable households out of poverty.  Thus, the chapter addresses the third research 
question of this study: “How do local government institutions and actors in Ghana’s competitive 
political setting impact the expansion of LEAP?”   
Like chapters 5 and 6, data for this chapter was sourced primarily from semi-structured 
interviews and documents. However, in this chapter, community-specific observation data in 
the form of grant disbursements and community sensitisation events is used to complement the 
interview and documentary data. In terms of data analysis, observation data was combined with 
interview data and analysed thematically in conjunction with thematic and content analysis of 
relevant documents, as was done in previous analytical chapters. In keeping with the multilevel 
analytical strategy adopted in this study, analysis of data focused on the subnational local 
government and community levels. The analytical strategy for this chapter is summarised in 
figure 7.1 below. 
Figure 7.1   Analytical strategy for chapter 7 
Source: Author 
As in the two previous analytical chapters, Lavers and Hickey’s (2015) Adapted Political 
Settlements Framework (APSF) is used to guide the analysis. A proposition of the framework, 
similar to what is presented in chapter 6, is tested in this chapter. The framework proposes that 
‘ruling coalitions in competitive clientelist settlements will be more likely to use social protection 
as a form of patronage to secure the support of relatively powerful lower-level factions that 
could otherwise defect to powerful opposition groups’ (p. 21). This chapter examines how the 
beneficiary selection process is used to secure the support of powerful groups at the local 
government level.   
RQ 3      Local government / subnational level   3rd Analytical chapter  
144 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.1 presents a discussion of the 
beneficiary selection process using the local government system. Section 7.2 presents an 
analysis of district level actors, patronage politics and LEAP beneficiary selection in case study 
districts. Section 7.3 presents an analysis of community level actors, patronage politics and LEAP 
beneficiary selection in case study districts. Section 7.4 analyses the attitudes of public servants 
regarding the beneficiary selection process. Finally, section 7.5 summarises the key findings and 
insights from the analysis and concludes the chapter. 
7.1    The LEAP beneficiary selection process using the local government system.   
As I noted previously in section 2.3.1 of chapter 2 regarding the outcome of democratic reforms 
to usher in Ghana’s fourth republic, a decentralised local government system has replaced the 
previous governance system of the British colonial administration (Ahwoi, 2010; Bebelleh and 
Nobabumah, 2013; Botchwey, 2017). A unique feature of the governance system is its tiered 
structure and how it is used to administer and allocate the central government’s resources to 
communities through the District Assembly system. Furthermore, as I previously discussed in 
chapter 2, changes to Ghana’s constitution means that community elders such as chiefs are no 
longer appointed to administer government policies (Asamoah, 2012; Ahwoi, 2010). Instead, the 
establishment of the local government system has resulted in the appointment and election of 
local authorities, including Chief Executives, to head local assemblies49 (Ahwoi, 2010). They are 
responsible for ensuring the effective delivery of government policies and programmes in their 
respective assemblies (Ahwoi, 2010; FES and ILGS, 2016). 
It is important to reiterate that, although the local government system comprises assemblies of 
different population sizes as I indicate in section 2.3.6 of chapter 2, the three assemblies – 
Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies – are all referred to as District Assemblies 
regardless of population size (Ahwoi, 2010; Ayee, 2003; Bebelleh and Nobabumah, 2013). Since 
its establishment, the District Assembly system is officially recognised as the main local 
government system which administers the central government’s programmes and policies 
(Ahwoi, 2010; FES and ILGS, 2016). Thus, from 2009, when LEAP began expanding its coverage, 
the management of LEAP used the District Assembly system to select eligible households 
(MESW, 2012). The LEAP beneficiary household selection process is illustrated in figure 7.2. 
below.  An explanation of the stages of selection and analysis of actors’ roles in different stages 
of the selection process is subsequently presented. 
 
49 Local assemblies are the equivalent of local councils in England. 
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 Figure 7.2    The LEAP beneficiary household selection process  
Source: Author 
The LEAP Operations Manual recognises LEAP as ‘a welfare programme which is administered 
directly to beneficiaries through social welfare departments’ (MESW, 2012, p. 10) which operate 
as support departments within the District Assembly system. Thus, as a first step in selecting 
LEAP households, LMS at the national level informs heads of the various assemblies, the 
Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs), about the objectives of the LEAP 
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beneficiary selection exercise and subsequent planned activities50 in communities under their 
administration (MESW, 2012). This is illustrated in figure 7.2 as the downward pointing arrow 
from LMS at the national level to MMDAs at the district level. A further responsibility of the 
heads of MMDAs, or the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs), is to 
‘endorse the final list of beneficiary households generated by LMS before grants are processed’ 
(LS1/LDD, 16th June 2018; D3/DS-AN, 29th January 2018; D9/ DS- CC, 16th February 2018). This 
stage is illustrated by the green arrow that stretches from the MMDAs to the potential 
household selection. The green arrow also indicates the line of influence.  
Next, MMDCEs share details of LEAP’s selection exercise with directors of the social welfare 
department. From interviews with LEAP directors, ‘communication between the MMDAs and 
social welfare directors was very important’ (LS2/ LND, 7th February 2018), ‘because the social 
welfare departments are the pivots around which the implementation of LEAP revolves at the 
districts’ (LS1/LDD, 20th February 2018). Following communication with social welfare directors, 
the latter then plan community activities before sharing final plans and schedules with MMDAs. 
This stage is represented by the upward pointing arrow from the social welfare departments to 
the MMDAs. 
A major responsibility of the Department of Social Welfare in the selection process is the 
formation and training of District LEAP Implementation Committees (DLICs) by Social Welfare 
directors who in turn implement sensitisation programmes in selected LEAP communities in 
preparation for implementation of the LEAP programme (MESW, 2012). This stage is illustrated 
in figure 7.2 by the downward pointing arrow from the Department of Social Welfare to the 
DLICs.  
At the community level, DLICs form and train Community LEAP Implementing Committees 
(CLICs) or nominate Community Focal Persons (CFPs) with the help of traditional authorities so 
that CLICs or CFPs can identify and select potential LEAP households using the programme’s 
eligibility rules (MESW, 2012). This stage is illustrated by the downward arrow from the DLICs to 
the CLICs.  
The formation of CLICs or CFPs is the penultimate stage in the beneficiary selection process. 
CLICs are recognised by LMS as community actors required to undertake ‘the most important 
training on the identification of potential households for the LEAP programme using the LEAP 
 
50 Activities following communication between LMS and MMDAs include sensitisation of the LEAP 
programme in selected communities and appointment of community officials to represent LEAP 
communities in the district.  
147 
 
eligibility criteria’ (MESW, 2012, p. 13). To reiterate LEAP’s eligibility criteria, presented in 
section 2.3.5 of chapter 2, qualifying households must first be extremely poor, that is, living on 
seventy cents or less a day51. However, not all 2.2 million extremely poor households (Debrah, 
2013) can be covered by the LEAP programme. Therefore, to optimise the use of the 
government’s scarce resources, carefully designed eligibility criteria have been developed 
(MMYE, 2007; MOGCSP, 2016) to select specific categories of extremely poor households who 
could potentially become beneficiary households.  CLICs are therefore trained to identify four 
categories of extremely poor households. They are, those with disabled persons without 
productive capacity, households with orphaned and vulnerable children (OVC), households with 
persons aged 65 years and above without any form of support and  extreme poor households 
with pregnant women and mothers with infants less than 18 months of age (MESW, 2012). 
CLICs/CFPs therefore play a crucial role, using the eligibility criteria to determine which 
households could potentially benefit from the programme. In figure 7.2, this stage is shown by 
the green arrow linking CLICs/CFPs to the potential household rectangle.  
Finally, there are hired and trained enumerators who administer Proxy Means Tests (PMTs) to 
select beneficiary households after CLICs have identified potential households.  The test covers 
six welfare areas: (a) composition of the household and educational background of household 
members; (b) health and disability status of household members ;(c) housing conditions 
including source of water supply, lighting and fuel ;(d) physical characteristics of dwelling units 
including main materials used; (e) household assets and durable goods owned and ;(f) sources 
of household income (MESW, 2012). Data generated from PMT surveys is then fed electronically 
into handheld personal computers which are automatically linked to a LEAP server to generate 
a final list of beneficiary households for the programme (MESW, 2012).  
It is important to note that while the role of actors at the district and community levels in the 
selection process described above is recognised as official and visible to LMS, interviews and 
observations revealed that the roles of three groups of actors – MMDCEs at the District 
Assembly level, traditional authorities represented by chiefs and opinion leaders, and Assembly 
members at the community level – are ‘unofficial’ and largely ‘invisible’ to LMS. As a result, these 
three groups of actors are indicated by dotted lines to the left of official actors’ roles in figure 
7.2.  
 
51 This was the equivalent average income earned/spent by households described as extremely poor in 
Ghana in 2008, when the programme was first launched. 
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As I pointed out earlier in this section, MMDCEs are the first to be notified of LMS’s intentions 
to implement LEAP at the local government level (MESW, 2012). This is because as 
administrative heads (FES and ILGS, 2016) they are required to provide relevant administrative 
support to departments including the social welfare department to achieve the intended goals 
of the central government  (Ahwoi, 2010). As part of their administrative role, therefore, 
MMDCEs are required to endorse the final beneficiary lists of LEAP households before 
households are formally enrolled on the programme (MESW, 2012). However, in addition to 
these official responsibilities, MMDCEs are influential in the targeting process, as ‘they 
sometimes actively participated in targeting households for the programme’ (D8/DSW-CC, 15th 
February 2018; D9/ DS- CC, 16th February 2018; D11/ DL1C-AS, 9th March 2018). From the 
analysis in this chapter, this role is described as unofficial. How they exert their authority and 
the effect on the outcome of beneficiary selection is analysed shortly, in section 7.2.  
Chiefs and opinion leaders in the community, also referred to as traditional authorities 
(Asamoah, 2012; Esantsi et al., 2015) are another group whose role is unofficial and also invisible 
to LMS. Chiefs as community heads ensure traditional laws and practices are enforced 
(Asamoah, 2012). Like chiefs, opinion leaders are elders of the community who similarly ensure 
the practice of traditional norms in communities (Esantsi et al., 2015). In the LEAP household 
selection process, the official role of opinion leaders and chiefs is to facilitate community 
sensitisation programmes. Their involvement in LEAP is outlined in the LEAP Operations Manual 
as follows: 
‘the District Social Welfare Officers and the District Committees shall together with the 
traditional authorities, assembly man/woman and opinion leaders organize workshops to 
sensitize community members on the eligibility criteria that has been agreed upon to 
identify the extremely poor and vulnerable households’ (MESW, 2012, p. C11).  
However, beyond community sensitisation, my observations of a community sensitisation 
exercise combined with informal conservations with DLICs and CLICs revealed that chiefs would 
often extend their influence and become involved in the selection of beneficiary households. 
This ‘unofficial’ involvement, shown by the arrow that points from the chiefs to CLICs, and its 
outcome on the beneficiary selection process is analysed in section 7.3.  
Assembly members are another influential group in the selection process. As outlined in the 
LEAP Operations Manual and indicated above, they assist traditional authorities in LEAP 
sensitisation activities (MESW, 2012). However, from observation data, it is clear that they are 
heavily involved in the beneficiary selection process and, unknown to LMS, perform roles 
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reserved for CLICs and CFPs. The effect of their influence on beneficiary selection is analysed in 
section 7.3. 
It is important to note here that the exertion of influence on LEAP’s expansion by the three local 
government actors, largely through their unofficial roles, is crucial to understanding the 
potential politicisation of the LEAP beneficiary selection process and its outcome on LEAP’s 
expansion. This is because of how closely they are linked to District Assemblies and in turn how 
closely District Assemblies are linked to the ruling government. It is therefore reasonable to 
expect patronage politics at the national level to extend to the district level and further to the 
community level in ways that influence LEAP beneficiary selection. This is the focus of 
subsequent sections in this chapter. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 present a comparative analysis of 
actors, patronage politics and LEAP beneficiary selection in case study districts at the district and 
community levels, respectively.  
7.2     District level actors, patronage politics and beneficiary selection in case study 
districts  
It emerged from my interviews that district level actors, primarily MMDCEs, in case study 
districts exerted their authority on the beneficiary selection process. MMDCEs focused their 
influence on the final stage of selection where selected households were administered PMTs.  
According to a social welfare officer in a pilot case study district52, MMDCEs mobilised their own 
data collectors to collect PMT results instead of following LMS’s directives to use trained and 
hired data collectors. He vividly recounted that:  
‘Municipal Chief Executives in some Assemblies did not use ESOKO’s enumerators to collect 
PMT responses but mobilised their own data collection.  And if the Municipal Chief Executive 
says they are doing their own data collection, what do you do?” But you know what will 
happen, they only select party members and sympathisers to administer the questionnaires 
because those are the people who will enable them stay in power’ (Interview with D8/DSW-
CC, 15th February 2018). 
Ghana’s constitution recognises the heads of MMDAs as the ‘highest political authority at the 
local government level’ (Government of Ghana, 1992, p. 111). In terms of their relationship with 
the government, the social welfare officer further stressed that ‘the Municipal Chief Executives 
are very powerful … you know they represent the government in the Municipal Assembly. And 
 
52 In my methodology chapter, I indicate that pilot case study districts denote districts that were first 




because they are very powerful, they can do anything’ (Interview with D8/DSW-CC, 15th February 
2018).  
The way in which the local government system positioned MMDAs, as local authorities with  
maximum political autonomy and administrative discretion (Ahwoi, 2010; Government of 
Ghana, 1992) enabled their heads  to exercise their authority – in this case, to mobilise specific 
groups to administer PMTs and not follow the recommendation of LMS to use trained 
enumerators.    
Regarding their involvement in the beneficiary selection process, LMS clarified that ‘details of 
how to select beneficiary households and who to administer proxy means tests were shared 
with local government heads’ to keep them informed of LEAP activities in their respective local 
assemblies (MESW, 2012, p. C28). So, MMDCEs did not have a defined role in the LEAP 
household selection process other than providing administrative support as noted earlier. 
However, ignoring the laid-down regulations on administering PMTs, a process to be carried out 
by ‘hired and trained enumerators’ (MESW, 2012, p. C3), and instead using their authority to 
mobilise specific groups to administer PMTs politicised this important stage of the selection 
process. It appears to have been a strategy to fulfil their political ambitions.  
As I noted previously in section 2.3.6 of chapter 2 and mentioned in section 7.1 above, MMDCEs 
have a close relationship with the ruling government. They are nominated by the ruling 
government and then endorsed by members of the local assembly, and therefore owe their 
allegiance primarily to the central government. The emphasis on their role as ‘representing the 
government in the Municipal Assembly’ thus justified the actions of MMDCEs. The recruitment 
of party members and sympathisers to administer PMTs to select LEAP households was an 
important role. It had significance for their position and authority. Considering the nature of 
Ghana’s political settlement and given that elites at the local government level were as 
vulnerable to the loss of power as their counterparts at the national level, MMDCEs needed to 
buy the loyalty of some groups to secure their position and influence, and political party foot 
soldiers of the ruling government were just the group to offer political support. Thus, by 
mobilising the ruling party’s foot soldiers to administer PMTs, MMDCEs intended to recognise 
and empower them in order to solicit their support in strengthening their own position and 
influence.  Strengthening the position of MMDCEs meant that the position of the ruling 
government was secured and in turn the power of political party sympathisers who might 
otherwise have defected to other political parties was also protected.   
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Narrating a similar experience with an MMDCE, a District LEAP Implementation Committee 
(DLIC) member in an expansion case study district53 verified the extent of MMDCEs’ authority 
and the degree of patronage politics that existed at the district level. 
‘District Chief Executives also recruited their own people, to administer PMTs.  We DLICs were 
aware that there were situations where only party sympathisers and foot soldiers were 
administering the tests…. because we belong to a social media platform and so we share all 
sorts of information. Mind you, it is not happening here but in other districts, but I cannot 
mention which districts they are’ (Interview with D11/ DL1C-AS, 24th February 2018). 
The DLIC noted that District Chief Executives (leaders of relatively small local assemblies) used 
LEAP to buy political support from party foot soldiers and party sympathisers. As I previously 
mentioned in section 7.1 regarding how the position of MMDCEs is determined by the ruling 
government (Ahwoi, 2010), the use of the ruling government’s political party foot soldiers 
signalled an attempt by District Chief Executives to form strong political alliances and clientelist 
networks, which according to political settlement theory is crucial for the stability of ruling 
governments or coalitions (Khan, 2010). The political support gained from relatively powerful 
groups like party foot soldiers at the community level strengthened the ruling government’s 
position and increased its chances of winning elections.   
From the experiences of district officials presented, the practice of MMDCEs recruiting their own 
enumerators was not uncommon in local government. However, what remains unclear from the 
evidence is whether the practice was most prevalent in expansion or pilot case study districts. 
The narrative of a social welfare director in the Akuapem North site provides some evidence 
that the exertion of MMDCEs influence was widespread in the pilot districts. She recalled her 
thoughts on the selection process: ‘What we did here was different, we did not handle the 
selection in the same way as the older districts did’ (Interview with D1/DSW-AN, 23rd January 
2018).   
As the Akuapem North District was a relatively new LEAP district, the social welfare director of 
this district referred to previous districts as ‘older’ ones. Her response suggests that the practice 
of using community volunteers and party foot soldiers by MMDCEs was much more prevalent in 
pilot districts than in expansion districts where households were enrolled on the LEAP 
programme in 2017 under NPP administration. A possible explanation is that MMDCEs in pilot 
districts had more experience with the beneficiary selection processes and could therefore 
 
53 In my methodology chapter, expansion districts are defined as districts which benefitted from LEAP 
under the NDC government from 2009 to 2016 and the NPP government from 2017 when LEAP expanded 
to vulnerable groups other than OVCs in selected communities. 
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navigate and influence the selection process using patronage networks in ways that those in 
expansion districts were unable to. 
From the interviews, it seems that the conduct of MMDCEs in recruiting ‘political party 
sympathisers as field researchers was not challenged’ (interview with LS2/LND, 7th February 
2018). MMDCEs’ constitutional mandate gave them significant discretionary power and 
autonomy in decision making (FES and ILGS, 2016). Thus, it could be argued, they were exercising 
their discretionary power regarding how PMTs should be administered. However, the decision 
on how to administer PMTs was not their responsibility but that of LMS. Given their authority 
and position in the local government system, it is equally valid to argue that the LEAP household 
selection process presented an opportunity for MMDCEs to abuse their authority as their 
decisions usually went unquestioned by the implementing social welfare officers for fear of 
losing their jobs. 
The power of patronage was not restricted to the district level but also extended to the 
community level where two groups of actors – traditional authorities and assembly members 
exerted control on the beneficiary selection process. This is the focus of analysis in section 7.3. 
 
7.3.      Community level actors, patronage politics and beneficiary selection in case 
study districts  
While district-level actors focused their influence on data collectors, community-level actors 
focused their influence on community committees and political party foot soldiers. Both 
traditional authorities’ and assembly members’ roles were not visible to LMS and yet were 
crucial to the outcome of beneficiary selection. 
7.3.1   Traditional authorities: Chiefs and opinion leaders  
As noted earlier in section 7.1 regarding their official roles, chiefs and opinion leaders facilitated 
workshops with DLICs to sensitise members of their communities to LEAP. The workshops were 
intended to inform community members about the effects of poverty and vulnerability in their 
communities and the need for a targeted programme like LEAP.  The purpose of workshops was 
also to explain the importance of the carefully designed eligibility criteria employed to  target 
specific vulnerable groups and the role of  complementary programmes like the Ghana Health 
Insurance Scheme and the Ghana School Feeding Programme (MESW, 2012).  
Thus, the expectation was that the role of chiefs and their elders ended with community 
sensitisation.  However, beyond community sensitisation, my observations as well as interviews 
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with DLICs and CLICs revealed that chiefs and their elders were actively engaged in the 
identification and selection of potential households for the LEAP programme although LMS did 
not formally include chiefs in the selection process.   
Chiefs were not included in my sampling frame because I was unaware that they had any 
exposure to the implementation of the LEAP programme in the way that other groups like DLICs 
and CLICs did. Besides, my study topic was somewhat a delicate one, and accessing chiefs for 
interviews would have been extremely difficult due to traditional norms of not ‘interrogating’ 
or questioning chiefs. Therefore, I did not interview any chiefs. However, I had the opportunity 
to observe community sensitisation events involving chiefs and opinion leaders that revealed a 
lot about their role and influence. My observations corroborated evidence that ‘chiefs and their 
elders wielded a lot of influence in the LEAP beneficiary household selection process’ (interview 
with CS1/ ISSER, 20th March 2018).  
The recognised role of chiefs in the sensitisation of LEAP activities in communities was informed 
by their leadership role in traditional Ghanaian society prior to Ghana’s independence from 
British colonial rule.  As I indicated in section 2.3.1 of chapter 2, chiefs were formally recognised 
by the British colonial administration as powerful rulers who could be utilised to administer the 
colonial government’s policies.  In contrast to formal institutions such as government ministries 
with designated ministers who have oversight responsibility for the administration of central 
government policies, the chieftaincy institution which forms part of informal institutions of 
governance in communities, headed by chiefs and their elders have no defined role or 
responsibilities within the reformed constitution. Instead, at the community level, chiefs had the 
major responsibility of ensuring the general well-being of community members and harmonious 
community living. In this informal community space, unwritten social norms of behaviour,  
values and practices rooted in culture were enforced in the various jurisdictions chiefs  presided 
over (Ahwoi, 2010; Asamoah, 2012). Chiefs primarily derived their authority from the socio-
cultural norms and values which they use to govern their local communities. Thus, the unwritten 
code of values and norms culturally embedded in traditional society are the instruments of 
power which allows chiefs to exercise authority similar to what is often is found with formal 
institutions.  The colonial government then, therefore utilised the authority of chiefs which they 
derive from  socio-cultural norms and values to administer the colonial government’s policies 
(Nkrumah, 2000).   
However, since Ghana gained its independence, chiefs have not exercised the kind of authority 
exercised under British colonial rule. Chiefs were banned from active politics (Government of 
154 
 
Ghana, 1992, p. 124) to allow them to concentrate on their community leadership role of 
promoting community development projects (Asamoah, 2012; Tieleman and Uitermark, 2019), 
although some have found alternative and subtle ways to participate in politics (Asamoah, 
2012). Nonetheless, it seems that the recognition by policy makers in Ghana of the authority of 
chiefs, both historically and in the post-independence era, led them to exploit chiefs’ authority 
by carving out a role for them in the sensitisation of the LEAP programme.  
The recognition by district level officials of chiefs’ historical authority allowed chiefs to extend 
their influence beyond community sensitisation to the selection process.  From the perspective 
of a district official in an expansion district, ‘chiefs with the help of opinion leaders nominated 
CFPs’ (interview with D6/ DLIC -MF, 14th February 2018). The evidence presented regarding the 
role of traditional authorities in the LEAP Operations Manual outlined in section 7.1 above 
suggests that they only guide, but do not nominate CFPs, Instead, the nomination of CFPs is the 
role of district level officials, primarily DLIC members. Furthermore, the LEAP Operations Manual 
clarifies, ‘the District Committee shall facilitate the formation of the Community Committees in 
each selected community by guiding participants to nominate and validate five (5) community 
members to constitute Community Committees’ (MESW, 2012, p. C12). 
In practice, however, informal conversations with DLICs in both pilot and expansion case study 
districts indicated that ‘DLICs partly shifted the responsibility of the formation of community 
committees onto traditional authorities since they were not very familiar with community 
members’ (D5/DSW- MF, 15th February 2018; D6/ DLIC -MF, 14th February 2018; CF2/ CC, 14th 
February 2018). It seems that the alteration in DLICs’ role provided opportunities for chiefs and 
elders to exert some influence on the beneficiary selection process. To deepen their authority, 
‘chiefs and their elders in LEAP communities are usually given up to a week to nominate persons 
to form community committees’ (interview with D10/ DLIC-AN, 24th February 2018). It appears 
therefore that it was during this one-week period, and not the half a day prescribed by LMS, that 
the formation of community committees came under some influence from chiefs. 
The unofficial role of chiefs, which was endorsed by social welfare directors in both pilot and 
case study districts, became a matter of concern as the nomination of CFPs by chiefs was biased 
in favour of specific groups. A district-level official in a pilot case study district revealed: ‘chiefs 
are biased when it comes to the nomination of CFPs. They normally choose political party foot 
soldiers or other loyal supporters of the ruling party’ (interview with D8/DSW-CC, 15th February 
2018). The choice of persons nominated by chiefs suggests that chiefs had once again become 
155 
 
involved in party politics despite the constitutional requirement that ‘chiefs were not to be 
actively involved in party politics’ (Government of Ghana, 1992, p. 153). 
As community leaders concerned about the welfare of households in their communities (Oduro, 
2010), chiefs felt they could utilise the support of specific groups, in this case political party foot 
soldiers who had a relationship with the ruling government, to support the administration of 
social services at the district level. Furthermore, as traditional authorities in Ghanaian 
communities who understood the clientelist nature of democratic politics and the role of 
political support required by ruling governments to survive, it seems that the nomination by 
chiefs of the ruling party’s foot soldiers to represent the LEAP community was also a strategy to 
strengthen the presence of the ruling government in LEAP communities in return for welfare 
support. 
While patronage contributed to the conduct of chiefs and elders, there is also the possibility that 
socio-cultural factors played a much more significant role in the conduct of chiefs and elders. As 
I observed a community sensitisation exercise in a pilot district, my attention was drawn to the 
respect accorded chiefs and their elders. The paramountcy and reverence associated with the 
chieftaincy institution in Ghana (Asamoah, 2012; Tieleman and Uitermark, 2019) required that, 
on entry into a community or village54, chiefs were greeted with gestures of respect including 
bowing and not shaking hands with them (Asamoah, 2012). Additionally, the purpose of the visit 
was not to be communicated directly to the chief but through the elders or opinion leaders, who 
were regarded as the chiefs’ council of advisors (Asamoah, 2012). The latter then relayed the 
information to the chiefs. This practice illuminated the significance not only of societal norms 
but also of Ghanaian values.  
In addition to the respect associated with their leadership, the trust (Lyon, 2006; Tieleman and 
Uitermark, 2019) that community residents and assembly members had in the judgement of 
chiefs and elders meant that their decisions to nominate whom they deemed appropriate as 
community committee members or to take the position of a community focal person was rarely 
questioned. Like MMDCEs, the judgement of community leadership was hardly challenged by 
community residents, other members of the local assembly, or the social welfare department, 
but in most cases respected. From this evidence, then, it can be inferred that socio-cultural 
 
54 A community or village was defined by district level actors as a settlement in a rural location 
housing a few tens to hundreds of inhabitants (D6/ DLIC -MF, 14th February 2018; D10/ DLIC-AN, 




values of trust and respect which were accorded traditional authorities played a big part in how 
they exerted influence in their communities. In addition, as chiefs were legally prohibited from 
participating in partisan politics, it can be inferred that socio-cultural values like respect and 
trust, from which they derived their authority, played a crucial role in the same way as patronage 
in their nomination of CFPs to select LEAP potential households at the district level.    
The fourth republic constitution of Ghana does not place chiefs in positions of power or accord 
them a degree of autonomy in decision making in the same way that it does MMDCEs. However, 
chiefs do have autonomy and make judgements in community-level matters and decisions, 
which can only be explained in terms of the authority they derive from socio-cultural norms and 
values deeply rooted in Ghanaian traditional customs.  
An understanding and appreciation of Ghanaian values by district-level officials and LMS was 
implied in the statement that ‘raising queries and challenging decisions of chiefs was rather 
difficult’ (interview with D1/DSW-AN, 23rd January 2018). It was difficult to question why specific 
groups were nominated and even more challenging to establish whether the conduct of chiefs 
in nominating political party sympathisers was a subtle attempt to participate in partisan politics 
and whether such decisions were influenced by chiefs abusing the trust and respect accorded 
them.  
Although the conduct of chiefs was regulated during the colonial era, they are not regulated in 
the same way today. During the colonial era, the British colonial administration implemented ‘a 
series of Native Jurisdiction Ordinances through the state council which placed limits on the 
power of traditional authorities’ (FES and ILGS, 2016, p. 2). For example, traditional authorities 
were not allowed to administer justice to the natives of the Gold Coast through indigenous 
tribunals unless such decisions were authorised by the colonial government (Asamoah, 2012). 
In modern day (post-colonial) traditional settings, the actions of chiefs are regulated by an 
independent body55 of traditional rulers in each administrative region of Ghana (Ahwoi, 2010; 
Government of Ghana, 1992). However, as there is a lack of clarity in Ghana’s fourth republican 
constitution about the limits of the chief’s power, it was difficult for LMS or the official regulatory 
body to regulate the actions of chiefs in the same way as the colonial authorities had been able 
to.     
 
55 Referred to as the Regional House of Chiefs. 
157 
 
The evidence presented so far reveals that chiefs in both pilot and expansion case study districts 
influenced the selection process beyond their recognised role, although it is difficult to establish 
whether this was the case in all LEAP communities throughout the country. Nonetheless, it is 
reasonable to argue that a combination of two factors, chiefs’ indirect involvement in politics 
and socio-cultural norms and values, seemed consistent in both pilot and expansion case study 
districts.  
7.3.2     Assembly members  
As I previously pointed out in section 2.3.6 of chapter 2 regarding actors in local government, 
assembly members are elected members of the local assembly who represent the views of 
citizens in particular constituencies at the assembly. They comprise both male and female 
representatives, although assembly members in all LEAP communities I visited were 
predominantly male.  However, for clarity, this thesis uses the term assembly members.  
It emerged from the interviews and observations I conducted that assembly members went 
beyond their official role of ‘assisting traditional authorities to sensitise communities about 
LEAP’ (MESW, 2012, p. C12), also selecting potential households for LEAP. The unofficial role of 
assembly members in the LEAP programme resulted from a failure of LMS to update and 
document their roles after LEAP’s five-year pilot implementation period. An assembly member 
in a pilot case study district recollected about his role:    
‘I recruited some retired schoolteachers and community nurses and asked them to select 
orphans in the primary schools where they previously worked, and a list of names was 
generated and given to the social welfare director. A year later, the social welfare director 
and I visited households with vulnerable old people, listed them and then used a 
questionnaire to do the selection of beneficiaries. Back then, everything was done by us, but 
now I guess it’s all changed’ (Interview with CF10/AS, 4th April 2018).   
The evidence points to the role of the assembly member in the final stages of the selection 
process, where a list of households was generated after potential households for the 
programme had been identified. This evidence dates to the era when LEAP was first piloted in 
selected households with HIV/AIDS as the single primary eligibility criteria. As was explained, 
assembly members, with the help of social welfare directors, identified potential households for 
the programme and were also involved in generating a final list of beneficiary households for 
LEAP. From the perspective of a district official in a pilot district, ‘Assembly men then, were the 
key persons used by the local government to support social welfare directors in the 
administration of the LEAP programme in selected communities’ (D4/DSW-AS, 2nd March 2018). 
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Prior to the establishment of community committees in 2013, assembly members took on the 
community targeting role of identifying and selecting households for the LEAP programme. This 
role was not only recognised by local government but endorsed by the department of social 
welfare whose key actors, social welfare directors, worked closely with Assembly members to 
deliver the government’s programmes to communities. As the official LEAP Operations Manual 
was not yet operational, ‘Assembly men’s role of identifying and selecting LEAP households was 
not documented’ (CF10/AS, 4th April 2018; D8/DSW-CC, 15th February 2018), but assembly 
members recognised and carried out these duties, nonetheless. Since community committees 
were established in the post-pilot phase of the LEAP programme, their role has been similar to 
the Assembly members’ – identifying potential households using the LEAP eligibility criteria.   
This was my understanding as I observed LEAP events and interviewed community officials in 
expansion case study districts. However, as I understood from district social welfare directors in 
pilot case study districts, assembly members’ role of identifying potential households for LEAP 
remained and, in addition, they facilitated workshops with community residents including 
traditional authorities. This made them immensely powerful actors in LEAP communities, as an 
interview participant confirmed: ‘As the LEAP programme expands, assembly members have 
become very powerful’ (interview with CS1/ ISSER, 20th March 2018).  
Having conducted studies on the LEAP programme including baseline and impact evaluation, the 
research participant had engaged with assembly members in selected LEAP communities and so 
was familiar with their authority and extent of influence. Assembly members possessed deep 
knowledge of the community including the welfare concerns of households. Additionally, 
‘Assemblymen were relied upon by MMDCEs to provide them with relevant information about 
the communities they represent’ (interview with CS1/ ISSER, 20th March 2018). 
Assembly members were thus regarded as invaluable actors in the LEAP community who could 
not be bypassed, as one explained:  
‘Assembly members are familiar with the poorest households in the communities and know 
what they are doing.  However, very often without monitoring, they do their own thing and 
include their relatives, and other people who can help them maintain their role. But they are 
our entry points into the community so we cannot bypass them, we only have to monitor 
their activities’ (interview with D5/DSW- MF, 12th February 2018).  
There was a sense of admission by the interview participants in the expansion case study 
districts that assembly members were indispensable in the LEAP selection process and that this 
awareness could result in an abuse of power. The assurance that ‘Assembly members knew what 
they were doing’ exemplified a sense of trust and respect for their judgement and presents a 
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possible explanation of their conduct. As elected officials who represented the views of political 
constituents, assembly members were regarded not only as statesmen but as elders in their 
communities.  As I discussed earlier  in section 7.2.2 about cultural values in Ghanaian society, 
trust in elders’ ability to deliver on tasks (Lyon, 2006) and habitual reverence for leaders’ 
decisions (Akuoko, 2008; Tieleman and Uitermark, 2019) often went hand in hand. In the context 
of LEAP’s implementation, community residents including traditional authorities had a lot of 
trust in the judgement of assembly members. Thus, the critical decision as to who qualified to 
be selected as potential beneficiaries was rarely questioned. Assembly members in LEAP 
communities therefore acted opportunistically to select households not based exclusively on 
the eligibility criteria but also on factors like family relations, knowing that their decisions would 
not be challenged.   
Social welfare directors were also aware that assembly members selected households based on 
political alliances, as explained by a director in a pilot case study district.  
‘I am aware that in addition to family networks, Assembly members sometimes select 
powerful actors, like party people for the LEAP programme and this can skew the selection 
towards a particular political party. However, as I sit in my office, I do not know the 
communities as much as those who live there’ (Interview with D8/DSW-CC, 15th February 
2018).  
As the social welfare director in the expansion case study district explained, the director in the 
pilot case study district seemed to be accepting of the conduct of assembly members in selecting 
political party sympathisers for LEAP.  The excuse often given to acceding some responsibility to 
assembly members in selecting beneficiaries was that they knew community members better 
than social welfare officials.  It can thus be argued that assembly members, particularly in pilot 
case study districts, went beyond their role of sensitising communities to LEAP. They selected 
potential households for LEAP based on friendly connections and political alliances in addition 
to the formal eligibility criteria.  
Two possible explanations account for the conduct of assembly members. It could be argued 
that assembly members were acting in the interest of their constituents, or that assembly 
members aimed to preserve their political interests and position. Both seem valid, though the 
latter seems a more convincing explanation given assembly members’ role in the District 
Assembly and their relationship with the head of the Assembly.  
Regarding the first explanation, members of the District Assembly are legally required by a local 
governance act (Act 936) to pay attention to the concerns and interests of their constituents 
(Ahwoi, 2010; FES and IGLS, 2012), so putting forward the names of households personally 
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known to them can be seen as an attempt to demonstrate their commitment to protecting their 
constituents’ interests, in this case by improving their wellbeing.  
Regarding the second explanation, given the competitive clientelist political context in which 
LEAP is implemented, which requires ruling governments to make use of clientelist groups to 
secure positions of power and influence (Khan, 2010), it was not unsurprising for assembly 
members as part of the political settlement to include political party sympathisers on the list of 
potential beneficiary households for LEAP. In Ghana, political party sympathisers and loyalists of 
the ruling government are a relatively powerful and influential  group who offer loyalty to the 
ruling government (Oduro, Mohammed and Ashon, 2014; Idun Arkhurst, 2013). The selection of 
such groups in pilot and expansion case study districts as potential LEAP beneficiaries was thus 
a strategy to reward their loyalty in exchange for political support. 
While actors like MMDCEs and assembly members were empowered by the LEAP beneficiary 
household selection because of their political connection to the ruling government, other actors 
felt disempowered and excluded from the LEAP beneficiary selection process. The attitudes of 
public servants regarding the selection process are analysed next. 
7.4   Public servants’ attitudes regarding the LEAP beneficiary selection process  
From the interview data, there was a strong sense that two groups of public servants – social 
welfare directors and DLIC members – both social workers by training, felt excluded from the 
selection process. Complaints of betrayal and exclusion from selection decisions were 
consistently expressed by them in both pilot and expansion case study districts.  
7.4.1    Betrayal and exclusion from selection processes  
According to an experienced social welfare director in an expansion district, feelings of betrayal 
were the result of changes in the mode of administering PMTs and the failure of LMS to 
communicate such changes to them.  She explained:  
‘Since this government came in, we social welfare directors and our staff have not been 
involved in the LEAP beneficiary selection process. Who knows and understands the problems 
of vulnerable groups better than social welfare officers? Someone cannot come from 
somewhere and administer questionnaires, enrol households, and tell us what to do. You see, 
bringing in persons other than professionals to administer proxy means tests raises questions 
about LEAP’s political role. The department feels betrayed’ (Interview with D5/ DSW-MF, 12th 
February 2018).  
The social welfare director associated her frustration with changes in the mode of administering 
PMTs and how data entry clerks administered questionnaires to potential households. As I noted 
earlier in section 7.1 about the purpose of data in relation to the selection process, data 
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collected from potential beneficiary households was fed into a LEAP server to generate a final 
list of beneficiary households for the programme (MESW, 2012). This practice of making 
targeting processes more effective, as I discussed in section 5.2 of chapter 5 regarding interests 
of transnational actors, was recommended by LEAP’s design team (see MMYE, 2007). 
Furthermore, the LEAP Operations Manual indicates that the ‘administration of proxy means 
tests was to be carried out by hired and trained data collectors’ after potential households were 
selected by CLICs (MESW, 2012, p. C16). Thus, the administration of PMTs and the collection of 
data by hired and trained data collectors was official. LMS was therefore implementing what 
had been documented for the LEAP programme but was not adequately communicating 
updated targeting decisions to key persons who had previously been entrusted with this role.  
Thus, for social welfare directors who were previously in control of the administration of PMTs 
with the assistance of assembly members, changes to this practice without any formal prior 
notice from LMS violated their trust in LMS. 
This feeling was not limited to the social welfare directors in expansion case study districts but 
was expressed by social welfare directors in other districts (not one of my case study districts).  
Narrating her experience with the data collection agency, the social welfare director noted: 
‘the administration of proxy means tests in this recent expansion was completely taken over 
by a non-governmental organisation. Officials from some charity came to administer the 
questionnaires to selected households. We social welfare directors had no hand in it. We only 
advised them to start from the hard- to- reach areas’ (Interview with D2/DSW-MK, 29th 
January 2018).  
Like with other social welfare directors, the feeling of exclusion directly expressed in this case 
was the result of a lack of control of tasks done previously by social welfare directors. Not only 
did social welfare directors feel left out, but their implementing staff, comprising DLICs, also 
complained that tasks they had previously carried out had been taken over by a private data 
collection agency. An example was monitoring the data collection exercise.  
A DLIC member in one of the expansion sites expressed strong sentiments about the take-over 
of their role by a data collection agency. 
‘Often we DLICs have been side-lined. We were never informed of the LMS’ decision to involve 
ESOKO56 , although in some cases we met some of their enumerators in our training 
workshops. We do not do any monitoring when the data collection exercise is being carried 
out. Right now, ESOKO comes from Accra to monitor the fieldworkers. They only inform us of 
 
56 The name of the data collection agency 
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their presence, and they report directly to the LMS’ (Interview with D10/ DLIC-AN, 24th 
February 2018). 
From the response above, complaints of DLIC members were the result of feelings of 
powerlessness created by LMS’s failure to inform them of changes to the monitoring of data 
collection. The LEAP Operations Manual indicates that ‘an enumerator and a supervisor were 
required to monitor the administration of proxy means tests’ (MESW, 2012, p. 17). Thus, 
monitoring the data collection process was clearly outlined. However, it was not clear from the 
manual whose responsibility it was to monitor the administration of the PMTs, although DLIC 
members had previously carried out that role. The use of ESOKO, a private data collection 
company recommended by UNICEF, exemplified mistrust in the ability of public servants to carry 
out effective implementation practices intended to achieve the objectives of the LEAP 
programme.   
Despite social welfare directors’ complaints about ESOKO taking over their role, it seems there 
was flexibility regarding the use of ESOKO’s data entry clerks. This flexibility was evident in how 
some social welfare directors mobilised social welfare staff to collect PMT data instead of using 
ESOKO’s data entry clerks. As explained by a district social welfare director:  
‘I went personally to talk to the Metropolitan Chief Executive to allow my team [myself and 
the LEAP Implementing staff in the social welfare department] to get involved in the selection 
of potential households and in the administration of PMTs tests for selected households and 
he agreed’ (Interview with D8/DSW-CC, 15th February 2018).  
In granting the social welfare director’s request, the Metropolitan Chief Executive demonstrated 
trust in the skills and competencies of the director and his implementing staff of social workers. 
It also demonstrated a belief in the value of their continued support and commitment for 
ensuring the LEAP programme was implemented as intended. These were qualities of public 
servants which the LMS should have recognised and promoted through their active involvement 
in the LEAP selection process. However, as public servants who were trained to ensure that the 
welfare concerns of vulnerable households in their districts were appropriately addressed 
(MESW, 2012), social welfare directors and DLIC members did not have a choice. They continued 
to work with LMS, often providing administrative and emotional support to vulnerable 
households in LEAP communities as their roles demanded.  
An interesting observation I made on LEAP payment days, however, indicated that beneficiaries 
found ways of reducing the effects of exclusion and powerlessness felt by DLICs. The provision 
of gifts (typically harvested farm produce) was aimed at compensating for feelings of 
powerlessness and was done in recognition and appreciation of their continued support. 
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Photos of examples of farm produce brought from beneficiary farms to payment grounds that I 
captured on my phone are pictured in figures 7.3 and 7.4 below.      
Figure 7.3   Plantain and cassava   
 
Figure 7.4   Sugar cane and pineapples 
 
Source: Author from fieldwork  
In explaining the purpose of bringing the farm produce, a beneficiary from an expansion case 
study district remarked:  
‘they work very hard. They come all the way from the office to support us and make sure we 
all get our grants. When we need anything at all, we go to the office and the DLICs are always 
there to help us …This is something small, very small to show gratitude and our appreciation 
to them’ (LB6/AN, 27th March 2018).  
This interview response corroborated the observation I had made earlier. A similar encounter in 
a pilot district was associated with an appreciation of continued support. In an informal 
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conversation about the gifts, the beneficiary commented about the effort of the social workers 
involved:   
‘The social welfare director and DLIC at the office have been very supportive. They are all ears 
to our problems. I went there once to get advice so I am hopeful that when I go again, they 
can advise. I need to know whether in the next round of expansion, my deceased sister’s child 
who I now take care of can be selected. I already have two orphans in my household.   
(LB7/AS, 4th April 2018).  
This response regarding the commitment of social welfare directors and DLICs is consistent with 
the views of beneficiaries in both pilot and expansion case study districts. For other public 
servants from LMS, like the monitoring and evaluation director who occasionally monitored 
payments, my observation was that such small gifts extended to them by beneficiaries were 
similarly in appreciation of the support they provided to them and to the LEAP programme. The 
offering of these gifts was not to be interpreted as a sign of bribery or other corrupt practice, 
but rather as a culturally appropriate way of recipients of government services showing 
appreciation for the delivery of services offered to them, even when they were aware that they 
were entitled to the services.  
7.5   Summary of findings and conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to examine how Ghana’s local government institutions and 
actors impacted the expansion of the LEAP programme. The LEAP beneficiary selection process 
was used as a lens to analyse LEAP’s expansion.  
The analysis revealed that Ghana’s local government system and socio-cultural values 
contributed significantly to how the beneficiary selection process was carried out. However, in 
line with the Adapted Political Settlements Framework (APSF), which emphasises the role of 
domestic politics in the uptake of social protection, patronage politics played a much more 
crucial role in shaping selection decisions in the expansion of the LEAP programme. Key 
institutional actors at the district and community levels involved relatively powerful groups at 
the community level in the LEAP beneficiary selection process to reward them for their loyalty 
and their continued support of the former’s positions and influence.   
Three sets of findings which centre on the influence of Ghana’s local government system, 
patronage politics and socio-cultural values contribute to the evidence.  
First, how Ghana’s local government system contributed to how LEAP’s beneficiary household 
selection was carried out. Despite a rigorous set of selection criteria developed by transnational 
and domestic technocrats to identify and select potential households for LEAP, the discretionary 
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power and autonomy of heads of local government were instrumental in creating opportunity 
for the process to be abused.   
Second, the analysis revealed that patronage politics was not restricted to the national level 
where political elites used the expansion of LEAP to secure loyalty from political constituents. It 
extended beyond this to the subnational levels of government, where the LEAP beneficiary 
selection process was used to draw political support from clientelist networks to further political 
interests. Since Ghana’s competitive clientelist settlement required that ruling elites draw on 
the support of clientelist groups for survival, LEAP presented an opportunity to use political party 
foot soldiers to strengthen the position and influence of powerful elites in local government. 
The actual selection of LEAP beneficiary households intended to allow a selection of extreme 
poor households under the administration of both the centre right party (NPP) and centre left 
party (NDC) irrespective of households’ political affiliation was thus supposed to be 
indiscriminatory. However, the selection mechanism played into the hands of powerful actors 
at the district and community levels who used the process to include non-poor households 
especially if these households were likely to increase their support base irrespective of their 
poverty status. Political considerations thus opened the door for inclusion of both non-poor and 
poor households from the ‘right’ political party. The overriding issue was leveraging the LEAP to 
increase the political base of a party and so although primarily LEAP targeted the poor who were 
likely to contribute to this political base, it also opened the door for some non-poor groups to 
be selected.   
Third, the analysis revealed that Ghanaian socio-cultural norms and values, of respect and trust 
deeply rooted in hierarchical authority structures, played a part in how beneficiary households 
were selected.  
An insight gained from the analysis is that, in a competitive democratic political context where 
social protection is subject to the influence of multiple actors with varying interests, the 
implementation process is likely to empower some groups but also to disempower others. In 
expanding Ghana’s LEAP programme, key local government actors whose interests were aligned 
with those of the national government were empowered. In contrast, public servants whose 
interests and priorities were to improve the wellbeing of vulnerable households felt 
disempowered and excluded from the selection process and thus from the programme’s 
expansion. Therefore, in expanding social protection in a highly competitive political context 
with multiple actors with differing interests, it is important for political elites not only to 
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recognise the public servants who actually deliver the programmes, but also to find ways to 
empower them, as they could alter the outcome of the selection process. 
The next chapter is focused on the overall conclusion of the thesis. It discusses the key findings 
presented in the three analytical chapters. This is considered in the context of the conceptual 
framework of the study and the extent to which the findings are supported by previous research 
on the politics of implementing social protection. The overall contribution of the thesis to the 



















Chapter 8    Conclusions, Implications and Contribution to Knowledge 
Chapter purpose and structure 
This study set out to investigate how the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) 
programme, a new approach to social protection in Ghana with cash transfers targeted at 
vulnerable groups with the aim of lifting them out of poverty, was introduced by transnational 
actors (TNAs), and the politics of its implementation.   
The study was also designed in response to the paucity of research on the politics of social 
protection implementation in the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) context. Much of the research 
literature on the politics of social protection in SSA particularly on social cash transfers, has 
focused on programme impact or the role of transnational actors in promoting and securing 
their adoption. Implementation of social protection, especially on how transnational and 
domestic politics impact implementation has not been sufficiently problematized.  To address 
this gap in the literature, the study was guided by an overarching research question:  
• How have transnational and domestic politics shaped the implementation of the LEAP 
programme in Ghana?  
To address this question, three sub-questions were formulated. First, how have the ideas and 
interests of transnational actors shaped the implementation of Ghana’s LEAP programme? 
Second, how does Ghana’s competitive democratic politics influence the expansion strategies 
of domestic elites? Third, how do local government institutions and actors impact the expansion 
of LEAP?  
A qualitative case study design was used to provide in-depth answers to these questions. Lavers 
and Hickey’s (2005) Adapted Political Settlements Framework (APSF) was adopted to analyse 
and understand how transnational and domestic politics influence the expansion of Ghana’s 
LEAP programme. Furthermore, the study adopted a multilevel analytical approach to 
understand what the experiences of key actors at different levels of governance reveal about 
the politics of expanding LEAP under two governments with different ideological leanings.     
The study revealed that in the implementation of the LEAP programme, the three TNAs – DFID, 
the WB and UNICEF – focused much of their attention on technical and financial matters, 
including building a LEAP Management Secretariat to ensure that efficient payment and 
targeting systems were in place. This focus was in line with how they conceived of effective ways 
of implementing an impactful social protection programme. The three TNAs did not focus much 
attention on the actual delivery of the programme, including the processes of selecting 
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beneficiaries and distributing benefits, areas where domestic politics had the potential to 
influence implementation and outcomes. In this study, domestic politics, characterised by 
competitive clientelism, was shown to exert great influence and control over the 
implementation process, particularly regarding the selection of beneficiaries at the local 
government level. I argue that the implementation of Ghana’s LEAP programme has been 
subjected to strong domestic political influence and that this was not anticipated by TNAs in how 
they designed the programme.   
The analyses behind these conclusions were presented in three empirical chapters. Chapter 5 
examined what role the programmatic ideas and organisational interests of the three TNAs 
involved in Ghana’s LEAP programme played in the design and implementation framework of 
the programme, while chapter 6 analysed how competitive clientelism affected LEAP’s 
expansion. Chapter 7 turned the attention to how the local government system and powerful 
actors within it influenced the LEAP beneficiary selection process.  
In this final chapter of the thesis, I summarise and review the key findings across the three 
analytical chapters and discuss how the insights produced contribute to understanding of the 
politics of implementing social protection in a developing country context. I argue that many of 
the efforts to implement social protection in SSA, have not paid much attention to how politics 
at the local government level influences the implementation process and produces unintended 
outcomes. In this chapter, I also reflect on the significance of the findings in relation to the social 
protection literature and highlight areas for future research on the politics of social protection 
programmes in the SSA context. 
This chapter unfolds as follows. Section 8.1 presents a discussion of the key findings from this 
study. Section 8.2 presents my reflections on what the findings mean for redesigning the 
implementation of LEAP. Section 8.3 summarises the main contributions of the study to 
scholarly knowledge, and section 8.4 concludes by outlining possible areas for future research.  
8.1    Key findings  
The study produced a number of key findings based on the questions used to frame the research 
and the conceptual framework used to interpret the findings.  From the study, four key findings 
emerged: 
1) TNAs, particularly DFID and the WB, employed hard forms of power to preserve their 
organisational interests in LEAP and how it was to be implemented. Both pushed the NDC 
government to introduce reforms in the targeting and payment systems and threatened to 
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pull out crucial funding if the government failed to comply.  This was discussed in section 
5.2.2 of chapter 5 and section 6.2 of chapter 6 and is discussed further in section 8.1.1. 
2) TNAs exerted a strong influence in designing LEAP and the framework for its 
implementation, but this influence took a back seat in the actual implementation process, 
where the dynamics of local political agendas and interests took centre stage and influenced 
critical implementation decisions and outcomes at the local level. Section 5.3 of chapter 5 
and sections 6.1 and 6.2 of chapter 6 present and discuss these findings. Section 8.1.2 
discusses the significance of these findings in relation to the literature on the politics of 
social protection. It also points out the limitations of the adopted conceptual framework in 
understanding the politics of implementing Ghana’s LEAP programme.   
3) Patronage politics, a defining feature of competitive clientelism, played a crucial role in 
determining how Ghana’s LEAP programme expanded. Patronage politics was used by 
Ghana’s two main political parties in the implementation process to secure electoral support 
and preserve their positions of influence. In particular, political elites in the NDC and NPP 
were able to reframe LEAP’s agenda to suit their political interests and adopt strategies 
intended to further them. I argue that patronage politics is an important tool used by 
governments in multi-party democracies in developing countries to implement social 
protection programmes to enhance their political survival.  These issues were discussed in 
sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 of chapter 6 and in sections 7.2 and 7.3 of chapter 7 and are 
elaborated further in section 8.1.3.  
4) The thesis also revealed how socio-cultural values and norms acted as vehicles through 
which community leaders, especially chiefs, exerted influence in the beneficiary selection 
process to expand the LEAP programme. Although, officially, chiefs had no role in the 
selection process, nevertheless, because of their position of authority in local communities 
and their role in  enforcing socio-cultural norms and values, they were able to influence the 
beneficiary selection process unchallenged. I argue that there is a knowledge gap regarding 
their influence, which should be acknowledged and factored into the design and 
implementation of social protection programmes in communities where the authority of 
chiefs and elders remains. This was discussed in Chapter 7.3 and is elaborated in section 
8.1.4. 
The subsection which follows discusses the key findings in the light of their significance for the 
APSF and in relation to the relevant literature on the politics of social protection.  
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8.1.1     The exertion of hard forms of power by the WB and DFID  
In section 5.2.2 of chapter 5, I discussed how the WB and DFID in Ghana pushed for a shift from 
manual to electronic targeting and payment systems and threatened to pull out their loan and 
grant respectively from the LEAP budget if these systems were not reformed.   
As I indicated in the analysis, they argued for this change on the basis that it was a tried and 
tested implementation practice, and that the use of technology would ensure the unbiased 
application of carefully designed eligibility criteria for selecting vulnerable households to benefit 
from LEAP. They also argued that switching from a manual to an electronic payment system 
would guarantee that the right amount of grant money would be delivered to selected 
households. These reforms indicated TNA interest in protecting their financial investments in 
LEAP and ensuring that the intended goal of reducing vulnerability and extreme poverty would 
be achieved. The threat of sanctions was perceived as a strategy to protect their interests and 
enforce their recommendations. They were able to use the threats to encourage the NDC 
government at the time to fulfil their side of the financial commitment to LEAP.   
In addition to chapter 5, the analysis in chapter 6 illuminated TNAs exertion of hard power. 
Section 6.2 of chapter 6 discussed how DFID threatened to withdraw budgetary support for LEAP 
if the government failed ‘to provide financial flows to LEAP in a timely and predictable manner’ 
(DFID Ghana, 2013, p. 5). Such demonstrations of hard power are often associated with the 
protection of financial investments and contrasts the use of ‘soft power’, often utilised when 
TNAs promote cash transfers.  Studies which discuss the use of soft power are those of Foli 
(2016) on the role of TNAs in promoting cash transfers in Ghana, Hickey and Bukenya  (2016) on 
the adoption of social pensions in Uganda, and Lavers (2016b) on commitment to social 
assistance  in Rwanda. These studies examine the use of persuasive strategies such as providing 
opportunities for local implementing partners to attend international conferences and lobbying 
government officials to put cash transfers on their poverty reduction policy agenda.  
As the findings of this study revealed, in reality, the WB and DFID did not follow through with 
their threats when governments were slow in fulfilling their obligations regarding LEAP. It 
appears that the threats were made to encourage compliance and accountability to TNAs. 
However, it was also evident that domestic politics can limit TNAs’ influence on the 
implementation process. TNAs’ hard power fails to extend to the actual implementation 
process, where domestic political elites’ interests become more prominent.     
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The exertion of hard power by TNAs is not specifically suggested in Lavers and Hickey’s (2015) 
APSF as a mechanism through which commitment to social protection expansion occurs. 
Instead, the framework indicates how soft power is used by TNAs to promote their ideas. The 
ability to use coercion and threaten sanctions reflects hierarchical power relations between 
TNAs and the governments they support in implementing social protection programmes. In the 
case of Ghana, it was used after domestic political elites had accepted TNA ideas to implement 
the LEAP programme.  As the analysis indicates, the threat of sanctions seemed to be intended 
to secure TNA investments and protect their ideas about effective ways of implementing cash 
transfer programmes.  
The revelation that the WB and DFID exerted hard power is consistent with previous research.  
For example, Hickey and Bukenya (2016) show how, in an effort to secure the financial 
commitment of Uganda’s political elites, DFID ‘threatened to pull out its funding unless the 
Ugandan government increased its financial contribution to 10 billion Ugandan Shillings to  
enable and accelerate a roll out of its social grants programme’ (p. 15). Following this threat, the 
Ugandan Government committed to the programme (in terms of increasing its financial 
spending) as it found itself in a rather difficult position in which to close a politically popular 
programme because elections were looming at that time (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016). 
On the other hand, the literature cites instances where soft power has been employed by TNAs 
in different situations to achieve different results. Although Hickey and Bukenya (2016) 
demonstrate that DFID exerted hard power, they also show that DFID simultaneously tried to 
‘build a credible evidence base and frame social cash transfers in ways that fit the elites’ general 
understanding that cash transfers were better than food subsidies’ (p. 15). Similarly, Hickey and 
Pruce (2016) note that Zambia’s political elites used lobbying opportunities with ministers over 
breakfast meetings to ensure that transnational ideas were put on the policy agenda at cabinet 
meetings. The Zambia case shows the importance of local elites championing the ideas of TNAs 
and supports the arguments of Hall (1989), Goldstein and Keohane (1993) and Béland (2005) 
that powerful actors in the ruling coalition are able to champion particular ideas of external 
policy actors in order to increase their chances of adoption. This was the experience of Ghana’s 
deputy minister of manpower and employment in adopting cash transfers to design the LEAP 
programme (Foli, 2016). My findings suggest that, on balance, TNAs’ threats to discontinue 
financial assistance to the LEAP programme produced more of an effect in terms of government 
financial support than any soft power approaches. Soft power was used to secure commitment 
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to the adoption of the programme and hard power was used to ensure compliance and protect 
TNA interests. 
This study shows that both hard and soft forms of power were used in different stages for 
different purposes. When it was the intention of TNAs to promote buy-in of an idea, then soft 
power was exerted, but when it came to the protection of TNAs’ financial interests, hard power 
was seen as more effective. In both cases, there was little room for domestic elites to introduce 
their own framings of social protection that built on knowledge of how extreme poverty could 
be addressed.  
8.1.2     The limits of TNA influence on the implementation of LEAP  
In section 5.3, I discussed the limits of TNA influence on the implementation of LEAP, highlighting 
how local political interests and priorities became more prominent in the implementation 
process.   
I discussed three factors linked to the ruling government’s political interests which limited the 
influence of TNAs on the implementation of LEAP. First, the ruling government’s commitment 
to fulfilling a political manifesto promise; second, an attempt to increase its number of 
supporters; and third, a delay in the passage of a social protection bill to delay commitment to 
LEAP. These three factors demonstrate how the political agendas and priorities of governments 
were prioritised and affected the progress of implementation.   
The APSF draws attention to how transnational factors including ideas of TNAs and of the 
underlying interests of domestic elites explain the way in which social protection expands. 
Lavers and Hickey’s (2015) framework does not explain the extent or limits of TNA influence. 
Instead, it stresses the role that TNA paradigmatic ideas,  policy ideas and financial support play 
in  persuading domestic elites to adopt social protection  (Lavers and Hickey, 2015). However, in 
the Ghanaian context, what this thesis shows is that TNA influence has limits, especially during 
the actual implementation process. The APSF does not give this much attention.     
The literature on the politics of cash transfer promotion and adoption discusses the limits of 
TNA influence, often through the lens of practical constraints or ideological commitments.  
Hickey and Bukenya (2016) show how attempts by TNAs to promote social pensions in Uganda 
were often resisted by bureaucrats, mainly because of concerns over the affordability and 
sustainability of the programme beyond its pilot phase.  Affordability and sustainability concerns 
thus limited the extent to which TNAs promoted social pensions in Uganda. In another case, 
Lavers (2016b) shows how dominant beliefs about inclusive socio-economic development, in 
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which workfare programmes were prioritised over cash grants, limited the ability of TNAs to 
promote exclusive cash transfers as a solution to socio-economic inequality and extreme 
poverty in Rwanda. 
As the Ugandan and Rwandan cases of cash transfer adoption show, there are limits to TNA 
influence regardless of the type of political settlement. However, an examination of TNA 
influences in competitive political settlements, exemplified by the LEAP case, and in dominant 
party settlements, illustrated by the Ugandan and Rwandan cases, suggests that there are 
differences in the factors that limit TNA influence. In the case of Ghana’s competitive clientelist 
political settlement, it appears that the threat of losing power in the short term energises 
political elites and their governments to prioritise political interests and agendas to enhance 
their chances of retaining power. These political interests and agendas of elites limit TNAs’ 
intended implementation plans for LEAP. In the case of dominant party type political 
settlements (e.g., Uganda and Rwanda), where elites are likely to commit to the dominant ideas 
and development strategies of ruling coalitions, the literature suggests that the dominant ideas 
of ruling coalitions can also limit the extent to which TNAs can influence domestic elites to buy 
into cash transfer programme ideas.  
8.1.3     Political patronage and the expansion of LEAP 
In sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 of chapter 6, I presented evidence to suggest that the NDC’s and 
NPP’s social protection ministers used LEAP to secure electoral support in three ways. First, 
NDC’s elites targeted some of the poorest households in the country and used the LEAP cash 
transfer as a financial incentive to buy allegiance and electoral support. Second, as elections 
loomed, the NDC’s social protection minister visited some of the most vulnerable groups in the 
most deprived communities and promised to enrol them on the LEAP programme if her 
government was voted back into power. The LEAP cash transfer programme was thus used as 
bait for electoral support. Third, the NPP’s social protection minister attempted to poach its 
opponents’ supporters by buying their products and promising to find markets for their 
products. These actions exemplify how LEAP was used by the NPP and NDC to buy allegiance 
and add to their voter support numbers.  
In addition to using LEAP to secure electoral support, I showed in sections 7.2 and 7.3 of chapter 
7 that elites at the local government level used the LEAP beneficiary selection process to buy 
the allegiance of party sympathisers and to strengthen their relationship with them. These 
actions were aimed at retaining their positions of influence and power.  
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In section 7.2, I discussed how patronage politics at the district level was evident in two ways. 
First, Chief Executives of pilot districts used party foot soldiers instead of trained data collectors 
to select potential households for LEAP. This action was intended to recognise their networks of 
political support and increase their client lists. Second, the nomination of assembly members by 
traditional authorities in both pilot and expansion districts was an attempt to strengthen the 
ruling government’s support networks, as explained in section 7.3.  
Patronage politics is not emphasised by the APSF as an important factor contributing to the 
uptake of social protection although it explains elite behaviour, particularly how elite behaviour 
in policy circles affects the outcome of policy. However, as this thesis finds, patronage politics 
plays a key role in the expansion and outcome of social protection and must be recognised in 
frameworks for analysing social protection, particularly in the context of low-income countries 
in SSA. This thesis shows that domestic elites can re-purpose the ideas of TNAs to further their 
own interests.   
Patronage politics is prevalent in democratising polities in Africa. This has resulted in a 
democratic constitutional order which runs alongside patron-client networks (Bratton and Van 
de Walle, 1994). Patronage politics thus occurs in many African governments irrespective of the 
level of democratic governance or political competition (Kopecký, 2011). In dominant party 
political settlements where there is little competition for power as well as in political settlement 
contexts where competition for power is intense (Levy, 2014), patronage politics features in 
equal measure. Thus, when Hickey (2008) refers to particular forms of domestic politics, 
patronage politics is also implied. In the case of Ghana, which has a competitive political 
settlement, this thesis shows that patronage politics is still a strong factor, influencing the 
direction of LEAP’s expansion. 
The literature on the politics of promoting cash transfers suggests that in different political 
settlement contexts, the adoption of cash transfers is used to expand patronage reach. In their 
study on extending the senior citizens pensions programme in Uganda, Angucia and Katusiimeh 
(2017) found that despite his unwavering focus on boosting economic growth, President 
Museveni bought into DFID’s cash transfer ideas because he saw a vote-winning potential in 
expanding social pensions in a way that investments in infrastructural development did not 
offer. The extension of social pensions to Yumbe, a district which was officially a stronghold of 
his political opponent (Angucia and Katusiimeh, 2017; Hickey and Bukenya, 2016) showed the 
lengths to which the President went to increase his client lists and consolidate his support base.  
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In addition to dominant party type settlement contexts like Uganda’s, patronage politics also 
features in competitive political contexts like that of Kenya. Wanyama and Nyambedha’s (2017) 
study on the pilot implementation of Kenya’s cash transfer programme for orphaned and 
vulnerable children (OVC) showed that the Kenyan government’s expenditure on its cash 
transfer programme increased not because poverty and vulnerability statistics pointed in that 
direction, but because of ‘the political support that politicians gain by an increase in number of 
beneficiaries on cash transfer programmes within their constituencies’ (p. 40). In this case, 
patronage politics not only increased the budget for a cash transfer programme but also 
undermined the programme’s use of eligibility criteria in targeting OVC.  
These two instances show how political interests are linked to political support to the extent 
that ruling elites are driven to go beyond or even ignore the eligibility criteria for selection. 
Examination of Ghana’s LEAP also revealed that political elites expanded to stronghold regions 
and to communities where local elites were likely to consolidate their power base. Thus, in 
competitive political settlement contexts, the Ghana case suggests that political elites use social 
protection programmes as part of their arsenal to enhance their electoral chances and political 
fortunes. 
8.1.4    The role of traditional authorities in the expansion of LEAP  
In chapter 7, I presented evidence to argue that in expanding LEAP in both pilot and expansion 
case study districts, traditional authorities played influential roles in the beneficiary selection 
process.  They were able to do so because of the positions of power they occupied in their 
communities which were accorded to them by socio-cultural values and norms. In the case of 
LEAP’s implementation, socio-cultural values and norms and the power they conferred on local 
leaders were as important as patronage politics in influencing the beneficiary selection process.   
In Ghanaian traditional communities, those at the apex of the authority structure are accorded 
tremendous respect and trust (Akuoko, 2008; Asamoah, 2012; Lyon, 2006). Chiefs and opinion 
leaders occupy the highest level (Asamoah, 2012), and they informally used their positions to 
influence the beneficiary selection process. In the nomination of community officials to 
coordinate LEAP activities with district officials for example, community residents in both pilot 
and expansion districts tended to go with the decisions of traditional authorities. When it came 
to decisions on which households qualified to be listed as potential beneficiaries, traditional 
authorities used their positions of power and authority to add family members and others 
known personally to them. The role that chiefs and elders played in this process was clearly seen 
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as undermining the authority of the LEAP Management Secretariat (LMS) which had issued clear 
directives on how community committees were to be selected and how they were to operate.   
In both pilot and expansion districts, the ways in which chiefs and elders of communities 
exercised their authority had their origins in systems of indirect rule prior to Ghanaian  
independence (Asamoah, 2012; Akuoko, 2008; Botchwey, 2017). Traditional authorities at that 
time were very powerful actors in the local governance system (Akuoko, 2008; Asamoah, 2012). 
However, constitutional reforms after independence weakened their authority as traditional 
rulers were not accorded formal roles in governance in the way that they had experienced under 
colonial rule (Ahwoi, 2010). Nevertheless, this has not diminished their influence in local 
governance, at least in the communities where they are recognised as authority figures.   
The role and influence of traditional authorities which operate outside of formal governance 
systems such as chieftaincy, forms part of informal institutions57 as I indicate earlier in section 
7.3 of this chapter. Informal institutions are recognised by Lavers and Hickey’s APSF as 
comprising political settlements.  
As this study revealed, traditional authorities had as much influence as political elites at the 
national level of governance. This suggests that attention must be given to key actors in informal 
institutions in framing social protection implementation processes. Their roles should be clearly 
reflected in the APSF. In particular, the administration of socio-cultural values and norms from 
which chiefs and elders derive authority are important characteristics of informal institutions 
that should be included in the APSF to explain how expansion of social protection schemes 
occurs in the wider SSA context.   
The literature on the politics of social protection, which focuses primarily on cash transfer 
promotion and adoption, does not explain clearly how socio-cultural values of respect and trust 
accorded traditional rulers can influence implementation of cash transfer programmes. 
Although  Ellis, Devereux and White (2009) present case studies of cash transfer programmes in 
Africa and highlight the role of chiefs play in community targeting, they do not explain the 
sources of their influence. A case in point, similar to what this thesis found, is the pilot 
implementation of Kenya’s cash transfer programme OVCs. According to Wanyama and 
Nyambedha (2017), chiefs were consulted to nominate community committees and, similar to 
 
57 Informal institutions are socially shared rules, usually unwritten, communicated and enforced outside 




the Ghana case, chiefs often nominated family members and close relations as community 
officials for the OVC programme, thus exerting some influence in the beneficiary selection 
process. However, their actions are not explained in terms of socio-cultural values and how 
these enable them to exercise this influence. My study takes account of local politics, particularly 
focusing on who has authority at the local level. Most studies on the pilot implementation of 
cash transfer programmes focus on the participation of political elites at national and local 
government levels (see Hickey and Bukenya, 2016; Lavers, 2016) rather than on the influential 
role of traditional authorities who sit outside formal institutions. My thesis explains why, 
although traditional authorities sit outside formal systems of governance, they can still exert 
considerable influence on social protection programmes, in particular on beneficiary selection. 
TNAs do acknowledge the challenges of selection at the community level and ensuring that 
beneficiaries are selected in accordance with official eligibility criteria, but their solutions, such 
as the establishment of household databases, are technocratic and seek to avoid or sometimes 
weaken the influence of local politics on the selection process.   
The key findings discussed have illuminated the influence of TNAs, domestic political elites, and 
traditional authorities in the implementation and expansion of LEAP. The analysis has indicated 
a combined effect of influences which shows that LEAP has not always been implemented in line 
with the programme’s goal but rather in ways that serve the interests of elites at local levels of 
governance. So what do these findings imply for LEAP and its implementation? The next section 
explores the implications of these findings for redesigning the implementation of LEAP. 
8.2    Key findings and implications for redesigning the implementation of LEAP.  
Based on findings from this study, three issues that need to be considered to improve the 
implementation of LEAP are strengthening institutional capacity at the district level, recognising 
the role of patronage politics in implementation and recognising informal institutional actors in 
the administration of LEAP. 
8.2.1    Strengthening institutional capacity at district level.  
As this study shows, TNAs understand ‘working with the grain logic’ in competitive clientelist 
settlements, but also recognise the limits to their influence. The WB, DFID and UNICEF focused 
their support on strengthening delivery systems at the national level in ways that secured 
growth in overall beneficiary household numbers. They did not invest in strengthening capacity 
at the district level to ensure efficient delivery of services directly to beneficiary households. 
This has led to a situation where TNA support and influence has been limited to the national 
level. My thesis suggests that strengthening institutional and human capacity at the district level 
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is crucial if TNA investment at the national level is to produce the intended implementation 
outcomes. This could be done in two ways.  
The first way would be to train social welfare directors and district implementing committees to 
strengthen their capacity regarding critical aspects such as the selection of beneficiary 
households, which is often sub-contracted to private data collection agencies.  This would equip 
them with relevant skills to enhance their roles as social workers. Currently, they operate on the 
periphery of the selection process although they have significant knowledge of the communities 
and of the poverty characteristics of households in these communities.  
The second way would be to strengthen district level management systems and accountability 
structures. My study suggests that investing in the case management structures of various social 
welfare departments staffed with relevant personnel would be useful, and that this would 
reduce dependence on the case management system of LMS, which is often controlled by TNAs.   
8.2.2    Recognising the role of patronage politics. 
The demands of competitive clientelism require that political elites adopt survival strategies 
including expanding their patronage reach to districts and communities to retain power. The 
result was that the LEAP programme did not always reach those most in need and was open to 
abuse to serve political interests. My study confirms that politics does play a significant role in 
shaping the scale up of programmes. It also plays a role in shaping their focus – for example, the 
lack of emphasis on graduation, and decisions regarding which districts would benefit from the 
distribution of grants.  
Social protection programme implementation, in how it is designed, its monitoring, evaluation 
and learning activities need to take the local politics of implementation into account if it is to 
have a realistic chance of succeeding on its own terms. However, realistically, politics is part of 
the terms on which social protection is distributed.  
According to the evidence from this study, shifting much of the control of LEAP away from 
political elites to non-partisan agencies or government departments is unlikely to reduce the 
influence of the former. This is because as this thesis has shown, elites of the ruling government 
work primarily through directors at the LMS to protect their interests. At the local government 
level where powerful government actors and their clientelist networks can shape beneficiary 
selection of LEAP in ways that protects their interests, directors at LMS do not have much control 
over the actions of institutional actors. As I have suggested previously in section 8.2.1, 
strengthening district level system is important, but so is recognising that political influences 
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(and thus the influence of patronage politics) on LEAP’s implementation are critical factors in 
shaping implementation on the ground. In redesigning the implementation of LEAP, the socio- 
political context must also be recognised and factored in as much as technocratic inputs.   
8.2.3    Recognising informal institutional actors in the administration of LEAP.  
Since the era of democratic governance in Ghana, TNAs participating in policy formulation and 
implementation with governments in low-income countries have focused on engaging with 
formal institutions like political parties (Grebe, 2017; Jedwab and Osei, 2012; Kpessa and Béland, 
2012), but have engaged much less with informal institutions as these are associated with 
corrupt or collusive practices. However, as Khan (2010) points out, informal institutions are 
crucial to understanding governance and development outcomes in low-income countries. In 
the case of Ghana, it is clear that informal institutional actors, comprising chiefs and elders  are 
influential.   
In a competitive democratic environment where the previous role of the chief as head of the 
traditional council has been taken over by a government ministry and their  powers further 
weakened by a series of acts and ordinances (Government of Ghana, 1992), chiefs and their 
elders dwell on the paramountcy of their institution and use the respect and the level of 
confidence that people have in their judgement to exercise authority in decision-making. Lyon 
(2006) notes that in many African societies, the absence of formal rules and mechanisms to 
guide the decisions and behaviour of those in authority results in the tendency for individuals to 
resort to socio-cultural values like trust and compliance with authority. In this regard, 
policymakers must be more alert to how socio-cultural values can merge with the plans of 
governments to improve welfare among the poorest households. The current exclusion of 
traditional authorities from the implementation process and/or TNAs’ blindness to their role in 
implementing LEAP prevents the emergence of stronger mechanisms for selection, monitoring 
and accountability systems for LEAP.   
8.3    Contributions of this study to knowledge 
The findings from this study makes three significant contributions to the political settlements 
literature.  First an empirical contribution. This study first documents the impacts of 
transnational and domestic politics in shaping the implementation of social protection in a 
competitive political settlement. Second, the study makes a theoretical contribution to the APSF, 
by adding socio-cultural values and norms as crucial source of influence on the expansion of 
social protection. Finally, the study makes a methodological contribution by testing a multi-level 
data collection and data analytical strategy in the implementation of social protection.  
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8.3.1    Empirical contribution: Implementation of cash transfers in competitive 
clientelist political settlements 
 In chapters I and 3, I discussed how the politics of social protection literature has focused 
primarily on the politics of promoting and adopting cash transfers in dominant party type 
political settlements in Eastern and Southern Africa. This scholarly work includes Hickey and 
Bukenya’s (2016) study on expanding social pensions in Uganda, Lavers’ (2016) study on elite 
commitment to Rwanda’s social cash transfer programme and Ulriksen’s (2016) study on the 
political drivers of Tanzania’s social safety net programme. These studies pay limited attention 
to the intricacies of implementation, particularly beyond the pilot phase. In the most recent 
study on the uptake of the LEAP programme in Ghana, for example, Abdulai (2020) discusses 
issues around the adoption of cash transfers and geographical targeting of households for the 
LEAP programme, thus making an important contribution to understanding the roles of 
transnational politics and competitive clientelism, issues that featured in my thesis. However, 
my study goes an important step forward by exploring the roles of local actors in the 
implementation of cash transfers.   
My study also shows that TNA influence on the implementation of cash transfers is limited in 
the context of competitive clientelist settlements. The literature presents studies that show the 
influence of TNAs in the adoption, promotion and pilot implementation of cash transfers and 
other social assistance programmes in the SSA context. These studies do not adequately indicate 
the limits or extent of TNA influence. My research suggests that a much more complex picture 
of influence prevails, which explains some of the limits of TNA influence.    
While Hickey and Bukenya (2016) and Lavers (2016) show that in dominant party systems, TNAs 
exert significant influence on cash transfer adoption, they do not clearly indicate what the limits 
of TNA influence are. Similarly, Foli’s (2016) study on the influence of TNAs in the adoption of 
LEAP shows various mechanisms of influence, including persuasion. Foli’s study, however, says 
little on the limits of UNICEF, DFID and the World Bank’s influence, whereas my study shows 
that in environments where political elites are constantly vulnerable to loss of power, they are 
able to prioritise strategies and policies to buy loyalty from their clients in the hope of enhancing 
their chances of re-election. This effectively puts political elites in a stronger position to 
influence where programmes extend to and who is targeted. This is a space where TNAs have 
little or no influence. In effect, TNA influence is limited by the interests and priorities of domestic 
political elites in a competitive political settlement context.   
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8.3.2    Theoretical contribution –Extending the APSF to include socio-cultural values 
and norms  
My study also extends the APSF by adding a crucial source of influence- that of socio-cultural 
values and norms to the political settlement context.  
In this study, the APSF has been useful in explaining the sources and forms of influence in the 
expansion of the LEAP as a social protection programme.  It has been instrumental in identifying 
the role and influence of transnational actors through first, their ideas from which they derive 
their knowledge power and second through their funding from which they derive their financial 
power and are able to exert influence on how social protection expands. The APSF also 
recognises the role that formal and informal institutions play in social protection expansion and 
has been instrumental in identifying through this study, how the chieftaincy institution which 
operates outside formal institutions, influence the expansion of social protection programmes.  
While analysis in this study revealed that chiefs or traditional authorities exerted significant 
influence on the expansion of LEAP, their source of influence which is the socio-cultural values 
and norms is not clearly indicated in the APSF. Nonetheless, my study showed that socio-cultural 
norms and values of respect and trust in the chieftaincy institution, played a significant role in 
the selection processes of the LEAP as much as the influence from political patronage. Thus, 
understanding how chiefs and elders derived their power was crucial in understanding how 
beneficiary selection occurred under programme implementation. I therefore argue that in low 
-income countries in SSA because chiefs and elders derive their authority from deep rooted 
values and norms accorded them in local society, socio-cultural values and norms are significant 
in political settlements and that they influence social protection expansion in much the same 
way that patronage politics does. Consequently, in figure 8.1 below  I add this important source 
of authority to the political settlements context.  Figure 8.1 thus becomes an extended version 









Figure 8.1 An extended version of the APSF  
 
Source: Author 
My study also shows that formal institutions do not hold full or ultimate power in how social 
protection programmes are implemented, and that informal institutions like the chieftaincy 
institution can exert what can be described as ‘concealed power’ and impact programme 
implementation processes and outcomes. This additional dimension offers a broader lens 
through which the complexities of power and politics in the expansion of social protection in 
low -income country contexts can be explored and understood. 
8.3.3     Methodological contribution – A multilevel analytical strategy  
Studies examining cases of cash transfer promotion and adoption analyse data mostly at the 
national level of governance where the adoption of policy occurs (see Hickey and Bukenya, 2016; 
Lavers, 2016). Similarly, in studies examining cases of pilot implementation of cash transfers, 
such as Kenya’s OVC programme (Wanyama and Nyambedha, 2017) and Uganda’s SAGE 
programme (Angucia and Katusiimeh, 2017), analysis is focused exclusively at a single level, in 
this case, the community level. These studies do not conduct analysis at multiple levels of 
governance. My study contributes to this analytical gap.   
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By adopting a multilevel analytical approach in which I examine implementation issues at more 
than a single level of governance, I have been able to enrich our understanding of the 
intersections of power and politics within and across the different levels of governance in the 
implementation of Ghana’s LEAP programme. This approach also illuminates the limits of TNA 
influence and shows that informal institutional actors and powerful elites at the local 
government level find ways to exert influence that are aimed at serving their interests. This 
approach also enables me to capture the influence of traditional authorities, from which I argue 
for implementation that recognises their roles and offers training to align them with the goal of 
the LEAP programme.  
8.4   Possible areas for further research  
This study was based on field data collected from selected districts in the Eastern and Central 
regions of Ghana. Districts which implemented LEAP in other administrative regions of Ghana 
including the Volta and Ashanti regions, which are political stronghold regions of the NDC and 
NPP respectively, were not included in this study. Yet, as analysis of data from the selected 
districts revealed, political elites expanded LEAP to districts in their political stronghold regions 
before considering districts in other regions including swing-voter regions. Thus, a study which 
compares how LEAP is implemented in stronghold region districts with how LEAP is 
implemented in swing voter areas would add to an understanding of the politics of 
implementing social protection programmes.   
This study has focused on Ghana’s LEAP cash transfer programme as a case of the politics of 
implementing social protection. Comparative research in other competitive political settings in 
SSA would help to understand the extent to which the case in Ghana is theoretically and 
empirically similar to cases in other contexts.  It would also be interesting to explore the politics 
of social protection in a competitive clientelist political settlement under a federal system of 
government in Africa, like in Nigeria. Research examining how patronage politics plays out in 
different states and the roles of informal institutions in the implementation of social protection 
in different states would deepen and enrich our understanding of how and where political and 
cultural influences are most likely to affect implementation. 
Finally, further research could explore the continued influence of TNAs on the implementation 
of social protection, once programmes designed by TNAs have transitioned to full government 
ownership and funding. In such instances, it would be worth finding out whether governments’ 
interests and priorities change or stay the same without the involvement of TNAs. What forms 
of coercive, hard, and soft power operate under government control of social protection 
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programmes? Do laws which commit governments to sustaining social protection programmes 
result in different implementation outcomes? By the time my field research was ending, the 
government’s financial contribution to the LEAP programme had increased substantially and a 
bill had yet to be passed to commit any government to continue spending on social protection 
programmes like LEAP. A study which explores similar issues to this thesis in this changed 
context should deepen our understanding of how transnational and domestic politics continue 
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Appendix 2: Permission to conduct research in Ghana 
17th October 2017 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
RESEARCH ON THE LIVELIHOOD EMPOWERMENT AGAINST POVERTY PROGRAMME IN GHANA 
The bearer of this letter, Mrs Betty Akyeampong is a doctoral student at the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex in Brighton, UK. She is researching the 
implementation and expansion of the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) 
programme under the NPP and NDC governments from 2008 to 2016. 
As part of her research, she would be interviewing key officials and current managers of the 
LEAP at the national and district levels, including grant disbursing officers and some beneficiaries 
in selected districts in the Accra, Eastern and Central regions.   She is also interested in 
interviewing any key personnel in your organisation with knowledge and experience of the LEAP 
for their perspectives on its goals and views about its implementation.   
Betty has been granted ethical approval by the Social Sciences and Arts Research Ethics 
Committee of the University of Sussex which guarantees that her research meets the highest 
standards of research practice in the Social Sciences.  She has agreed to take all the necessary 
measures to ensure that the views of her research participants are kept strictly confidential to 
protect their identity and that of the institutions they represent.   
She will be collecting data from November 2017 to June 2018. 




















Appendix 4 : Interview guides  
Interviews were custom designed to each participant’s role but based on the following basic 
interview guides. 
FOR TRANSNATIONAL LEAP ADVISORS 
KEY THEMES QUESTIONS  RESEARCH 
QUESTION 
ADDRESSED  
LEAP design  
▪ How long have you been involved in the LEAP 
programme? 
▪ How has your organisation participated in the 
LEAP programme? 
▪ What in your view motivated your organisation 
to support the LEAP programme? 
▪ How has this motivation changed over time? 
▪ What does your organisation require Ghana 
government to do in return for the support? 
▪ What is your organisation’s approach to 
poverty reduction?  
▪ How does your organisation’s approach align 
with the Ghana government’s approach to 
poverty reduction?  
▪ What do you consider to be the objective of 
government’s social programmes which 
complement the cash grant component of 
LEAP? 
▪ What do you consider to be the key objective of 
the cash grant component of LEAP? 
▪ From your perspective, how have the objectives 
of LEAP changed over time?  
▪ How has your organisation’s experiences of 
cash transfer programmes in other countries 
informed the design of the LEAP programme? 
 1 
Implementation   
▪ Can you share your experiences of 
implementing the LEAP programme with me? 
what stood out for you and why? 
▪ How has your organisation supported Ghana 
government departments and agencies which 
have linkages with LEAP? 
▪ As a LEAP advisor, how have you collaborated 
with other transnational LEAP advisors to 
support the LEAP programme? 
▪ In your view, are there any threats/ challenges 
to implementation?  
▪ What are your views on the eligibility criteria 
for selecting beneficiary households? 




▪ What is your view on the graduation plan of the 
LEAP programme?   
▪ What do you consider to be key changes in 
implementation of the LEAP in the last 18 
months? 
▪ What do you think accounts for the changes? 
▪ Do you think the LEAP has been implemented 
as intended? Why? 
▪ What is your own assessment of LEAP’s 
performance under the two governments?  
▪ What do you consider to be the key challenges 
to the implementation of LEAP? 
 
FOR LEAP OFFICIALS AT NATIONAL LEVEL:  MINISTRY OF GENDER, CHILDREN AND SOCIAL 
PROTECTION AND MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC PLANNING, LEAP MANAGEMENT 
SECRETARIAT, LEAP SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS  
THEMES 
 






▪ How have the development partners 
(transnational actors) been involved in the LEAP 
programme?  
▪ How do you think their participation in LEAP has 
changed in the last 18 months? 
▪ Which development partners in your view has 
been most influential in the implementation of 
LEAP?  Why and how have they been 
particularly influential? 
▪ What in your view do development partners 
require the government of Ghana to do to 
continue supporting the LEAP programme? 
▪ Did the Government of Ghana request for 
development partner support or did 
development partners instead see the need to 
and willingly provide support? Why? 
1 
LEAP design   
 
 
▪ What do you consider to be the key objectives 
of the LEAP cash grant? 
▪ What do you consider to be the objective of the 
cash grants component of the LEAP 
programme? 
▪ What do you consider to be the objective of the 
complementary services component of the 
LEAP programme? 
▪ Do you think the intended objective of the 
programme has changed over time? If so or if 








▪ What are your views on expansions carried out 
by governments in succession?  
▪ How differently in your view is the current 
government (NPP)’s approach to 
implementation from the previous NDC 
government? 
▪ What is your own assessment of the LEAP’s 
implementation under the administration of 




▪ How did the previous NDC government involve 
district actors in the LEAP? 
▪ How has the NPP government involved district 
level actors in the implementation of LEAP? 
▪ What are your views on the LEAP eligibility 
criteria? 
▪ What are your views on the switch from manual 
to electronic payments? 
▪ What are your views on the graduation plan of 
the programme? 
▪ What are your views on the productive 
inclusion activities for beneficiary households of 
the LEAP programme? 
▪ What do you consider to be main changes in the 
implementation of LEAP in the past 18 months? 
▪ What do you consider to be the threats to 
effective implementation of the LEAP 
programme? 
▪ Do you think there is a future for the LEAP 
programme? Why? 
▪ What do you consider to be the key challenges 
to the implementation of the LEAP programme? 
2 and 3 
 
FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTORS: DISTRICT SOCIAL WELFARE OFFICERS, DISTRICT LEAP 
IMPLEMENTING COMMITTEES, DISTRICT LEAP SUPPORT WORKERS   
THEMES  QUESTIONS  RESEARCH 
QUESTION 
ANSWERED 






▪ How long have you been in this role? 
▪ What are your views on expansions 
carried out by the two main 
governments in succession?  
▪ How differently in your view is the 
current government (NPP)’s approach to 
implementation different from the 
previous NDC government? 





▪ Which actors do you consider key in the 
implementation of LEAP in your district? 
▪ How have the key actors affected 
implementation processes at the district 
level?  
▪ What is your assessment of NDC and NPP 
governments in the implementation of 
the LEAP programme? 
Role in 
implementation   
▪ Can you share your experience of LEAP’s 
implementation with me?   
▪ What are the highlights of your 
experiences and why do you consider 
them important or significant? 
▪ How have you been involved in the 
implementation of the LEAP 
programme?   
▪ Has your role changed in the last 18 
months?  If it has, how and if not why? 
▪ How was your district selected for the 
LEAP programme? 
▪ How have you involved CLICs/CFPs in 
LEAP’s implementation in your district? 
▪ What role did you play in the most 
recent expansion in your district? 
▪ What do you consider to be the key 
challenges in implementing the LEAP in 
your district? 
▪ How has the LEAP Management 




COMMUNITY COMMITTEES: COMMUNITY FOCAL PERSONS AND COMMUNITY LEAP 
IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEES  
THEMES  QUESTIONS  RESEARCH 
QUESTION 
ADDRESSED 






▪ How long have you been a CFP/ 
CLIC? 
▪ Can you share your experience as 
CFP/ CLIC with me? 
▪ How were you nominated as CFP/ 
CLIC for your community?  
▪ Take me through the process of 
selecting potential beneficiary 












▪ How have you used the LEAP 
programme’s eligibility criteria? 
▪ How have you been involved in the 
most recent LEAP expansion? 
▪ What do you consider to be the key 
challenges to your role as CFP/ 
CLIC?  
▪ How has the district supported your 
role as CLIC/CFP?  








 Participation in LEAP  
▪ How long have you been on the 
LEAP programme?  
▪ How were you selected onto this 
programme? 
▪ Which vulnerable groups do you 
support in your households?  
▪ How do you think the LEAP 
programme has changed since you 
became a beneficiary?  
▪ What do you think accounts for the 
changes?  
▪ What are your views on the 
Government supporting you with 
bi-monthly grants? 
▪ Which other government 
programmes do you benefit from?  
▪ What are your views on the 












Appendix 5:   Interviewee reference codes  
Transnational Actors/ Development Partners  
Interviewee 
Code 
Designation Location of interview Date of 
interview 
DP 1/DFAd LEAP Programme Advisor, DFID  Adukrom, taxi rank pub 
Skype interview 





DP 2/ UNAd 
 









World Bank Office, 
Accra. 
21/03/2018 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning  
MF 1 Director of Budget  Skype interview 10/09/2019 
MF2 LEAP Budget Officer  Skype interview  11/09/2019 
Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection (MoGCSP) & LEAP Management Secretariat  
Interviewee 
Code  
Designation Location of interview Date of 
interview 
 
M1/ DPME Director, Policy Planning, Monitoring 
and Evaluation (PPME) 
Former Director of Social Protection 
PPME Director’s Office 16/01/2018 
26/02/2018 
04/04/2018 
M2/ChD Chief Director, Ministry of Gender, 
Children and Social Protection 
Chief director’s office  18/01/2018 











LEAP Deputy Director’s 
office 
 
LS2/LND LEAP National Director LEAP Management 
Secretariat, Car Park 
07/02/2018 
LS3 /DCM Director, Case Management and 
Operations 
 
LEAP Secretariat foyer 
 
07/02/2018 
LS4/HP Head of Payment LEAP Secretariat foyer 22/02/2018 
LS5 /HME Head of Monitoring and Evaluation  LEAP Secretariat foyer 05/03/2018 
LS6 / FS Finance Specialist  LEAP Secretariat, 
general office 
13/03/2018 
LEAP Support Institutions 
Interviewee 
Code 
Designation Location of interview Date of 
interview 
SI1/ GPs Head of Business Development -
Delivery Channels, Ghana 
Interbank Payment and 
Settlement Systems (GhIPSS) 
Business Development Assistant, 
GhIPSS 
Meeting room, GHIPSS 20/03/2018 
SI2 /GSOP National Co-ordinator, Ghana 




SI3/GHR WB Social Protection Programme 
Consultant, Ghana National 





Civil Society groups 
Interviewee 
Code 
Designation Location of interview Date of 
interview 
CS1/ ISSER Senior Research Fellow /Head 
Statistics & Survey Division, 
Institute of Statistics, Social and 
Economics Research (ISSER), 
University of Ghana, Legon 
Research fellow, Institute of 
Statistics, Social and Economics 
Research (ISSER), University of 
Ghana, Legon 
Meeting room, ISSER  20/03/2018 
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CS2 /IMANI Development and Economics 
Policy Analyst/ Senior Research 
fellow  
Skype interview  05/04/2018 
17/04/2018 
District Social Welfare Officers / Directors & District LEAP Implementing Committee members  
Interviewee  
Code 
Designation Location of interview Date of 
interview 
D1/DSW-AN District Social Welfare Officer, 
Akuapem North District  
General Office, 







D2/DSW-MK District Social Welfare Officer, 
Lower Manya Krobo district  
Office of the District 
Social Welfare Officer 
 
29/01/2018 
D3/DS-AN District LEAP Support Officer, 
Akuapem North District 
Akuapem North District 
, Staff Cafeteria 
29/01/2018 
D4/DSW-AS District Social Welfare Director, 
Akuapem South District  
 




D5/DSW- MF District Social Welfare Officer, 
Mfantseman District/ Former 
Director of Social Welfare, Cape 
Coast Metropolitan Assembly 





D6/ DLIC -MF District LEAP Implementing 
Committee member, Mfantseman 
Municipal  
Conference room, 





D7/ DS -MF  District LEAP Support worker 
Mfantseman Municipal  
 
Conference room, 






D8/DSW-CC Director of Social Welfare, Cape 
Coast Metropolitan Assembly/ 
Former Social Welfare Officer, 
Gomoa West District 
Office of Director 15/02/2018 
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D9/ DS- CC District LEAP Support Worker, Cape 
Coast Metropolitan Assembly 
Foyer, Department of 







District LEAP Implementing 
Committee member  
General Office, 







District LEAP Implementing 
Committee member, Akuapem 
South District  
Planning Office, 
Akuapem South District 
, Aburi 
09/03/2018 
D12/DS-AS District LEAP Support Officer, 
Akuapem South District  
General Office, 
Department of Social 
Welfare and 
Community 




Community LEAP Implementing Committee members/ Community Focal Persons 
CF1/ CC Community focal person, Brabeze, 
Cape Coast District 
Office of the District 
Director of Social 
Welfare 
15/02/2018 
CF2/ CC Community focal person, Efutu 
Koforidua,  Cape Coast District  
Office of the District 
Director of Social 
Welfare 
15/02/2018 
CF3/ CC Community focal person, Ekon, Cape 
Coast District 
Office of the District 
Director of Social 
Welfare 
15/02/2018 
CF4/AN Community focal person, Osubeto 
Akuapem North District 
Assembly Hall, Roman 




Community Focal person, Sokonye 
Akuapem North, District  
Church Hall, Church of 
Pentecost, Obolokofi 
26/03/2018 
CF6/AN Community Focal person, 
Aboagyena, Akuapem North District 
Church Hall, Assemblies 
of God, Nkwantanang 
26/03/2018 
CF7/AN Community focal person, Nsutah 




CF8/AN Community focal person, Lakpa 






CF9/AS  Community Focal Person, 




CF10/AS  Community Focal Person, Pokrom , 
Akuapem South District  






Designation  Location of Interview Date of 
interview 
LB1/AN Caregiver of disabled child  Assembly Hall, Roman 
Catholic school, Adawso 
26/03/2018 
LB2/AN  Extreme poor household with 
vulnerable children  
Church of Pentecost, 
Aboabo , Akuapem 
North District 
26/03/2018 
LB3/AN Extreme poor farmer , 65+ Church Hall, Church of 
Pentecost, Obolokofi 
26/03/2018 
LB4/AN  Caregiver of disabled woman Church Hall, Asefaw 
Pentecost Church 
27/03/2018 
LB5/AN  Caregiver of vulnerable children Church Hall, Asefaw 
Pentecost Church 
27/03/2018 
LB6/AN  Extreme poor farmer, 65+ Church Hall, Asefaw 
Pentecost Church 
27/03/2018 
LB7/AS Caregiver of one disabled child and 




LB8/AS Caregiver of four orphaned children  Pokrom Pentecost 
Church Hall 
04/04/2018 










Appendix 6:  Socio-economic profile of case study districts  
Akuapem North Municipal  
Akuapem North Municipality is one of the nine municipalities in the Eastern Region of Ghana. It 
is located at the southern end of the Eastern Region and it is about 58 km from the nation’s 
capital city, Accra. Its capital is Akropong. It shares boundaries to the northeast with Yilo-Krobo 
Municipality, to the southeast with Shai Osudoku District and to the southwest with Akwapim 
South District. According to the most recent population and housing census of 2010, the 
Akuapem North Municipality has a population of 166,700 (Ghana Statistical Services, 2014a). 
The municipality is currently headed by a Municipal Chief Executive appointed by the New 
Patriotic Party (NPP) government. Employees of the social welfare department in the 
municipality, including the social welfare director and implementing staff of the LEAP 
programme, however, are not political appointees but civil servants of the local government 
ministry. Most residents of the municipality speak Akuapem Twi, one of the major varieties of 
the Akan58 language in Ghana. 
The local economy of the Akuapem North Municipality comprises agricultural, manufacturing 
and services sectors, with agriculture employing about 60 percent of the population in small 
scale crop and livestock production, while manufacturing employs 16 percent of the population 
in activities such as stone quarrying, among others. Although the exact contribution of the 
service sector to the local economy of the municipality is not known, services remains a private, 
informal type sector which features banking, dressmaking and hairdressing and employs 
predominantly women (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2016). 
Although rainfall and temperature distribution in the municipality enhances the cultivation of 
some food crops, the erratic nature of rainfall and the topography of the region, which features 
one main hill range that allows only for subsistence agriculture, adversely affects the scale of 
food production and makes farmers particularly vulnerable to poor income and food insecurity. 
In addition to the climate, the low human capital development in the municipality, exacerbated 
by poorly equipped secondary schools and low secondary school59 enrolment rates, results in 
very few labour market opportunities for the youth and makes them increasingly vulnerable to 
 
58 Akan is the language of the Akan ethnic group of Ghana. Akan comprises three main mutually intelligible 
dialects: Fante, Asante Twi and Akuapem Twi. Fante is spoken in the Central Region and Akuapem Twi in 
the Eastern Region of Ghana. 
59 Secondary school age in Ghana is generally from 13 to 18 years old. 
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income poverty (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2016). According to the most 
recent statistics, 18.9 percent of all 13- to 15-year-olds60 attended junior high school, while 8.5 
percent of 16 to 19 year olds61 attend senior high school in the last five years (Ghana Statistical 
Service , 2014a). Disability is also a challenge in the municipality. Out of the three percent of the 
population who have various forms of disability including sight and speech disability, a third have 
never attended school and nearly 60 percent are not economically active. As a result, the youth 
(16-25) age group, followed by subsistence farmers and then the disabled, remain the most 
vulnerable groups in the municipality, living in households that earn a very low average of 4.00 
Ghanaian Cedis62 per month (Eastern Regional Co-ordinating Council, 2016), the equivalent of 
$0.23 per day.  
Although the incidence of poverty in the municipality worsened from 12.6 percent in 2006 to 
19.6 percent in 2016, (GSS, 2016) the Akuapem North Municipality was not selected for LEAP 
until much later in 2016, towards the end of the second term of the NDC government. LEAP 
communities including Nsuta Aprede, Kyekyeku and Akyeremateng are primarily farming 
communities with about 70 percent of households in these three communities comprising male 
farmers who engage in the cultivation of small-scale food staples such as plantain and cassava, 
and women who engage in petty trading including the sale of water, agricultural produce and 
second-hand clothing. In addition to the LEAP programme, there are government-managed 
social intervention programmes that address vulnerability and poverty in the municipality like 
the Ghana School Feeding Programme (GSFP), launched in 2009 in the municipality to promote 
school attendance and improve food security. Although it has since expanded from an initial 11 
to 30 kindergartens and primary schools in the municipality, it has not yet reached the LEAP 
communities in the Akuapem North Municipality. Similarly, the Ghana Youth Employment and 
Entrepreneurial Development Agency Programme (GYEEDA), launched by the NDC government 
in 2012 to train and provide employable skills to the youth to enable them to take up 
employment in the police, prison and health care management sectors, has not yet benefited 





60 Equivalent to secondary school in the United Kingdom. 
61 Equivalent to post-16 or sixth form college level in the United Kingdom. 
62 The equivalent of 0.70 USD as of 14/04/2020. 
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Akuapem South District 
Akuapem South District was carved from Nsawam Adoagyiri Municipality to form one of the new 
districts and municipalities created in the year 2012 by the NDC government. It is located in the 
south eastern part of the Eastern Region of Ghana, bordered to the west by Nsawam Adoagyiri 
Municipality, to the southeast by Kpone Katamanso Municipality, and to northeast by Akuapem 
North Municipality. In contrast to Akuapem North Municipality, the population of the district is 
smaller, with a total of 134,000 inhabitants according to the latest population and housing 
census of 2010 (Ghana Statistical Services , 2014b). The district is currently headed by a District 
Chief Executive appointed by the NPP government. Like Akuapem North Municipality, the 
Akuapem Twi language is the commonest mode of communication in this district. 
Food crop subsistence farmers comprise the most vulnerable group, whereas orphans and the 
disabled constitute the second most vulnerable group in the district. The agricultural sector in 
Akuapem South District contributes the most, 37 percent, to employment in the local economy, 
followed by the trade sector, which contributes 28 percent, and industry, which contributes 15 
percent (Akuapem South District, MTDP, MLGRD, 2013). As small- and medium-scale farmers 
engage mostly in pineapple and pawpaw cultivation, there is very little land left for the 
cultivation of staple food crops. In effect, households that cultivate small food crops are mostly 
deprived in the lean season and are much more vulnerable to income poverty than are small- 
and medium-scale pineapple farmers.  
The district is located on the main Accra-Kumasi highway, which facilitates the export of 
pineapples from the region and provides pineapple farmers a regular source of income . 
However, subsistence farmers in villages such as Kwamekrom and Pepawoeni who cultivate 
mainly vegetables like tomatoes and garden eggs face a major hurdle. Environmental 
degradation including sheet and rill erosion makes inter-village travel very difficult.  As such, 
these farmers are forced to market their produce in nearby villages where they get hardly any 
price for their produce. In addition to poor road networks negatively affecting access to markets 
for subsistence farmers, road accidents happen to be the number one cause of death in the 
district. In effect, most households cater for one or two orphans, including those with disabilities 
caused by road accidents, according to reports by social welfare officials in the district. Like 
Akuapem North Municipality, Akuapem South District also struggles with school enrolment. 
Available data indicates low skills development, with 13.8 percent of the total school-aged 
population (aged 3-19) having never attended school and only 40 percent of the school-aged 
population attending school in the district in 2016 (Ghana Statistical Services, 2014b).  
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Although available data suggests that the incidence of extreme poverty in the district was 16.5 
percent in 2016, lower than the average for the Eastern Region of 22 percent in the same year, 
communities in Akuapem South District were targeted for the LEAP programme much earlier by 
the NDC government, in 2009, compared to Akuapem North district with a slightly higher 
poverty incidence rate, which was targeted only recently. This is because Akuapem South District 
was part of the Nsawam Adoagyiri Municipality of the Eastern Region then, where LEAP was first 
launched in 2009. However, in 2012, when the NDC government created new districts, the 
Akuapem South District was carved out from the bigger Nsawam Adoagyiri Municipality, with 
LEAP benefitting 14 of its communities. The Akuapem South district has since remained a stand-
alone district with its district capital office in Aburi where a District Social Welfare Director has 
since 2014 managed the LEAP programme. In 2017, as part of the NPP’s LEAP expansion 
programme, eleven more communities including households in Yaw Duodo, Pokrom, Oboadaka 
and Pepawoenyi were targeted for the programme, with households in farming communities 
such as Oboadaka and Pepawoenyi containing the highest number of LEAP beneficiary 
households. 
Cape Coast Metropolitan  
Cape Coast Metropolitan is in the Central Region of Ghana. It covers an area of 122 square 
kilometres, with Cape Coast serving as its administrative capital. It is bounded on the south by 
the Gulf of Guinea, on the west by Komenda Edina Eguafo Abrem Municipal, and on the east by 
Abura Asebu Kwamankese District. The population of Cape Coast Metropolitan stands at 
190,180 according to the 2010 population and housing census. The official spoken language is 
Fante, one of the variants of the Akan language in Ghana. The current administrative head is a 
Metropolitan Chief Executive appointed by the NPP government. However, the staff of the 
community development and social welfare department in the Metropolitan assembly are not 
politically appointed, but civil servants.  
Like Akuapem North Municipal and Akuapem South District, agriculture is the main economic 
activity, employing about 65 percent of the population. Crop cultivation is predominantly carried 
out in the northern area, with small- and medium-scale farmers engaged in the production of 
seasonal staples such as maize and sweet potatoes as well as cash crops such as cashew nuts. 
On the other hand, fishing is the main economic activity for southerners living along the coast.  
A major challenge for both categories of workers (farmers and fishermen), which also makes 
households vulnerable to poverty, is seasonality. The seasonal nature of farming and fishing, 
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together with coastal habitat degradation, results in low levels of household income for the 
majority of the working poor. While a handful of medium-scale farmers are able to diversify and 
invest in non-farm income-generating activities such as palm nut processing and soap 
production, the majority of small-scale food crop farmers in the northern area cannot afford to 
invest in small enterprises. They also cannot afford to rent farmland to scale up food production. 
The resulting income poverty affects all categories of workers but particularly impacts fishing 
communities, where there are no income-generating opportunities besides petty trading of 
ginger, sachets of drinking water and smoked fish. Seasonality affects not only farmers and 
fisherman in the poorest communities, but children as well. Newspaper reports indicated that 
in 2010, a year after LEAP was launched by the NDC government in Cape Coast Metropolitan, 
children as young 12 years old from fishing communities like Ekon were forced to go into 
prostitution and had been selling sex for as little as GHC 1 (an equivalent of $0.17) to 
complement household income. Other vulnerable categories are children and adults with 
multiple disabilities such as cerebral palsy and deafness as well as the elderly with no family 
income support for whom LEAP grants are the only lifeline.  
The Cape Coast Metropolitan area was first piloted for the LEAP programme by the NDC 
government. Thirty communities comprising households with vulnerable children, vulnerable 
farmers and fisherman and groups with disabilities were targeted. In 2017, although the 
incidence of poverty in the Cape Coast Metropolitan area had decreased significantly from 22 
percent in 2009 to 2.6 percent in 2016 (Coloumbe, 2015), some communities had still not 
escaped extreme poverty, hence 30 more communities including households from farming 
communities like Brabeze and Efutu Koforidua have since benefited from the NPP’s LEAP 
expansion programme.  
In addition to the LEAP programme which supplements household income, the Ghana School 
Feeding Programme which began in the area in 2008 to address hunger and increase primary 
school enrolment continues to expand, benefitting 34 schools in 2018 compared to an initial 14 
schools (Ghanadistricts.com). 
Mfantseman Municipality 
Mfantseman Municipality is one of five administrative districts which were elevated to 
municipality status in January 2008 in the Central Region. Located along the Atlantic coastline of 
the Central Region of Ghana and covering a total of 612 square kilometres, the municipality 
shares boundaries with Gomoa West District to the east, Ekumfi District to the west, Ajumaku-
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Enyan-Essiam District to the north and the Gulf of Guinea to the south. As of 2010, the 
population of Mfantseman Municipality was 211,916. Like Cape Coast Metropolitan, Fante is the 
main language in the municipality. It is headed by a Municipal Chief Executive appointed by the 
NPP government. 
Fishing is the main economic activity of the municipality, employing about 51 percent of the 
total population, followed by farming, which employs about 30 percent, and commerce, which 
employs 19 percent. Besides the availability of lagoons and rivers which promote fishing in 
towns such as Anomabo and Egyaa, the interaction between the favourable climate, soil and 
rivers promotes farming, especially in the inland areas of Akobima and Dominase, among others. 
Crops cultivated include cocoa and palm on small scale, as well as fruits like pineapples. 
However, like the southern part of Cape Coast Metropolitan, seasonality is a major cause of 
poverty in Mfantseman Municipality. The seasonal nature of farming and fishing results in 
underemployment for most able-bodied subsistence farmers and fishermen. In addition to 
farmers and fishermen, children are vulnerable to child labour and income poverty. This is 
because the extent of deprivation in some of the poorest households, together with the income-
generating opportunities in the central business district of the capital, pulls children out of 
school to look for seasonal work and earn some income. Often, school dropouts are seen 
engaging in fishing-related work like sorting and cleaning the catch, carrying loads and selling 
fish to supplement household income.  
Although the incidence of poverty in Mfantseman Municipality is 29.8 percent (Ghana Statistical 
Services, 2014) – a relatively high poverty incidence compared to the three other case study 
districts – like in Akuapem North Municipality, the LEAP programme was only launched in 
Mfantseman Municipality in 2016, just before the NDC left office. Households in communities 
which benefit from the LEAP programme are located in deprived settlements like Akraman and 
Hinni, which are remote from the municipality’s offices in Saltpond, the capital. Households in 
these communities are mostly those with adults with no productive capacity or income support 
from family and those with out-of-school children who are at risk of child labour.  
 
 
